Russia, the Broken

Societies are most noticeably disrupted when the regime collapses in a violent coup, a revolution, or is defeated in war. Great empires fall prey to calamity when they run out of the energy that once fueled the dynamism of their origin and sewed the fabric of their society. The insidious process that seems often to lead to these outcomes may be recognized when authoritarian rulers, with their own self-interests in mind, undertake efforts to monopolize power by denying citizens their rights. They do so by undermining independent media, exerting control over the legislative powers meant to directly serve the people, populating the judiciary with justices aligned more with the goals of the executive than the Constitution and by growing a powerful upper class of wealth that facilitates the necessary control of society. After some time has passed, patriotic songs lose their ardor against the backdrop of repression, corruption, disinformation, a massively disproportionate wealth gap, and a decaying social infrastructure. Financial ruin, economic despair, and a failing war effort will accelerate the decline, leaving society in search of hope for a better future that now appears beyond reach. … More Russia, the Broken

Russia’s Coalition of Troubled Nations and Ukraine’s Defiance

Russia’s war upon Ukraine has seen the active participation of three other aligned autocracies – Belarus, North Korea, and Iran – in its prosecution of the largest European military conflict since World War II. A fourth partner, China, has provided subtler but well-recognized support for Russia’s war for reasons better known to their respective leaders than the world at large. Despite the lack of adequate justification for Russia’s invasion, the leaders of these autocracies have seen fit to engage in this war for seemingly no better reason than transactional purposes of one sort or another. … More Russia’s Coalition of Troubled Nations and Ukraine’s Defiance

A Different War: Modeling Outcome in an Asymmetric and Unconventional War

Despite clear superiority in armament, munitions, and troop numbers, favored nations have, not infrequently, fallen far short of expectations when it comes to achieving their ends in war. Many factors can account for this – terrain, morale, logistics, industrial capacity, and finance among others that Carl von Clausewitz alluded to in his influential work, “On War,” published in 1832. More importantly, predictive modeling of outcomes based primarily upon variables drawn from the war experiences of the 19th and 20th centuries appear insufficient in the 21st century. Russia’s old Soviet style of conducting war quickly drew international attention in the early stages of its invasion of Ukraine when it failed to achieve its goal of capturing Kyiv and was forced to retreat into the eastern part of the country where it has remained stalled in large part during the subsequent four years. Several setbacks followed in the wake of rapid innovations in Ukraine’s strategy of resistance that have not only unfolded on the battlefield but in its efforts to undermine Russia’s economy. … More A Different War: Modeling Outcome in an Asymmetric and Unconventional War

Russia’s World of Lies, Repression and its Breaking Point

Russian leadership has had a long history of lying to its people over the past century, more so than most other regimes. Its deceit has manifested in a variety of ways, the most egregious of which in recent times has been Vladimir Putin’s euphemistic “special military operation” (SMO). In actuality, it was a full-scale invasion of the second-largest nation by territory in Europe with the intent of overthrowing its government and installing a pro-Russian regime thereby returning it to the status of a dependent republic. An estimated 190,000 troops were gathered over the course of four months on Ukraine’s border on the pretense of a military drill similar to what was enacted less than a year previously. In January 2022, Russia’s Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov proclaimed Russia did not want war with Ukraine and yet without any trigger in the interim, it happened. … More Russia’s World of Lies, Repression and its Breaking Point

Overview of Current Global and Regional Aspects Concerning Russia’s War in Ukraine
Part II: Russia and Europe

Russia has long engaged in a campaign of disinformation, government and electoral interference and outright sabotage in Europe. It has done so in an attempt to weaken resolve and undermine NATO defensive coordination. The disappointing performance of Russia’s military during the past year and the precarious state of its economy is likely to place greater emphasis upon its need to at least succeed with its malign efforts in Europe at large. It must do so in order that it not expose itself to what it perceives to be even greater vulnerabilities to its west. Much of this is perception more than it is reality, but Russia remains immersed in its own propaganda that the West presents an eternal threat to its existence. The reality, in fact, is that the regime itself, more than the nation it rules, feels threatened and is prepared to take what action is needed to preserve itself whatever the consequences for its people. … More Overview of Current Global and Regional Aspects Concerning Russia’s War in Ukraine Part II: Russia and Europe

