Russia’s war upon Ukraine has seen the active participation of three other aligned autocracies – Belarus, North Korea, and Iran – in its prosecution of the largest European military conflict since World War II. A fourth partner, China, has provided subtler but well-recognized support for Russia’s war for reasons better known to their respective leaders than the world at large. Despite the lack of adequate justification for Russia’s invasion, the leaders of these autocracies have seen fit to engage in this war for seemingly no better reason than transactional purposes of one sort or another. Involvement of these countries has complicated the conduct of this war to which Ukraine’s very capable intelligence services, the Main Directorate of Intelligence (HUR) for military operations and the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) for domestic counterintelligence, have responded in partnership with Western agencies. Tracking logistics of supply, launching multimodal clandestine operations, instituting rapid tactical adaptations among several other measures are implemented to counter any advantages provided by Ukraine’s adversaries. Likewise, maturation of Ukraine’s war industry and its several technological innovations in both long-range and precision targeting capabilities have also created opportunity to exert pressure not only upon Russia’s military-industrial complex and assets that support its war economy, but to strike directly at specific targets of Russia’s foreign enablers. In doing so, it is sending a message that it will not tolerate overt acts of aggression, direct or indirect, against its territory.
The Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps
On July 25, 2026, Ukraine struck an Iranian cargo vessel carrying components for Russian drones and missiles. The ship was anchored in the Caspian Sea near the mouth of the Volga River prior to unloading. Since 2022, the Caspian Sea has been a strategic route used by the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) to supply Russia with offensive weaponry not only for military purposes but to terrorize civilian populations of several cities throughout Ukraine. In doing so, it became an adversary of Ukraine. This most recent episode accompanied a similar strike by Ukraine’s Special Operations Forces upon two Russian cargo ships carrying military assets from Iran to Russia and an earlier attack in August 2025 upon the Russian port of Olya in the Volga delta. The port was heavily damaged along with another cargo vessel carrying Iranian Shahed drone components and munitions.
In the recent Persian Gulf conflict, Iran launched drone and missile strikes upon the energy infrastructure of several Arab nations in the region in addition to targeting a number of U.S. military installations hosted by some of them. Its closure of the Strait of Hormuz has added further to the physical injuries by affecting the economy of the entire Gulf region. Ukraine responded by offering the Gulf nations counter-drone technological support to defend against the Iranian assault. A contingent of 200 Ukrainian servicemen arrived to provide tactical expertise. In return, Ukraine secured an agreement to provide supplemental oil to aid in its own conflict with Russia. Moreover, long-term military and technical cooperation agreements were established with Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, Qatar and Kuwait that will secure greater future defensive preparedness against similar military threats by Iran or other nations.
Iran has demanded reparations for the damage incurred upon its ship in the recent incident and had previously threatened retaliatory measures against Ukraine. The latter may not be forthcoming considering the justification for Ukraine’s actions and the wisdom behind avoiding further confrontation with a nation that has shown its capacity to inflict considerable injury by what has transpired with Russia’s military and economy. Ukraine appears to be a far different adversary strategically than what the IRGC has encountered recently. Contending with Ukraine at this stage would require something quite different than Iran’s cat-and-mouse strategy of gaming the U.S. political arena to threaten the Trump administration’s control of Congress.
Lukashenko and Belarus
Belarusian president Aleksandr Lukashenko, widely referred to as “Europe’s last dictator,” has ruled since 1994. His reign has resulted in Belarus becoming increasingly dependent upon Russia for its energy and financial backing while Lukashenko himself has become reliant upon Russia’s political and implicit military support to bolster his regime. In return, Lukashenko has been not only complicit in supporting Russia’s military efforts in Ukraine but has participated in Russia’s hybrid war upon Eastern Europe by encouraging the illegal passage of migrants from the Near and Middle East through its territory targeting Poland in particular.
Against his nation’s popular sentiment, Lukashenko committed Belarus to becoming a co-aggressor early in Russia’s invasion of Ukraine by serving as a staging area for the Russian military. Its territory and airspace provided approach from the north and logistics operations facilitated the coordination of supplies while its hospitals took in injured Russian servicemen. Missiles were launched from Belarusian territory during the early stages of the invasion and Russian attack helicopters and transport aircraft departed from Belarusian airfields.
