Bad Leaders and Useful Idiots

October 24, 2026

A recurrent nightmare of history has been the arrival of elected leaders who gained power through the promotion of a populist sentiment toward such divisive issues as immigration, racial animus and class struggle. Their promise of change would come with a price – the revelation that executive power provided the authority to alter the mechanics of government to suit their purpose. Change would come in the form of judicial action and financial pressure upon institutions meant to restrain the arbitrary exercise of executive power over the public good, and the policing of society by alternative means. The pattern is a familiar one having played out during the 20th century most notably in Soviet Russia and Nazi Germany. It led to the creation of repressive authoritarian regimes that not only established control over their own society but dictated a foreign policy that made the world less secure. … More Bad Leaders and Useful Idiots

Putin Digs Yet Another Hole to Nowhere

September 24, 2026

Vladimir Putin continues to prosecute his war with Ukraine in the vain hope of emerging the victor in a conflict that has inadvertently revealed Russia’s weaknesses and vulnerabilities to the world. As Russia loses its hold on Crimea; experiences considerable loss of infantry, armament and territory; watches both its fossil fuel export industry disappear and major commercial enterprises collapse; and witnesses its financial institutions now following suit, Putin chooses to turn his attention toward escalating a hybrid war upon Europe as if to distract from his failure in Ukraine. Russia’s actions in the latter case have become so overt that denial only invites ridicule. Presumably the purpose of the approach centers upon weakening the resolve of nations supporting Ukraine although it may also ostensibly feed into the Russian public’s desire to strike out against the West which Putin has demonized as the agent of their discontent. … More Putin Digs Yet Another Hole to Nowhere

Russia, the Broken

August 18, 2026

Societies are most noticeably disrupted when the regime collapses in a violent coup, a revolution, or is defeated in war. Great empires fall prey to calamity when they run out of the energy that once fueled the dynamism of their origin and sewed the fabric of their society. The insidious process that seems often to lead to these outcomes may be recognized when authoritarian rulers, with their own self-interests in mind, undertake efforts to monopolize power by denying citizens their rights. They do so by undermining independent media, exerting control over the legislative powers meant to directly serve the people, populating the judiciary with justices aligned more with the goals of the executive than the Constitution and by growing a powerful upper class of wealth that facilitates the necessary control of society. After some time has passed, patriotic songs lose their ardor against the backdrop of repression, corruption, disinformation, a massively disproportionate wealth gap, and a decaying social infrastructure. Financial ruin, economic despair, and a failing war effort will accelerate the decline, leaving society in search of hope for a better future that now appears beyond reach. … More Russia, the Broken

Russia’s Coalition of Troubled Nations and Ukraine’s Defiance

August 5, 2026

Russia’s war upon Ukraine has seen the active participation of three other aligned autocracies – Belarus, North Korea, and Iran – in its prosecution of the largest European military conflict since World War II. A fourth partner, China, has provided subtler but well-recognized support for Russia’s war for reasons better known to their respective leaders than the world at large. Despite the lack of adequate justification for Russia’s invasion, the leaders of these autocracies have seen fit to engage in this war for seemingly no better reason than transactional purposes of one sort or another. … More Russia’s Coalition of Troubled Nations and Ukraine’s Defiance

A Different War: Modeling Outcome in an Asymmetric and Unconventional War

July 8, 2026

Despite clear superiority in armament, munitions, and troop numbers, favored nations have, not infrequently, fallen far short of expectations when it comes to achieving their ends in war. Many factors can account for this – terrain, morale, logistics, industrial capacity, and finance among others that Carl von Clausewitz alluded to in his influential work, “On War,” published in 1832. More importantly, predictive modeling of outcomes based primarily upon variables drawn from the war experiences of the 19th and 20th centuries appear insufficient in the 21st century. Russia’s old Soviet style of conducting war quickly drew international attention in the early stages of its invasion of Ukraine when it failed to achieve its goal of capturing Kyiv and was forced to retreat into the eastern part of the country where it has remained stalled in large part during the subsequent four years. Several setbacks followed in the wake of rapid innovations in Ukraine’s strategy of resistance that have not only unfolded on the battlefield but in its efforts to undermine Russia’s economy. … More A Different War: Modeling Outcome in an Asymmetric and Unconventional War

Ethnic Animus Within the Russian Federation Toward the Kremlin

June 17, 2026

“Remember my words: Russia will disappear when the Ukrainian sun rises” – Djokhar Dudayev, Revolutionary leader and President of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria (1991-1996)

