“Remember my words: Russia will disappear when the Ukrainian sun rises” – Djokhar Dudayev, Revolutionary leader and President of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria (1991-1996)
Djokhar Dudayev was killed in April 1996 by a Russian missile strike that targeted his whereabouts. Four months later, the First Chechen War (1994–1996) ended with the signing of the Khasavyurt Accords, after Chechen fighters had forced Russian troops out of their capital, Grozny. Chechnya was the first republic to clash with the Kremlin after the Soviet Union dissolved in 1991. The Chechens refused to remain part of a state that had long oppressed them. Under both Tsarist and Soviet rule, mass deportations and repression had eroded their homeland and ethnic identity in the hopes of subduing revival of any nationalist sentiment. In 1999, a brutal military campaign launched by then Prime Minister Vladimir Putin crushed Chechen hopes for sovereignty in the Second Chechen War (1999-2009). Grozny was levelled by indiscriminate aerial bombing, ballistic missile strikes, and a continuous artillery siege of the capital, killing some 8,000 civilians. The campaign strengthened Putin’s position in Moscow, helping secure his rise by popular ascent to an effectively uncontested presidency.
Issues of ethnic identity and sovereignty, however, have remained unresolved not simply within Chechnya but among the several considerable indigenous communities throughout the land we call Russia. The matter has simmered for too long and now that Putin’s overreach in Ukraine threatens Russia’s economy and military defeat, perhaps even heralding its collapse, a renewed revival of similar aspirations of independence has come about. The historical roots here factor deeply into the escalation of hatred toward the Kremlin that has emerged as a consequence of Russia’s war in Ukraine and deserve some elaboration.
A Brief History of Russian Imperialism
Tsarist Russia’s expansion from its original site, the Grand Principality of Moscow, began northward in the second half of the 15th century extending out to the Arctic coast of present-day European Russia. In the mid-16th century, its imperial march involved the invasion of the Kazan and Astrakhan Khanates to the south. This large territory evolved into the present-day Republics of Tatarstan, Bashkortostan, Chuvash, Mordova, Udmurtia, Kalmykia and Mari-El. Soon after, the Ural Mountains were crossed into Siberia where the Sibir Khanate was defeated. The Pacific coastline was finally reached by 1639. Southward expansion into central Asia proceeded in the 18th and 19th centuries along with conquest of the mountain tribes of the northern Caucasus region where the Republics of Chechnya, Dagestan, Ingushetia, Adygea, Kabardino-Balkar, Karachay-Cherkess and North Ossetia-Alania are now situated. Further south, the territories of the present-day nations of Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan were acquired from the Ottoman and Persian empires through conquest and diplomacy. A great number of ethnicities occupying a vast Eurasian landmass had been gathered in quick succession into the fold of a new Russian Empire and subjected to a process of Russification with restrictions placed upon their many cultures and religions. The process would be later intensified in 20th century Soviet Russia under Stalin’s regime with its notorious brand of brutalism amounting to outright genocide in some regions. This scarred history now underlies the sentiment of the descendants of a generational tragedy.
Creation of the Russian Federation
The Soviet Union was declared formally dissolved in December 1991. In that immediate period, from before and then soon after the declaration, its 15 primary republics announced their independence establishing them as the newly formed nations of Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Estonia, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Russia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine and Uzbekistan. Each now exist as individual members of the United Nations. Following the latter secessions, Russia itself was still left with a considerable landmass of more than 17,000,000 square kilometers (6,600,000 square miles) spanning 11 time zones. What we have commonly referred to as “Russia,” however, is more aptly termed the Russian Federation as it contains 88 federally administered states that have remained in place since its inception in 1991. The Kremlin conveniently regards both names as interchangeable but in doing so, an impression is gained that the entire landmass is inhabited by ethnic Russians or at least a homogenized version of ethnic Russians and non-Russian minorities living communally in undisputed harmony. This is not the case.
A 2021 census found ethnic Russians made up 72% of the total population of the Russian Federation. Of these, about 80% live on the European side of the Russian Federation, west of the Ural Mountains, while the rest are scattered over the remaining roughly 75% of the landmass that constitutes the Asiatic side. Approximately 40 million of its citizens count themselves part of a distinct non-Russian ethnicity, 40 of which are recognized by the Kremlin. These non-Russian minorities make up about 28% of Russia’s current population of 143,258,559. Roughly half the remaining non-Russian population is Muslim, accounting for upward of 25 million people, the largest such community in Europe. The densest populations reside in the North Caucasus region in republics such as Dagestan, Chechnya and Ingushetia among others with still more occupying the distal Volga region, in particular, Tatarstan and Bashkortostan. The Tatars are the largest non-Russian ethnic group with a population of about 4.71 million people while another four of the 195 ethnic groups in the Russian Federation each have populations in excess of a million people. Interestingly, a 2021 census recorded a nearly 5.1% decline in the ethnic Russian population over the previous decade whereas that of predominantly Muslim regions increased disproportionately in number as in the case of Chechnya with a current population of more than 1.6 million which had grown by 17.1% during the same period.