Russian aerial drone attacks upon Ukraine traversing Belarusian territory have been facilitated by equipping drones with modems containing SIM cards that connect them with roaming services in Belarus. The Russians established relay towers along Belarus’ 674-mile-long border with Ukraine to further aid in guiding drone attacks particularly into the western part of the country by amplifying the signal for greater precision targeting and enabling target redirection in mid-flight. This prompted Volodymyr Zelensky to hand down an ultimatum requiring Lukashenko to dismantle the stations within the span of a week or face their destruction. The assets were accordingly shut down shortly thereafter leading to a cessation of this northern corridor of attack without much word from Lukashenko’s regime. Tensions continue in the border region over the presence of this communications infrastructure. Ukrainian intrusion upon Belarusian territory in this fashion appears not to be without precedent as occurred in a February 2023 incident in which a high-value Russian Beriev A-50U surveillance aircraft was destroyed at Machulishchy airfield outside Minsk in a drone operation carried out by Belarusian partisans ostensibly in collaboration with Ukrainian security services.
The Integral plant, a major microelectronics manufacturing facility in the Belarussian capital, Minsk, along with its subsidiary, Transistor, have become major suppliers of a wide variety of components for Russia’s Kh-101, Iskander-K, Kalibr, and Izdeliye-30 cruise missiles as well as the Oreshnik ballistic missile. The plant has evaded Western sanctions on components required for maintenance of its production systems. A recent reported explosion and fire occurred at the Integral plant creating speculation of sabotage although no definitive confirmation has emerged.
Belarus itself is undertaking a military buildup, calling up reserves, creating logistical hubs and forming new combat units despite Lukashenko denying any intention of entering Russia’s war. A new airborne assault brigade was created and stationed only 25 miles from the border with Ukraine. It adds to three other similar brigades dispersed within the country. A 10-year Union State Security Treaty was signed by Belarus and Russia in December 2024 specifying defensive responsibilities and a joint military response to external threat. The treaty follows upon the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) of the late 1990s between the two countries. How much these may pertain to current circumstances is a matter of subjective interpretation, but the agreements would certainly serve Russia’s intentions of pressuring Lukashenko to do more. The Belarusians themselves are strongly opposed to the idea of entering the war and serve as a strong deterrent against the matter.
Kim Jong Un and North Korea’s Sacrifice
A mutual defense agreement was signed in 2024 between Kim Jong Un and Vladimir Putin committing the transfer of significant portions of North Korea’s military stockpile to Russia. The transfer had actually already begun in the summer of 2023 with delivery of munitions by rail and maritime shipment. They came in the form of artillery shells, KN-23 and KN-24 short-range ballistic missiles, multiple rocket launchers, self-propelled artillery and anti-tank missiles. In 2024, an initial deployment of roughly 12,000 North Korean troops was provided primarily to the Kursk region to confront an invading Ukrainian force and later supplemented by more than 2,000 troops in the course of the subsequent year. Over this two-year timeframe, North Korea earned upwards of $14.4B for its efforts, helping to boost its own economy by 3.5% in 2025.
Frontline battlefield exposure of North Koreans in Kursk has resulted in casualty rates nearing 50% at times, similar to that of ethnic minorities from within the Russian Federation and foreign fighters drawn from other nations who Russian commanders preferentially deploy in high-risk infantry maneuvers.Estimates of casualties among the North Koreans range from 6,000 to 7,000 of which some 2,300 have been killed. The North Koreans have been indoctrinated with the notion that surrender equates to treason and that imminent capture requires them to commit suicide. Those few who have been captured believed they were there to kill South Koreans fighting for Ukraine. It is against the law in South Korea to enter the war without government permission so that there are very few South Korean troops on the premises. As of early 2026, North Korean troops remained in the Kursk region and a further reported 30,000 are to be added by 2027 despite the heavy toll.
