A Different War: Modeling Outcome in an Asymmetric and Unconventional War

July 8, 2026

Despite clear superiority in armament, munitions, and troop numbers, favored nations have, not infrequently, fallen far short of expectations when it comes to achieving their ends in war. Many factors can account for this – terrain, morale, logistics, industrial capacity, and finance among others that Carl von Clausewitz alluded to in his influential work, “On War,” published in 1832. More importantly, predictive modeling of outcomes based primarily upon variables drawn from the war experiences of the 19th and 20th centuries appear insufficient in the 21st century. Russia’s old Soviet style of conducting war quickly drew international attention in the early stages of its invasion of Ukraine when it failed to achieve its goal of capturing Kyiv and was forced to retreat into the eastern part of the country where it has remained stalled in large part during the subsequent four years. Several setbacks followed in the wake of rapid innovations in Ukraine’s strategy of resistance that have not only unfolded on the battlefield but in its efforts to undermine Russia’s economy. … More A Different War: Modeling Outcome in an Asymmetric and Unconventional War

Ethnic Animus Within the Russian Federation Toward the Kremlin

June 17, 2026

“Remember my words: Russia will disappear when the Ukrainian sun rises” – Djokhar Dudayev, Revolutionary leader and President of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria (1991-1996)

Djokhar Dudayev was killed in April 1996 by a Russian missile strike that targeted his whereabouts. Four months later, the First Chechen War (1994–1996) ended with the signing of the Khasavyurt Accords, after Chechen fighters had forced Russian troops out of their capital, Grozny. Chechnya was the first republic to clash with the Kremlin after the Soviet Union dissolved in 1991. The Chechens refused to remain part of a state that had long oppressed them. Under both Tsarist and Soviet rule, mass deportations and repression had eroded their homeland and ethnic identity in the hopes of subduing revival of any nationalist sentiment. In 1999, a brutal military campaign launched by then Prime Minister Vladimir Putin crushed Chechen hopes for sovereignty in the Second Chechen War (1999-2009). Grozny was levelled by indiscriminate aerial bombing, ballistic missile strikes, and a continuous artillery siege of the capital, killing some 8,000 civilians. The campaign strengthened Putin’s position in Moscow, helping secure his rise by popular ascent to an effectively uncontested presidency. … More Ethnic Animus Within the Russian Federation Toward the Kremlin

Russia’s World of Lies, Repression and its Breaking Point

May 3, 2026

Russian leadership has had a long history of lying to its people over the past century, more so than most other regimes. Its deceit has manifested in a variety of ways, the most egregious of which in recent times has been Vladimir Putin’s euphemistic “special military operation” (SMO). In actuality, it was a full-scale invasion of the second-largest nation by territory in Europe with the intent of overthrowing its government and installing a pro-Russian regime thereby returning it to the status of a dependent republic. An estimated 190,000 troops were gathered over the course of four months on Ukraine’s border on the pretense of a military drill similar to what was enacted less than a year previously. In January 2022, Russia’s Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov proclaimed Russia did not want war with Ukraine and yet without any trigger in the interim, it happened. … More Russia’s World of Lies, Repression and its Breaking Point

Overview of Current Global and Regional Aspects Concerning Russia’s War in Ukraine
Part II: Russia and Europe

April 6, 2026

Russia has long engaged in a campaign of disinformation, government and electoral interference and outright sabotage in Europe. It has done so in an attempt to weaken resolve and undermine NATO defensive coordination. The disappointing performance of Russia’s military during the past year and the precarious state of its economy is likely to place greater emphasis upon its need to at least succeed with its malign efforts in Europe at large. It must do so in order that it not expose itself to what it perceives to be even greater vulnerabilities to its west. Much of this is perception more than it is reality, but Russia remains immersed in its own propaganda that the West presents an eternal threat to its existence. The reality, in fact, is that the regime itself, more than the nation it rules, feels threatened and is prepared to take what action is needed to preserve itself whatever the consequences for its people. … More Overview of Current Global and Regional Aspects Concerning Russia’s War in Ukraine Part II: Russia and Europe

Overview of Current Global and Regional Aspects Concerning Russia’s War in Ukraine
Part I: Two Wars                  

April 1, 2026

The new war in the Persian Gulf has altered circumstances globally and has once more brought to light Vladimir Putin’s contempt for the United States. Other events in play have more to do with Putin’s war in Ukraine and Russia’s interference in the broader scope of the European theater. A new Spring dawns on a troubled continent in a year that will prove decisive for its security as it relates to Putin’s mental state, his need for conflict and his own survival. A rapidly changing geopolitical dynamic is in play, attributable to the unpredictability of Trump’s war with Iran and Putin’s need to perpetuate his war in Ukraine as Russia’s own future appears in jeopardy. Both wars are ones of choice although one has thus far consistently shown itself to be intentionally criminal in its conduct with both its aerial and ground assaults targeting a civilian population. … More Overview of Current Global and Regional Aspects Concerning Russia’s War in Ukraine Part I: Two Wars                  