Of the Russian Federation’s 88 federal states, 21 are designated “autonomous” republics representing a relative majority of a particular indigenous ethnic people inhabiting their traditional homeland in much the same way a colonial possession may be imagined. Each was allowed a constitution which remained subordinate to the Constitution of the Russian Federation. Each was granted use of its own official language for local administrative affairs although Russian would remain the official state language to be used for all federal administrative and legal affairs. A highly centralized overriding authority remained within Moscow. Individual republics were not allowed to secede and issues related to internal security, foreign policy, national defense and currency were matters that rested under the jurisdiction of the Kremlin.
Putin’s Fundamental Error
Over time, stricter limitations within the Russian Federation were imposed curtailing the political independence of the republics. During most of the Soviet administration (1922-1991), the Kremlin made certain that regional leadership was carefully vetted for loyalists of the regime among the ethnic minorities in order to retain a seamless extension of its power throughout the realm. Under Putin and particularly since the invasion of Ukraine in 2022, further Kremlin repression ensued to curb dissent and enforce conscription among the minority ethnic communities. Local autonomy waned and local cultures were once again stifled with an awakening sense of a return of marginalization reminiscent of Stalinist times. Methods of conscription disproportionally recruited those of non-Russian ethnicity, affecting predominantly those inhabiting the Caucasian and Asiatic portions of the Russian Federation rather than the European territory west of the Urals. Those ethnic Russians living in Moscow and St Petersburg and their immediate vicinity, where roughly 12% of the Russian Federation’s population resides, were made to feel that Putin’s “special military operation” was a remote conflict unlikely to affect their lifestyle.
To make matters worse, Putin has made a point of creating a new national identity emphasizing the Slavic heritage of ethnic Russians and reintroducing Russia’s long-abandoned spiritual past imbedded within the Russian Orthodox Church. No recognition is given to the cultures and religions of the impoverished ethnic minorities while their territories continue to be exploited for their oil, gas, and minerals leaving behind environmental ruin without compensation. They have once again become colonial inhabitants of a revived imperial dominion. Regional representation in parliament was stripped of power for the sake of a purported efficiency in managing legislation over the Russian Federation and to ensure its cohesion under a centralized authority. This broke the promise of regional sovereignty made by Boris Yeltsin in the constitution and effectively dismantled the federal system. By removing the means of remediating regional inequities, the fabric of the Russian Federation now no longer exists.
Forum of Free Nations of Post-Russia (FSNPR)
Once titled, the “Forum of Free Peoples of Russia” at its inception in May 2022 during the inaugural meeting in Warsaw, the organization was renamed with intentionality, the “Forum of Free Peoples of Post-Russia” in September 2022. It was organized less than three months after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine by the Journalists Solidarity Foundation and brought together prominent Russian political émigrés, exiled separatists, and foreign sympathizers at its first meeting. The FSNPR argued for the separation of republics with prominent non-Russian ethnic minorities and the formation of truly independent states. Before the year closed, four meetings had taken place, followed by five in 2023. The 10th Forum in April 2024 occurred in Washington DC where a declaration was adopted accusing the Kremlin of the occupation and enslavement of indigenous peoples of the Russian Federation. By 2023, attendance included 27 member organizations from across the Russian Federation in addition to foreign diplomats, journalists, economists, religious figures and political scientists.
The FSNPR has been criticized for making pronouncements regarding the collapse of a sovereign state without itself having state-sanctioned authority. Russian propagandists have attempted to deride the proceedings while the Kremlin has designated the FSNPR an undesirable organization. That the FSNPR has drawn this attention should underline its significance in expressing the legitimate grievances of indigenous people, more so at a time when the regime has taken further measures that denigrate non-Russian ethnic minorities. In November 2024, the Russian Supreme Court went on to declare the FSNPR and its 172 branch organizations an international terrorist agency for its promotion of separatism, ostensibly giving the Kremlin further authority to more severely punish internal dissent. The organization continues to convene in several hubs globally to review the current status of the Russian Federation’s indigenous peoples and discuss the means of undertaking democratic reform among the several regions in a changing environment.
An Armed Commitment to Fight
Just as Russia has been conscripting its ethnic minorities to fight on its behalf, several of these same people have made their way to Ukraine to join its armed forces to fight against Russia. During the Chechen Wars, Ukrainian nationalists fought with Chechen rebel forces against Russia’s armed forces because of a shared desire to resist Russian imperialism. In much the same way, Chechen military units began forming in 2014 when Russian paramilitary forces first overtook Crimea. Veterans of the Chechen wars have fought alongside Ukrainian Armed Forces (UAF) on a number of fronts within occupied Ukrainian territory. For Chechens, the new war reignited the effort of again striking out at a long-reviled enemy and has fostered again aspirations toward independence for their own land. Five Chechen battalions were formed, among them, the Djokhar Dudayev and Sheikh Mansur Battalions, the latter named after an 18th century Chechen military leader who led the first armed resistance (1784-1785) against Russian expansion into the North Caucasus. Both battalions were part of the International Legion of Territorial Defense of Ukraine before the latter was disbanded in early 2026 to reform into specialized assault regiments within the UAF. Ukraine does continue to operate a separate international unit that recruits foreign fighters with prior combat experience under its military intelligence unit (HUR).