Djokhar Dudayev was killed in April 1996 by a Russian missile strike that targeted his whereabouts. Four months later, the First Chechen War (1994–1996) ended with the signing of the Khasavyurt Accords, after Chechen fighters had forced Russian troops out of their capital, Grozny. Chechnya was the first republic to clash with the Kremlin after the Soviet Union dissolved in 1991. The Chechens refused to remain part of a state that had long oppressed them. Under both Tsarist and Soviet rule, mass deportations and repression had eroded their homeland and ethnic identity in the hopes of subduing revival of any nationalist sentiment. In 1999, a brutal military campaign launched by then Prime Minister Vladimir Putin crushed Chechen hopes for sovereignty in the Second Chechen War (1999-2009). Grozny was levelled by indiscriminate aerial bombing, ballistic missile strikes, and a continuous artillery siege of the capital, killing some 8,000 civilians. The campaign strengthened Putin’s position in Moscow, helping secure his rise by popular ascent to an effectively uncontested presidency. … More Ethnic Animus Within the Russian Federation Toward the Kremlin

Russia’s World of Lies, Repression and its Breaking Point

May 3, 2026

Russian leadership has had a long history of lying to its people over the past century, more so than most other regimes. Its deceit has manifested in a variety of ways, the most egregious of which in recent times has been Vladimir Putin’s euphemistic “special military operation” (SMO). In actuality, it was a full-scale invasion of the second-largest nation by territory in Europe with the intent of overthrowing its government and installing a pro-Russian regime thereby returning it to the status of a dependent republic. An estimated 190,000 troops were gathered over the course of four months on Ukraine’s border on the pretense of a military drill similar to what was enacted less than a year previously. In January 2022, Russia’s Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov proclaimed Russia did not want war with Ukraine and yet without any trigger in the interim, it happened. … More Russia’s World of Lies, Repression and its Breaking Point

Overview of Current Global and Regional Aspects Concerning Russia’s War in Ukraine
Part II: Russia and Europe

April 6, 2026

Russia has long engaged in a campaign of disinformation, government and electoral interference and outright sabotage in Europe. It has done so in an attempt to weaken resolve and undermine NATO defensive coordination. The disappointing performance of Russia’s military during the past year and the precarious state of its economy is likely to place greater emphasis upon its need to at least succeed with its malign efforts in Europe at large. It must do so in order that it not expose itself to what it perceives to be even greater vulnerabilities to its west. Much of this is perception more than it is reality, but Russia remains immersed in its own propaganda that the West presents an eternal threat to its existence. The reality, in fact, is that the regime itself, more than the nation it rules, feels threatened and is prepared to take what action is needed to preserve itself whatever the consequences for its people. … More Overview of Current Global and Regional Aspects Concerning Russia’s War in Ukraine Part II: Russia and Europe

Overview of Current Global and Regional Aspects Concerning Russia’s War in Ukraine
Part I: Two Wars                  

April 1, 2026

The new war in the Persian Gulf has altered circumstances globally and has once more brought to light Vladimir Putin’s contempt for the United States. Other events in play have more to do with Putin’s war in Ukraine and Russia’s interference in the broader scope of the European theater. A new Spring dawns on a troubled continent in a year that will prove decisive for its security as it relates to Putin’s mental state, his need for conflict and his own survival. A rapidly changing geopolitical dynamic is in play, attributable to the unpredictability of Trump’s war with Iran and Putin’s need to perpetuate his war in Ukraine as Russia’s own future appears in jeopardy. Both wars are ones of choice although one has thus far consistently shown itself to be intentionally criminal in its conduct with both its aerial and ground assaults targeting a civilian population. … More Overview of Current Global and Regional Aspects Concerning Russia’s War in Ukraine Part I: Two Wars                  

Vladimir Putin and the Hill He is Drawn to Die Upon

March 4, 2026

Is Vladimir Putin capable of coming to terms with the mounting concerns over the state-of-affairs in Russia brought about by his war in Ukraine? His predilection for conflict has dominated policy throughout most of his 25 years in leadership beginning with his war in Chechnya (1999 – 2009), and followed by incursion into Georgia (2008), the Donbas War (2014 – 2022), the Syrian Civil War (2015 – 2024), to the invasion of Ukraine (2022 – present). The strategy has maintained Putin’s version of the historic Russian “strong-man” ethos at the helm of Russia’s destiny, one in which the nation’s security comes at the expense of individual freedom. In the process, Putin has ensured for himself the power once possessed by his tsarist ancestors but now with the added benefit of a much more sophisticated internal security apparatus. The problem confronting him in this present moment is the wall he has run into both militarily and economically. The question confronting Russians now must revolve around whether Putin is mentally capable of overcoming his own shortcomings to save the country from ruin. … More Vladimir Putin and the Hill He is Drawn to Die Upon