Vladimir Putin and the Hill He is Drawn to Die Upon

Is Vladimir Putin capable of coming to terms with the mounting concerns over the state-of-affairs in Russia brought about by his war in Ukraine? His predilection for conflict has dominated policy throughout most of his 25 years in leadership beginning with his war in Chechnya (1999 – 2009), and followed by incursion into Georgia (2008), the Donbas War (2014 – 2022), the Syrian Civil War (2015 – 2024), to the invasion of Ukraine (2022 – present). The strategy has maintained Putin’s version of the historic Russian “strong-man” ethos at the helm of Russia’s destiny, one in which the nation’s security comes at the expense of individual freedom. In the process, Putin has ensured for himself the power once possessed by his tsarist ancestors but now with the added benefit of a much more sophisticated internal security apparatus. The problem confronting him in this present moment is the wall he has run into both militarily and economically. The question confronting Russians now must revolve around whether Putin is mentally capable of overcoming his own shortcomings to save the country from ruin. … More Vladimir Putin and the Hill He is Drawn to Die Upon

From Moldova to Crimea Lies an Uncertain Future for Russia

A changing situation exists along coastal Ukraine, Moldova, its neighbor to the west, and Crimea in the east. It threatens the unwitting Russian intruder more than the nations it has menaced.

Russia escalated its aerial assault upon Ukraine’s major coastal city and seaport, Odesa, beginning in December, 2025 and continuing into 2026. The city has considerable strategic value as Ukraine’s major throughway for foreign trade accounting for 65% of its imports and exports. Its rail connections, in turn, extend nationally to provide for both the efficient concentration of goods for export and quick distribution of imported needs. In its usual fashion, Russia has destroyed residential buildings, hospitals, electrical and heating substations, water supplies and bridges, resulting in more than 60 casualties thus far along with protracted power outages and exposure to the current winter’s extreme cold. … More From Moldova to Crimea Lies an Uncertain Future for Russia

When Rhetoric Clouds the Realities of Russia’s War 
Part II: The Elusive “Ironclad” Security Guarantee

The term, “security guarantee,” brings with it a sense of comfort provided a vulnerable nation by other nations with assurances that substantial force will be brought to bear upon an aggressor that threatens its well-being. When the vulnerable nation is not made a member of a group like NATO whose charter expressly defines the obligations of all members to intervene in an expected manner, such “security guarantees” become, over time, a matter of debate, or worse, of inconvenience. … More When Rhetoric Clouds the Realities of Russia’s War Part II: The Elusive “Ironclad” Security Guarantee

When Rhetoric Clouds the Realities of Russia’s War 
Part I: Underestimation

It’s easy to understand how the current American buffoonery, clearly manifested at the negotiating table, might make one deeply cynical of diplomacy when it’s seen to be geared toward benefiting the aggressor and an outside dealmaker rather than the victim of the aggression and its supportive neighbor, Europe. The nature of the proposed settlement for ending Russia’s war upon Ukraine seems only to forestall an inevitable resumption of hostility given the historical unreliability of security guarantees, particularly when it comes to Russia. Parallels are seen with the Trump Administration’s recent bungling of trade agreements with China in wild pursuit of bargains in the absence of more thoughtful long-term benefits. … More When Rhetoric Clouds the Realities of Russia’s War Part I: Underestimation

Winter Comes to Moscow

A fourth year of war is nearing an end and whereas the aggressor nation has experienced comparatively little of the physical trauma associated with this conflict, circumstances have changed in the current year enough to threaten the Russian Federation’s (RF) own survival. For Vladimir Putin, however, it is not the sentiment of the inhabitants within the broad scope of the RF that matters as much as those who dwell in Moscow. The Russian capital is under threat and not just from imposed international economic sanctions, mounting financial strain, and war fatigue, but to more direct elements that will undermine both civil life and the Kremlin’s authority. And perhaps it’s time for American media to take more notice of Russia’s many vulnerabilities as it contemplates an end to the war. … More Winter Comes to Moscow