“To be free is not to be unchained – it is to be unbroken.”
– Lina Kostenko, Ukrainian poet
The new war in the Persian Gulf has altered circumstances globally and has once more brought to light Vladimir Putin’s contempt for the United States. Other events in play have more to do with Putin’s war in Ukraine and Russia’s interference in the broader scope of the European theater. A new Spring dawns on a troubled continent in a year that will prove decisive for its security as it relates to Putin’s mental state, his need for conflict and his own survival. A rapidly changing geopolitical dynamic is in play, attributable to the unpredictability of Trump’s war with Iran and Putin’s need to perpetuate his war in Ukraine as Russia’s own future appears in jeopardy. Both wars are ones of choice although one has thus far consistently shown itself to be intentionally criminal in its conduct with both its aerial and ground assaults targeting a civilian population.
Trump’s War in Iran
The unintended consequences of conflict in the Middle East should be forever imprinted on the minds of Americans, yet history continues to remind us of the cyclical pattern of military intervention that falls short of its aims and creates unforeseen problems. From the 1983 bombing of the Marine barracks in Lebanon to the protracted wars in Iraq (2003-2011) and Afghanistan (2001-2021), the U.S. has sacrificed much. The latter wars, added to those of Syria, Yemen and other post-9/11 conflicts, have claimed 15,262 American lives. The financial cost to the U.S. of its two major wars in the Middle East amounted to upwards of $8 trillion. The first six days of the current war in Iran cost upward of almost $13 billion after deploying more than 300 Tomahawk missiles and other offensive munitions ($5.5 billion) and defensive interceptor missiles ($5.7 billion) along with required operational maintenance ($890 million/day) and unintended armament losses ($1 billion).
Among the more peripheral considerations in the current war with Iran is the strategic partnership agreement Russia shares with the Iranian regime formally expressed in the Russia-Iran Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Treaty of January 2025. A collaborative relation between the two countries has already existed for some time fostering Iranian support for Russia’s war in Ukraine with the provision of Shahed drones, short-range ballistic missiles, artillery shells and ammunition. In reciprocal fashion, a familiar Russian theme re-emerged in the current U.S.-led war with Iran. It was last manifest in Afghanistan when Putin’s regime provided financial rewards to the Taliban for the killing of American servicemen.
On this occasion, the Russians are providing Iran with target coordinates including satellite images of strategic U.S. military assets with the same intention of killing Americans while also supplying Iran with their own version of Shahed drones. Additional technological improvements for Iran’s drones, based upon the Russia’s own experiences using them in Ukraine, have been passed on to enhance their lethality. On March 1, 2026, Iranian drones killed six U.S. service members at an operations center in Kuwait. Another attack on March 27 wounded a dozen U.S. service personnel and destroyed an E-3 Sentry aircraft, priced at $500 million, at the Prince Sultan Air Base in Saudi Arabia, a site previously imaged for Iran by Russian satellite surveillance.
Trump’s special envoy, Steven Witkoff, has unwittingly once more put his trust in the Kremlin’s denial of its involvement in the entire matter despite clear evidence to the contrary according to U.S. allies. It is, of course, in Putin’s best interest that the blockade of the Strait of Hormuz by Iran remains in effect for as long as possible to afford Russia the opportunity to sell its oil and gas at a premium.
The absence of any response from Trump on the matter speaks to his ongoing favorable, almost subservient, manner toward Putin despite a prevailing bipartisan distrust in the U.S. of the Russian leader. A 2025 Quinnipiac University Poll identified 81% of Americans held an unfavorable view of Putin including 73% of Republicans and 93% of Democrats. The apparent lack of concern by Trump does, however, reflect his dismissive attitude toward U.S. military personnel according to past accounts.
A ground war is yet to be decided in Iran as U.S. troops gather in the vicinity while the elite Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and conventional military (Artesh) create their defensive plans. The latter two military groups comprise an estimated combined force of about 500,000 personnel. The Basij paramilitary force may have upward of 450,000 in service that, when taken together with the military, constitute a considerable opposition should they remain unified in their loyalty to the regime.
In the end, the reasons for Trump’s affinity toward Putin are perhaps not as important as the consequences. If he commits himself to be counted among the pariahs of the world, he will answer for it ultimately in the public domain and perhaps in the upcoming November midterm elections, as another among several grievances that have already accumulated over the past year.
American Aid to Ukraine
The Trump administration has made it clear it will not help Ukraine win Russia’s war. It has allowed some of the previously appropriated funds committed by the Biden administration to be delivered but suspended the delivery of certain key assets such as the much-needed Patriot air-defense system that was instead diverted to the Middle East in July, 2025. A new arrangement was created at the time wherein NATO allies would fund ongoing acquisitions through the Prioritized Ukraine Requirements List (PURL) thus ending direct transfer of materiel from the U.S. to Ukraine. What funds may be available by this approach are now being depleted with the announcement that $750 million from the PURL is being redirected to supplement Trump’s war, specifically for air defense. Were it not for the subsequent profligate use of these expensive Patriot ($3-4 million) and THAAD ($12-15 million) missiles in shooting at great numbers of comparatively inexpensive Iranian Shahed drones ($20,000-$50,000), the act might have been more palatable but such was not the case.
Rather than take advice and technological assistance to execute a considerably less expensive strategy to deal with swarms of drones from an authority like Ukraine, Trump rejected the notion outright asserting that the U.S. somehow had better drone technology, failing at the same time to acknowledge the needed expertise to actually execute the strategy of drone defense. The first three days of the war with Iran saw more Patriot interceptor missiles used than had been supplied to Ukraine throughout its four years of war. The resultant shortage of Patriot missiles for Ukraine was predictable and unnecessary. Earlier attempts by Ukraine to help the situation confronting the U.S. with proven battle-tested interceptor drone technology and expertise failed to make an impression upon an administration deaf to reason.