Vladimir Putin and the Hill He is Drawn to Die Upon

March 4, 2026

Is Vladimir Putin capable of coming to terms with the mounting concerns over the state-of-affairs in Russia brought about by his war in Ukraine? His predilection for conflict has dominated policy throughout most of his 25 years in leadership beginning with his war in Chechnya (1999 – 2009), and followed by incursion into Georgia (2008), the Donbas War (2014 – 2022), the Syrian Civil War (2015 – 2024), to the invasion of Ukraine (2022 – present). The strategy has maintained Putin’s version of the historic Russian “strong-man” ethos at the helm of Russia’s destiny, one in which the nation’s security comes at the expense of individual freedom. In the process, Putin has ensured for himself the power once possessed by his tsarist ancestors but now with the added benefit of a much more sophisticated internal security apparatus. The problem confronting him in this present moment is the wall he has run into both militarily and economically. The question confronting Russians now must revolve around whether Putin is mentally capable of overcoming his own shortcomings to save the country from ruin. … More Vladimir Putin and the Hill He is Drawn to Die Upon

The Choreography of the Current Ukraine – Russia – U.S. “Peace Talks”

February 8, 2026

The second round of trilateral peace negotiations were held in Abu Dhabi on February 4-5, 2026, following initial talks that had occurred on January 23-24, 2026. A week-long U.S.-brokered ceasefire sparing, specifically, energy infrastructure was announced by the Trump administration on January 29 and would be in effect preceding this second round of talks at a time when winter temperatures had fallen dramatically. Moscow’s interpretation of the ceasefire, however, gave it four days at best and would only involve Kyiv whereas Ukraine was seemingly obliged to give consideration for all of Russia. True to form, during the night of February 2-3, Russia launched upwards of 450 drones and more than 70 missiles, 32 of which were ballistic missiles, specifically targeting energy facilities across 27 sites in at least six regions of Ukraine, disrupting water, electricity and heat. More than 1,170 apartment buildings in Kyiv alone lost heat when outside temperatures had fallen to -4 deg F (-20 deg C). The following night saw a similar attack damaging residential buildings and schools with several casualties. That these attacks heralded the second round of “peace talks” speaks to Vladimir Putin’s disregard for attempts to seek a solution to a war in which he and his Kremlin colleagues continue to perpetuate war crimes that have cumulatively amounted to calls of genocide. … More The Choreography of the Current Ukraine – Russia – U.S. “Peace Talks”

From Moldova to Crimea Lies an Uncertain Future for Russia

January 22, 2026

A changing situation exists along coastal Ukraine, Moldova, its neighbor to the west, and Crimea in the east. It threatens the unwitting Russian intruder more than the nations it has menaced.

Russia escalated its aerial assault upon Ukraine’s major coastal city and seaport, Odesa, beginning in December, 2025 and continuing into 2026. The city has considerable strategic value as Ukraine’s major throughway for foreign trade accounting for 65% of its imports and exports. Its rail connections, in turn, extend nationally to provide for both the efficient concentration of goods for export and quick distribution of imported needs. In its usual fashion, Russia has destroyed residential buildings, hospitals, electrical and heating substations, water supplies and bridges, resulting in more than 60 casualties thus far along with protracted power outages and exposure to the current winter’s extreme cold. … More From Moldova to Crimea Lies an Uncertain Future for Russia

When Rhetoric Clouds the Realities of Russia’s War 
Part II: The Elusive “Ironclad” Security Guarantee

December 19, 2025

The term, “security guarantee,” brings with it a sense of comfort provided a vulnerable nation by other nations with assurances that substantial force will be brought to bear upon an aggressor that threatens its well-being. When the vulnerable nation is not made a member of a group like NATO whose charter expressly defines the obligations of all members to intervene in an expected manner, such “security guarantees” become, over time, a matter of debate, or worse, of inconvenience. … More When Rhetoric Clouds the Realities of Russia’s War Part II: The Elusive “Ironclad” Security Guarantee

When Rhetoric Clouds the Realities of Russia’s War 
Part I: Underestimation

December 8, 2025

It’s easy to understand how the current American buffoonery, clearly manifested at the negotiating table, might make one deeply cynical of diplomacy when it’s seen to be geared toward benefiting the aggressor and an outside dealmaker rather than the victim of the aggression and its supportive neighbor, Europe. The nature of the proposed settlement for ending Russia’s war upon Ukraine seems only to forestall an inevitable resumption of hostility given the historical unreliability of security guarantees, particularly when it comes to Russia. Parallels are seen with the Trump Administration’s recent bungling of trade agreements with China in wild pursuit of bargains in the absence of more thoughtful long-term benefits. … More When Rhetoric Clouds the Realities of Russia’s War Part I: Underestimation