Category: Russian Military Losses

A Different War: Modeling Outcome in an Asymmetric and Unconventional War

July 8, 2026

Despite clear superiority in armament, munitions, and troop numbers, favored nations have, not infrequently, fallen far short of expectations when it comes to achieving their ends in war. Many factors can account for this – terrain, morale, logistics, industrial capacity, and finance among others that Carl von Clausewitz alluded to in his influential work, “On War,” published in 1832. More importantly, predictive modeling of outcomes based primarily upon variables drawn from the war experiences of the 19th and 20th centuries appear insufficient in the 21st century. Russia’s old Soviet style of conducting war quickly drew international attention in the early stages of its invasion of Ukraine when it failed to achieve its goal of capturing Kyiv and was forced to retreat into the eastern part of the country where it has remained stalled in large part during the subsequent four years. Several setbacks followed in the wake of rapid innovations in Ukraine’s strategy of resistance that have not only unfolded on the battlefield but in its efforts to undermine Russia’s economy. … More A Different War: Modeling Outcome in an Asymmetric and Unconventional War

Russia’s World of Lies, Repression and its Breaking Point

May 3, 2026

Russian leadership has had a long history of lying to its people over the past century, more so than most other regimes. Its deceit has manifested in a variety of ways, the most egregious of which in recent times has been Vladimir Putin’s euphemistic “special military operation” (SMO). In actuality, it was a full-scale invasion of the second-largest nation by territory in Europe with the intent of overthrowing its government and installing a pro-Russian regime thereby returning it to the status of a dependent republic. An estimated 190,000 troops were gathered over the course of four months on Ukraine’s border on the pretense of a military drill similar to what was enacted less than a year previously. In January 2022, Russia’s Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov proclaimed Russia did not want war with Ukraine and yet without any trigger in the interim, it happened. … More Russia’s World of Lies, Repression and its Breaking Point

Vladimir Putin and the Hill He is Drawn to Die Upon

March 4, 2026

Is Vladimir Putin capable of coming to terms with the mounting concerns over the state-of-affairs in Russia brought about by his war in Ukraine? His predilection for conflict has dominated policy throughout most of his 25 years in leadership beginning with his war in Chechnya (1999 – 2009), and followed by incursion into Georgia (2008), the Donbas War (2014 – 2022), the Syrian Civil War (2015 – 2024), to the invasion of Ukraine (2022 – present). The strategy has maintained Putin’s version of the historic Russian “strong-man” ethos at the helm of Russia’s destiny, one in which the nation’s security comes at the expense of individual freedom. In the process, Putin has ensured for himself the power once possessed by his tsarist ancestors but now with the added benefit of a much more sophisticated internal security apparatus. The problem confronting him in this present moment is the wall he has run into both militarily and economically. The question confronting Russians now must revolve around whether Putin is mentally capable of overcoming his own shortcomings to save the country from ruin. … More Vladimir Putin and the Hill He is Drawn to Die Upon

When Rhetoric Clouds the Realities of Russia’s War 
Part II: The Elusive “Ironclad” Security Guarantee

December 19, 2025

The term, “security guarantee,” brings with it a sense of comfort provided a vulnerable nation by other nations with assurances that substantial force will be brought to bear upon an aggressor that threatens its well-being. When the vulnerable nation is not made a member of a group like NATO whose charter expressly defines the obligations of all members to intervene in an expected manner, such “security guarantees” become, over time, a matter of debate, or worse, of inconvenience. … More When Rhetoric Clouds the Realities of Russia’s War Part II: The Elusive “Ironclad” Security Guarantee

When Rhetoric Clouds the Realities of Russia’s War 
Part I: Underestimation

December 8, 2025

It’s easy to understand how the current American buffoonery, clearly manifested at the negotiating table, might make one deeply cynical of diplomacy when it’s seen to be geared toward benefiting the aggressor and an outside dealmaker rather than the victim of the aggression and its supportive neighbor, Europe. The nature of the proposed settlement for ending Russia’s war upon Ukraine seems only to forestall an inevitable resumption of hostility given the historical unreliability of security guarantees, particularly when it comes to Russia. Parallels are seen with the Trump Administration’s recent bungling of trade agreements with China in wild pursuit of bargains in the absence of more thoughtful long-term benefits. … More When Rhetoric Clouds the Realities of Russia’s War Part I: Underestimation

