Russian leadership has had a long history of lying to its people over the past century, more so than most other regimes. Its deceit has manifested in a variety of ways, the most egregious of which in recent times has been Vladimir Putin’s euphemistic “special military operation” (SMO). In actuality, it was a full-scale invasion of the second-largest nation by territory in Europe with the intent of overthrowing its government and installing a pro-Russian regime thereby returning it to the status of a dependent republic. An estimated 190,000 troops were gathered over the course of four months on Ukraine’s border on the pretense of a military drill similar to what was enacted less than a year previously. In January 2022, Russia’s Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov proclaimed Russia did not want war with Ukraine and yet without any trigger in the interim, it happened.
The entire charade was preceded by the publication in July 2021 of a 5,000-word historically inaccurate essay by Putin entitled, “On the Historical Unity of Russians and Ukrainians” the undertone of which forecasted Putin’s sinister imperialist intentions to force Ukraine under Russia’s dominion. As one of a number of tortured justifications for the invasion, Putin resurrected the Soviet myth of the threat of NATO encroachment upon Russia’s border, conflating it with Ukraine’s desire to assimilate within NATO. Ironically, just as it was with other East European nations fearful of a future Russian hegemony and seeking the security of a defensively minded institution, Ukraine simply wanted the same. Just as ironically, the war Putin started, now in its fifth year, has brought him and Russia gazing into Friedrich Nietzsche’s abyss*, only to find the abyss now gazing back and asking, “Were you the real monster?”
It was only in September 2022, when Putin’s expected three-day-long SMO was unexpectedly failing miserably, that the Russian public became aware of the scale of the operation as that of an actual war with the announcement of a partial mobilization. The revelation prompted a mass exodus of young Russians in the hundreds of thousands to destinations beyond the country’s borders to avoid conscription. The response caused the Kremlin to further enhance censorship of the internet and exert increasingly stricter control of the media fearing that such a highly visible rejection of government coercion would lead to further anarchy and a delegitimization of its authority. The move provided space to propagate a well-curated campaign of lies designed to justify its SMO, attract military recruitment, and subdue open criticism of the government.
A pervasive propaganda machine within Russia came to control the narrative regarding the conduct of its military in Ukraine and prevent any dissemination of the widespread atrocities that had been committed there. Only days after Russia’s invasion, Putin issued a law criminalizing free speech pertaining to any information that contradicted the Kremlin’s version of events in Ukraine. Countless trolls were hired to undertake the same campaign of disinformation worldwide and to participate in activities to undermine foreign government administrations and electoral processes, and to curry favorable public sentiment toward Russia.
The current reality in Russia, however, has begun to exert control over the public narrative in a way that cannot be effectively overcome by the usual Kremlin methods of deception. The consequences of the war are becoming physically manifest on the doorsteps of Russian communities in a way that cannot be denied. Putin has purposefully changed his own narrative regarding the war to that of continued, albeit slow, advancement while attempting to still convince people of ultimate victory. He has set aside the fantasy of the quick victory scenario of earlier times. A threshold, however, is now being reached wherein state repression can no longer subdue public outrage over the overwhelming loss of life coupled with the physical incapacities of ever greater numbers of returning veterans.
Social welfare resources and an underfunded healthcare system are ill-prepared to manage the situation as much-needed funding continues to be prioritized toward the war effort. Inflationary pressures remain amid a stagnant economy as the Central Bank seeks measures to overcome mounting sanctions by the European Union (EU). The Kremlin has moved to further tighten control over personal finances by giving tax authorities access to bank data that would identify undeclared income and by giving police the authority to freeze bank accounts without court orders. Food and energy prices are escalating and violent crime has risen markedly while the mental health of Russian society continues to worsen. The means to manage the mental health crisis at the community level have long been neglected.