Vice President James Vance’s opposition to aid for Ukraine became evident during his Senate term and he remains part of a faction in the GOP arguing it too expensive and lacking in strategic priority. This appeared initially to be a reflection of his opposition to any war including the one against Iran until it came time for him to decide otherwise much to his subsequent humiliation. Ironically, he has now been tasked to head negotiations with a particularly hostile Iran to bring about an end to the conflict in which questions now arise whether the benefits from this war actually will prevail over its costs.
The anti-Ukraine faction is otherwise composed of members in Trump’s cabinet and a minority of Republican Congressional members whose reasons for doing so have varied. The only one that had some merit required European nations to provide more support, which subsequently has become the case. Remaining arguments touched on expense, border security and the need to shift foreign strategy toward China, all of which could be soundly challenged. In short, much of the Republican protest appears to stem from an ignorance of the geopolitical consequences of giving Russia the upper hand in the Eurasian theater, and China the opportunity to strengthen its alliance with its authoritarian neighbors to advance its own agenda in the East. This is the definition of Sinclair Lewis’ “babbitry” – an inability to see one’s horizon beyond their own village limits.
Europe has indeed stepped up with its support for Ukraine. In 2025, military aid rose by 67% whereas financial and humanitarian aid rose by 59%. The European Union (EU) took the lead as the major institutional provider with a near $104 billion loan for Ukraine, agreed on in late 2025. Military aid specifically depends upon individual member nations with those in Western and Northern Europe providing the bulk of funding. Relative to their GDPs, the Baltic and Nordic nations have contributed the most with Denmark at 3.25% and Estonia 3.01% compared to that of the U.S. which ranks about 16th in the order at 0.59%. The U.S. was the single largest donor in terms of its provision of armament, authorizing a cumulative total of $188 billion although European nations have collectively provided more total aid amounting to $197 billion. Of that U.S. funding of $188 billion, $61 billion did not actually go to Ukraine but was used to support U.S. activities in Europe associated with the war and aid for other nations affected by Russia’s war that resulted in a massive cross-border displacement of civilians.
A further caveat regarding U.S. funding for Ukraine that has been lost in the political rhetoric concerns its distribution. A considerable majority of it, amounting to upward of 70%, was actually used in the U.S. to grow its industrial base, support American labor and expand defense capacity to compete with China. The funds were needed to backfill the purchase of new armament for American stockpiles in order to replace older versions due to be retired but were actually being transferred to Ukraine. At least 11 states benefitted from this influx of defense money along with thousands of workers.
Ukraine itself has moved on to establish agreements with other nations, most recently with Saudi Arabia, where a cooperation defense agreement was signed on March 27. The 10-year agreement centers upon intelligence-sharing and enhancement of military technology. Otherwise, Ukraine has furthered relations with the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Kuwait and Jordan by extending its aerial defense expertise to those nations. Expanded international relations have remained top-of-mind to ensure Ukraine’s security beyond that already created with the EU, NATO and other global partners. The circumstances are in keeping with the change in the world order dynamic already initiated by the Trump regime’s foreign policy philosophy which prefers globally distributed hegemonic regional authorities presiding over the future of “lesser” states. This direction does not sit well with Ukraine as it shouldn’t other nations intent on preserving their independence.
Epilogue
The Trump administration has chosen to side with Russia in its war with Ukraine going so far as to blame the latter for being invaded. For any member of Trump’s regime, it is hard to argue otherwise when confronted over the matter by European leaders concerned with ending the conflict in a manner that does not benefit the aggressor. Trump has returned to demanding that Ukraine forfeit territory vital to its economic wellbeing in return for “reliable” security guarantees. Within Trump’s 28-point peace proposal, Ukraine would be required to limit the size of its military and agree to never join NATO. Another non-aggression agreement must be signed, this time, by Russia, Ukraine and Europe. Despite such a signed agreement, a peculiar line is added stating, “it is expected” that Russia will not invade neighboring countries.
In effect, Ukraine is required to weaken its military without Russia having to downsize and to never agree to joining NATO which, in actuality, would be the only long-term security guarantee of any worth where Russia is concerned. There is good reason for Russia not to have to deal with NATO in the future as regards Ukraine and Putin’s original desire to overtake all of the country. Russia is notorious for breaching international agreements, particularly with Ukraine, most notably the 1991 Alma-Ata Declaration, the 1994 Budapest Memorandum, the 1997 Friendship Treaty, and the 2014-2015 Minsk Agreements. There has been a longstanding global distrust of Russia for its use of binding agreements as a pause to fortify its position in order to than proceed with what it regards to be a justifiable reason to break with them. The Trump administration is blinded to this historical precedent. It engages in negotiations employing unskilled interlocutors who seem intent on seeking a business agreement with Russia more than a moral conclusion to its war in Ukraine.
The war in Iran now further highlights the misconception the Trump administration has had that Putin is a reliable player in negotiating an end to his war in Ukraine. Rather, Putin is prepared to advantage Iran in its war with the U.S. to his own benefit and to thwart Trump’s efforts to resolve the crisis he has created there. On the other hand, Trump has made every effort to advantage Putin in his war. The realpolitik of Trump’s war in Iran remains at odds with Putin’s war in Ukraine and, as a consequence, reliable long-term solutions for either or both do not appear to be in reach. The problem for the U.S. in this circumstance will be the longer-term fall-out, both economic and geopolitically strategic, resulting from the miscalculations in decision-making being made in both wars.
Copyright @Kost Elisevich, MD, PhD 2026. All rights reserved. Any illegal reproduction of this content will result in immediate legal action.
