A Different War: Modeling Outcome in an Asymmetric and Unconventional War

Despite clear superiority in armament, munitions, and troop numbers, favored nations have, not infrequently, fallen far short of expectations when it comes to achieving their ends in war. Many factors can account for this – terrain, morale, logistics, industrial capacity, and finance among others that Carl von Clausewitz alluded to in his influential work, “On War,” published in 1832. More importantly, predictive modeling of outcomes based primarily upon variables drawn from the war experiences of the 19th and 20th centuries appear insufficient in the 21st century. Russia’s old Soviet style of conducting war quickly drew international attention in the early stages of its invasion of Ukraine when it failed to achieve its goal of capturing Kyiv and was forced to retreat into the eastern part of the country where it has remained stalled in large part during the subsequent four years. Several setbacks followed in the wake of rapid innovations in Ukraine’s strategy of resistance that have not only unfolded on the battlefield but in its efforts to undermine Russia’s economy. … More A Different War: Modeling Outcome in an Asymmetric and Unconventional War

Russia’s World of Lies, Repression and its Breaking Point

Russian leadership has had a long history of lying to its people over the past century, more so than most other regimes. Its deceit has manifested in a variety of ways, the most egregious of which in recent times has been Vladimir Putin’s euphemistic “special military operation” (SMO). In actuality, it was a full-scale invasion of the second-largest nation by territory in Europe with the intent of overthrowing its government and installing a pro-Russian regime thereby returning it to the status of a dependent republic. An estimated 190,000 troops were gathered over the course of four months on Ukraine’s border on the pretense of a military drill similar to what was enacted less than a year previously. In January 2022, Russia’s Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov proclaimed Russia did not want war with Ukraine and yet without any trigger in the interim, it happened. … More Russia’s World of Lies, Repression and its Breaking Point

Overview of Current Global and Regional Aspects Concerning Russia’s War in Ukraine
Part I: Two Wars                  

The new war in the Persian Gulf has altered circumstances globally and has once more brought to light Vladimir Putin’s contempt for the United States. Other events in play have more to do with Putin’s war in Ukraine and Russia’s interference in the broader scope of the European theater. A new Spring dawns on a troubled continent in a year that will prove decisive for its security as it relates to Putin’s mental state, his need for conflict and his own survival. A rapidly changing geopolitical dynamic is in play, attributable to the unpredictability of Trump’s war with Iran and Putin’s need to perpetuate his war in Ukraine as Russia’s own future appears in jeopardy. Both wars are ones of choice although one has thus far consistently shown itself to be intentionally criminal in its conduct with both its aerial and ground assaults targeting a civilian population. … More Overview of Current Global and Regional Aspects Concerning Russia’s War in Ukraine Part I: Two Wars                  

When Rhetoric Clouds the Realities of Russia’s War 
Part II: The Elusive “Ironclad” Security Guarantee

The term, “security guarantee,” brings with it a sense of comfort provided a vulnerable nation by other nations with assurances that substantial force will be brought to bear upon an aggressor that threatens its well-being. When the vulnerable nation is not made a member of a group like NATO whose charter expressly defines the obligations of all members to intervene in an expected manner, such “security guarantees” become, over time, a matter of debate, or worse, of inconvenience. … More When Rhetoric Clouds the Realities of Russia’s War Part II: The Elusive “Ironclad” Security Guarantee

Ukraine is Europe’s Hammer

It is in Europe’s interest to redirect Vladimir Putin’s attention away from his multifaceted hybrid warfare scheme designed to intimidate European nations for their support of Ukraine. That can be accomplished by manifestly threatening Russia’s hold on Ukrainian territories it has occupied, specifically Crimea. Ukraine has been in open conflict with Russia now for more than 3.5 years and has demonstrated its military capability to inflict massive injury upon the Russian invader. Europe therefore has its hammer to retaliate should it choose to use it to good effect. The means to this end rests in supplying Ukraine with the necessary munitions sufficient to isolate the Crimean peninsula and force the surrender of any remaining Russian forces no longer able to evacuate the territory. Russia’s loss of Crimea would be the first step in retaking the remaining territories and bringing about the collapse of Putin’s regime for its failure to accomplish its goal of subduing Ukraine while, in the process, neglecting the welfare of his own people. … More Ukraine is Europe’s Hammer