An especially visible manifestation of the grief that has been brought upon Russia by the war was in full display following drone attacks on one of its largest oil refineries in the southern port city of Tuapse, a major oil-export terminal on the northeast shore of the Black Sea. The facility accounts for roughly 12% of Russia’s fuel export capacity or 240,000 barrels per day. A drone attack on another major refinery in Novorossiysk to the northwest earlier in the month had already forced diversion of some of its oil to Tuapse. Three successive attacks on April 16, 20 and 28 then caused massive damage to the Tuapse refinery infrastructure, protracted fires, a 4.3-square-mile-oil spillage into the Tuapse River and out to the sea, and considerable deposition of soot upon the community of approximately 60,000. Air analysis showed concentrations of benzene and xylene well above safety levels, forcing evacuation of the immediate premises. In all, 24 storage tanks, making up 52% of total capacity were destroyed and four others damaged. The destruction along with additional damage to at least one major processing unit resulted in a complete shutdown of operations. The port itself was also extensively affected by the attack after recent completion of repairs from previous attacks in November 2025. A fourth attack on May 1 set further oil tanks ablaze and delayed repairs of the entire complex indefinitely.
Since the time that the Trump administration relieved Russia of U.S. sanctions tied to its oil export industry, Ukraine intensified its campaign of attacks upon the production and transport assets related to the industry. During the month of April, about a dozen refineries were struck in addition to other assets such as pumping stations and port facilities, bringing the total to 21 sites. The readily demonstrable results of these strikes has exposed in dramatic fashion the consequences of the war to a wide swath of European Russia.
Repeated intense drone and missile assaults in March and April targeted Russia’s two critical Baltic oil terminals, Ust-Luga and Primorsk, which handle 40% of the country’s seaborne oil export. The attacks forced operations in both facilities to be halted disrupting as much as 30% of Russia’s refined oil exports. Massive protracted fires at Ust-Luga and Primorsk, situated 102 miles and 83 miles, respectively, from Russia’s second-largest city, St. Petersburg, brought a veil of soot that covered large parts of the city’s skyline, exposing many there with respiratory disorders to the familiar toxic pollutants of burning crude oil.
Another strike in the same period, targeted a critical oil pumping station and several oil storage tanks near the city of Perm, situated in the Ural Mountains more than 900 miles from Ukraine. An immense dark cloud of soot rose above the city of over a million people. It was a reminder that large distances separating them from a launch sites in Ukraine were not a guarantee of security. Similar strikes in 2026 on oil refineries in Ukhta near the Arctic Circle at about 1,180 miles and near Orsk, east of the Ural Mountains in Asiatic Russia, at about 1,250 miles, also occurred using long-distance drones.
It is when such reality intrudes too much upon a regime’s version of events and contradicts the narrative required to support government policy that the mechanics of repression are adjusted to meet the challenge. The Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation (FSB) is the internal security agency entrusted with domestic security and surveillance whose director answers only to Russia’s president. The FSB’s activities have intensified considerably with the public’s rising discontent over what it now sees and smells of a very protracted war that has finally come home. The cost of living, the loss of internet services, and mounting societal issues that remain unattended are being seen in the context of a war that has induced profound war fatigue. By early 2025, more than 80% of Russians between 18 and 30 years of age opposed any further mobilization and 68% of the general population already wanted the war ended as its top priority. The latter sentiment has risen to 73% by early 2026.
In late 2025, the FSB increased its crackdown upon critics of the regime with Soviet-era-style surveillance and intimidation, political arrests and high-profile court engagements. It has centralized its authority by taking control of local policing and the judiciary. These and other actions targeting the regular public have drawn the attention of some within the FSB and among regional authorities who question the extremity of the measures fearing that they may, in fact, trigger an even greater public reaction against government authority. This may indeed be the catalyst that triggers a violent reaction by newer generations of Russians unfamiliar with the sort of actions of past repressive Soviet regimes to which the older generations were accustomed and remained passive toward.