Putin’s ‘End of Days’

September 23, 2025

All the foreseeable advantages afforded Russia since its ill-fated 2022 invasion of Ukraine have been disappearing at an accelerative rate. The illusion of its military prowess with its limitless manpower and technological capabilities should have begun to raise doubts soon after the war began when it met the reality of Ukraine’s two counteroffensives in the latter part of 2022. More to say about the ongoing war immediately below but for Vladimir Putin, military failure is not his worst problem. It’s what awaits him in the last quarter of 2025. A fate reminiscent of the fall of the Russian Empire in 1917 and the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991 hangs in the balance before him now and may ultimately usher the despot and all his ugliness to an ignominious end. … More Putin’s ‘End of Days’

Knocking Russia Down to Size: Ukraine’s Cross-Border Offensive

August 29, 2025

Within its borders, Ukraine confronts Russia’s military forces in the east and southeast and, otherwise, defends its civilians throughout the country from Russia’s aerial attacks upon its cities. Vladimir Putin’s war has primarily distilled into two immediate strategies: 1. capture and hold ground, particularly in the Donbas, in order to fully occupy some of the oblasts in the eastern territories, and 2. terrorize Ukrainian citizens to weaken their resolve and sue for peace. Over the past 3.5 years, Ukraine with the support of over 40 nations worldwide, has withstood the Russian assault upon its sovereignty and its people with the sort of resilience normally attributed to a comparatively much larger nation. It has managed this not only by courage manifest in battle but through cunning, innovation and remarkable boldness in execution. Whereas Putin has concentrated his efforts upon indiscriminate destruction of civilian life and infrastructure and the deliberate sacrifice of Russian troops for limited territorial gain, Ukraine has undertaken the highly strategic tact of undermining his war industry and the money supporting it. … More Knocking Russia Down to Size: Ukraine’s Cross-Border Offensive

The Anxiety Over Ukraine’s Entry Into NATO

July 20, 2025

Both the U.S. and NATO have shown considerable restraint in support of Ukraine against Russia’s invasion by their very measured and incremental provision of armament, succeeding only in prolonging the conflict and continuing the suffering of Ukraine’s civilian population. Reasons for doing so have centered upon the fear of escalation and the perception that they would be drawn into direct military involvement against Russia in what would become a world war. This continuing fear of confrontation with Russia among NATO’s several member nations has not only prevented consensus regarding Ukraine’s admission into NATO but allowed Russia to behave as a rogue entity, committing numerous atrocities in direct contravention of international norms and exposing the weakness of the United Nations. … More The Anxiety Over Ukraine’s Entry Into NATO

European Solidarity and Purpose in the Face of the Russian Threat

June 10, 2025

If there is a truth to be learned from the history of global conflict, it must be that appeasement rarely brings a lasting peace when it is seen to result preferentially in concessions to the aggressor. Revanchist grievances arise and fester for generations and wounds are not forgiven. Even worse, the aggressor remains unsated when the original goal was not achieved. This was the lesson of the last world war and the one that most seem intent on forgetting, particularly those foolishly convinced of somehow being isolated from harm or those simply wanting to get on with the business of making money under more controlled circumstances. The failure to face the hard reality of ending a war by stopping an overt aggression in its tracks invites a future of recidivism acted out by the same aggressor or simply another of the same ilk. … More European Solidarity and Purpose in the Face of the Russian Threat

Putin’s Deceit: Ukraine, Belarus and the Road to Eastern Europe

April 14, 2025

Europe’s moment has come and action is called for in the face of Russia’s continued aggression in Ukraine as U.S. commitment predictably gives ground to its longstanding adversary. Vladimir Putin’s imperialist designs are committed first to bringing both Ukraine and Belarus back into Russia’s fold before considering the options of returning the nations of the Baltic region and Eastern Europe under Russian hegemony. That doesn’t mean to say Putin is not meddling elsewhere to cause instability within Europe as in the Western Balkan nations, Germany, Romania, Poland, France, the United Kingdom and still other nations. … More Putin’s Deceit: Ukraine, Belarus and the Road to Eastern Europe