The Anxiety Over Ukraine’s Entry Into NATO

Both the U.S. and NATO have shown considerable restraint in support of Ukraine against Russia’s invasion by their very measured and incremental provision of armament, succeeding only in prolonging the conflict and continuing the suffering of Ukraine’s civilian population. Reasons for doing so have centered upon the fear of escalation and the perception that they would be drawn into direct military involvement against Russia in what would become a world war. This continuing fear of confrontation with Russia among NATO’s several member nations has not only prevented consensus regarding Ukraine’s admission into NATO but allowed Russia to behave as a rogue entity, committing numerous atrocities in direct contravention of international norms and exposing the weakness of the United Nations. … More The Anxiety Over Ukraine’s Entry Into NATO

European Solidarity and Purpose in the Face of the Russian Threat

If there is a truth to be learned from the history of global conflict, it must be that appeasement rarely brings a lasting peace when it is seen to result preferentially in concessions to the aggressor. Revanchist grievances arise and fester for generations and wounds are not forgiven. Even worse, the aggressor remains unsated when the original goal was not achieved. This was the lesson of the last world war and the one that most seem intent on forgetting, particularly those foolishly convinced of somehow being isolated from harm or those simply wanting to get on with the business of making money under more controlled circumstances. The failure to face the hard reality of ending a war by stopping an overt aggression in its tracks invites a future of recidivism acted out by the same aggressor or simply another of the same ilk. … More European Solidarity and Purpose in the Face of the Russian Threat

So, Who Wants to be Part of Russia?

Three years ago when Russia made its imperialist intentions clear with the invasion of Ukraine, it was with the belief that the Ukrainian people really had no country of their own. As it turned out, to Russia’s dismay, the Ukrainians thought otherwise, enough for them to have withstood over a thousand days of brutal warfare with the sort of national will that would challenge any nation to have done the same. In the process, they have inflicted heavy losses upon Russia’s military, enough so that it is now struggling to maintain an effective offensive while its war economy is threatened with collapse should it continue on its present course. … More So, Who Wants to be Part of Russia?

The Ongoing Underperformance of American Foreign Policy in Ukraine

Current indications from within the Trump administration show an intent to end a decade-long failure to adequately confront Russian aggression in Ukraine to what by now can be considered an impending capitulation to Vladimir Putin’s intransigence. This as he heaps praise on the U.S. President for his reelection. Putin has gone on to regard Donald Trump as a “clever and pragmatic man” and to suggest that “if his victory had not been stolen in 2020,” then there may not have been a crisis. In return, the latter remarkably has blamed Volodymyr Zelensky for the war when he chose not to surrender Ukraine in the face of the February, 2022 Russian invasion, suggesting a serious lack of understanding of the situation by an ill-informed president. The current state of ignorance follows several years of U.S. leadership that has not confronted the depth of Putin’s intentions in Eastern Europe and Ukraine in particular. … More The Ongoing Underperformance of American Foreign Policy in Ukraine

Negotiating with a War Criminal – A History of Deceit

In 1938, Chancellor Adolph Hitler of Germany positioned troops along Czechoslovakia’s border with the apparent intention of invading its Sudetenland region on the false pretense that its predominant resident German population was under threat. In hopes of averting another world war after a number of provocative actions had already been undertaken in recent years by Germany, British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain met with Hitler, Italy’s Benito Mussolini and France’s Édouard Daladier, with Czechoslovakia’s President Edvard Beneš notably absent. … More Negotiating with a War Criminal – A History of Deceit