An April 2026 survey by the Russian Public Opinion Research Center reported a 4.5% decline in Vladimir Putin’s approval rating since late March, worsening his score by more than 12% compared to that of late December 2025. The recent drop followed the regime’s blockage of internet services, replacing them with its own state-controlled app in an attempt to subdue the public narrative regarding the war as the casualties mount and the economy continues its plummet. The government has gone on to ban the import of foreign satellite communications equipment to further manage the inflow of outside news. The denial of services has not been well-received by the Russian public particularly in light of the number of slow-downs and blackouts that followed, not to mention public concern over the perceived unwarranted government surveillance that would come about.
Public discontent, however, had become evident well before the regime’s attack on social media was launched. A notable decline in Putin’s popularity has occurred over the recent seven-week period to the lowest it has been since prior to the war, but Russia’s economy was already under considerable strain from the previous year. In January-February 2026 the country’s GDP had dropped 1.8% compared with the same period in 2025. Inflation has remained a problem, attributable to an elevated value-added tax (VAT), excise taxes, supply chain disruptions, service costs and labor shortages. It is not expected to fall below 5.7% in the current year as food and fuel prices continue to increase.
The blame for this grief falls directly upon Putin’s decision to wage war on Ukraine. In the beginning, Ukraine responded with a successful counteroffensive followed by a predominantly defensive posture that has seriously degraded Russia’s armed forces. Global assistance coming in the form of munitions, intelligence and humanitarian aid has been vital in providing the support for the tremendous human effort needed to confront the Russian assault. As the years progressed, Ukraine created its own arms industry, highlighted by production of aerial and naval drones that enhanced its military’s destructive capabilities.
The war effort has extended beyond the frontline to systematically targeting those aspects of Russian industry that support Russia’s war as well as frontline munitions and surveillance systems. The strategy has included not only the destruction of munitions factories and related supportive industries but, since 2025, an intensification of attacks upon Russia’s fossil fuel industry that has notably contributed to the economic distress of the country. Russia’s Spring offensive has failed with continued high casualties, destruction of surveillance assets both in occupied areas of Ukraine as well as within Russia, and the loss of previously occupied territory. The recent provision by the EU of $105.5 billion for Ukraine will assure sufficient funding in the present circumstances to inflict further injury upon Russia’s military and economy at least for the remainder of the year and likely well into the next.
Epilogue
“Disinformation,” the present-day polite term for lying, has overtaken much of current political rhetoric and social media both here and elsewhere. In Russian society, since the onset of Soviet rule in the early 20th century, the practice has been perpetuated to such a degree that public recognition of it has existed for several decades. Acceptance of this circumstance had come with the tacit understanding that, in return, the implied social contract would promise a secure and stable existence for Russia’s people. A distorted reality is naturally created where distrust becomes a norm and cynicism prevails when truth and falsehood cannot be distinguished. Russia now ranks 172nd out of 180 countries in the 2026 World Press Freedom Index after years of restricting independent media. This has resulted in the loss of a major source for public discourse regarding government conduct. When proper regulatory guardrails of such governance are abandoned as a consequence, and deceit gives avenue to ever-widening corruption, a kleptocracy is born and the social contract begins to dissolve.
Putin’s image as a strong leader is faltering as he ages. He is a true relic of his Soviet past and in the guise of a long-standing fight against the perceived monster, NATO, he has become a monster himself. The long-standing corruption of his regime undermined the effectiveness of Russia’s military and brought about the mismanagement of several agencies entrusted with the public welfare. Fear of retribution by this solitary overlord has kept his oligarchs and government aligned behind him to such an extent that he has been allowed to lead the country into an ill-conceived war which has now seriously depleted its military and brought its economy close to collapse. A breaking point comes when lies can no longer be sustained. After 25 years of rule, Vladimir Putin may be single-handedly bringing his country to yet another chaotic end in a shorter time than it took the several leaders of Soviet Russia over many decades during the previous century to do the same. Whether such a recurrent calamity can be averted may depend more upon the mental state of this singular perpetrator of war and corruption than what remains of the country’s inclination to push back.
*Beyond Good and Evil, Friedrich Nietzsche, 1886.
Copyright @Kost Elisevich, MD, PhD 2026. All rights reserved. Any illegal reproduction of this content will result in immediate legal action.