Beginning in 2024, a significant 12-fold surge of North Korean workers have entered Russian plant facilities and commercial enterprises to make up for a depleted Russianworkforce. They appear unaware that these same entities have become targets of aerial assault because of their involvement in supporting Russia’s war. A notable example of this blatantly deceptive practice concerns Ukraine’s significant escalation of attacks upon several warehouses and logistics hubs belonging to Russia’s giant commercial goods distributor, Wildberries, which has become an indirect supplier of military equipment including drone components and body armor. Hundreds of North Korean nationals, primarily women, have now been brought into these facilities.
Ukraine has specifically targeted Russia’s rail network along the Trans-Siberian Railway to destroy and disrupt further passage of North Korean munitions en route to the frontlines. A key logistics route was struck in a sabotage operation in the Khabarovsk Krai region in November 2025, derailing a freight train and damaging the track. Two years previously, in November 2023, a similar operation targeted a freight train passing through the 9.3-mile-long Bessolov-Severomuysky mountain tunnel in Buryatia. Shortly after, a freight train passing over the Chertov Bridge along the Baikal-Amur track was destroyed in another explosion.
The North Korean leader has done well financially for his regime and suffered neither territorial loss nor security within his domain gaining, in addition, Russian technological expertise for North Korea’s satellite and missile programs and sophisticated anti-aircraft defense systems. But Supreme Leader Kim Jong Un has aligned himself with an unreliable partner in Putin who has an uncertain future and secured his own status as a pariah on the world stage. Moreover, Kim has brought injury, death and suffering to his people under false pretenses for transactional gains that lack merit, something that even within his hermit state may still come back to hurt him.
China’s Stealth Move in Russian-Occupied Eastern Ukraine
Perhaps somewhat prematurely, Chinese business enterprises have moved especially into the occupied Donbas region as part of an agreement with Russia to aid the occupation economy in this illegally annexed part of Ukraine. The Karansky Quarry serves as an example of involvement of two Chinese firms that have undertaken work to restore the site for the production of crushed stone. Altogether, more than 17 Chinese companies, largely mining and metallurgical operations, have entered into all the Russian-occupied regions of eastern Ukraine to create opportunities for the home team. In its own perverse fashion, Russia seeks to normalize its presence in these regions by inviting foreign investment, albeit with a nation that has already provided validation for Putin’s war. Under present circumstances, however, with Ukraine’s advances on the front, the war appears headed in the direction of these Chinese interests.
Epilogue
In 2026, Ukraine has retaken more than 230 square miles of Russian-occupied territory and, in July alone, inflicted 42,860 personnel losses (i.e., killed, wounded, missing, captured) upon the Russian military, exceeding June’s count of 39,290. A serious crisis is unfolding in Russian-occupied Crimea with air defenses degraded, severe energy shortages, a depleted water supply and gradual territorial isolation with the destruction of logistical routes and maritime support. Ukraine has depleted Russia’s oil export by more than 40% through its unrelenting campaign of destruction of refineries, depots, pipelines, ports and tankers. A similar campaign now further threatens Russia’s financial stability with its assault upon warehouses and logistical hubs of the e-commerce giant, Wildberries, causing hundreds of merchants to default on their loans and putting considerable operational strain on the entire enterprise. That, in turn, will be further reflected in the country’s economic outlook forecasting a possible zero growth in GDP for the year.
The tide of the war in 2026 has swung in Ukraine’s favor and appears likely to remain so for the remainder of the year. The country has expanded its relations globally and strengthened its own security internally by growing a formidable defense industry that will sustain its military capabilities and continue its fight with the financial aid given it largely through the European Union and NATO. More importantly, it has remained resilient against the protracted onslaught of Russian aggression against its civilian population and is determined to see this war through to its rightful conclusion. It is a warning, therefore, to those nations that have aligned with Putin and his regime, that their continued support in this conflict not only discredits them individually in the eyes of the international community but identifies them as adversaries in this war and will be left to deal with the consequences of their actions.
Copyright @Kost Elisevich, MD, PhD 2026. All rights reserved. Any illegal reproduction of this content will result in immediate legal action.