The Sibir Battalion was formed mostly of Buryats, Tuvans and Yakuts whose homelands contain much of the resource-rich territories east of the Ural Mountains and from which the Kremlin extracts much of the wealth that fuels its war economy. These same territories have sacrificed much of their youth on behalf of Putin’s war when they were disproportionately targeted for conscription in the early years and used in Russia’s frontline assaults. In Buryatia, eyewitness reports indicated that local men were dragged from their houses in the night and brought to enlistment facilities. According to the 2021 Russian census, the territory had a population of 978,588 or 0.3% of the Russian Federation’s total population but accounted for 1.16% of all casualties on the Russian side during the initial two years of the war. The Ukraine-aligned Sibir Battalion fought in the Donbas primarily in the Battle of Avdiivka and have actually undertaken cross-border raids alongside two other Ukraine-aligned Russian paramilitary groups, the Freedom of Russia Legion (FRL) and the Russian Volunteer Corps (RVC) into the Belgorod and Kursk Oblasts in the Russian Federation.
To the north of Moscow and St Petersburg in the Republic of Karelia and neighboring territories dwell the Finno-Ugric peoples several of whom have chosen to fight against Russia. Their grievances are not dissimilar from those of ethnic minorities dwelling east of the Ural Mountains who regard the Kremlin’s repressive policies as reflecting a centralized imperialist attitude. Sufficient numbers had joined with the Ukrainians to warrant the creation of Operation Command North or the NORD military unit enrolled under the HUR. Many see this as their struggle for independence not unlike that which culminated in Finland’s independence from Russia’s emerging revolutionary government in the early 20th century.
In the late 15th century, a warrior class of horsemen arose in what were called the borderlands of present-day southern Ukraine. Their purpose initially was to defend the farms and communities of their homeland against the frequent raids of neighboring Crimean Tatars who had later aligned with the Ottoman Empire. These were the Cossacks who evolved into an autonomous military unit centered within the present-day Kherson and Zaporizhia Oblasts of Ukraine. Their numbers swelled to 40,000 by the mid-17th century becoming a formidable force that fought the Ottomans to the south, the Poles to the west and Russians to the north. Their particular history as freedom fighters has been foundational to the spirit of modern Ukraine and underlies its resilience against Russian aggression. Over time, the Cossack ethos was adopted by others in the neighboring steppe regions of the Russian Empire, some of whom became integrated within Russia’s imperial armed forces.
A generational Cossack heritage has remained among those within the southern lands of the Russian Federation, but a divide has been exposed among their numbers by Russia’s war in Ukraine. While Kremlin-backed Cossacks have continued to fight for Russia, those of actual ancestral origin have joined the ranks of the UAF, specifically the RVC, against Russia. These “free Cossacks,” as they are called, are made up largely of two groups in the Russian Federation neighboring Ukraine, the Don Cossacks of the Don River Basin and the Kuban Cossacks of the Krasnodar Krai region. Both have had long-held deep historical, cultural and ethnic ties to Ukraine. In fact, at the time of the collapse of the Russian Empire, the Kuban People’s Republic sought, unsuccessfully, political union with the Ukrainian People’s Republic. They have advocated for the liberation of their lands from the Russian Federation envisioning its actual disintegration with a new vision of a post-Putin Russia. This, in turn, has invited the wrath of the Kremlin leading to their persecution. Ironically, the Kremlin has for some time tried desperately to co-opt the legacy of the original Cossacks of the Kherson and Zaporizhia regions and make it part of Russia’s historical narrative but to no avail.
The Crimean Tatars of present-day Crimea are an indigenous Turkic-speaking people who bear a particular hatred toward Russians that harkens back to Tsarist times of the 18th through to the early 20th centuries. The Stalinist-era genocide (1944-1947) of the Tatars stands out as perhaps one of the most brutal episodes of the subsequent Soviet period marked by the sudden forced deportation of the Crimean Tatar population to predominantly central Asia. Upward of 240,000 were exiled with as many as 30,000 dying in the initial stages from hunger, thirst, disease and exposure. It was later revealed that more than 46% or 109,956 of the deported Tatar population perished during the entire interval. Many Tatars returned to Crimea during the Perestroika era in 1989 and particularly after Ukraine achieved its independence. By 2001, a Ukrainian census identified 243,433 Crimean Tatars representing a notable milestone in their repatriation.
A new nightmare for the Tatars would return in 2014 with Russia’s invasion and annexation of Crimea that launched its conflict with Ukraine. When its full-scale invasion of Ukraine began in 2022, a partisan network of Ukrainians and Crimean Tatars formed under the name ATESH, the Tatar word for “fire.” The unit operates as a decentralized covert paramilitary organization and is supported by a unit of the AFU Special Operations Forces. They provide intelligence for striking strategic targets, conduct sabotage operations within the Russian-occupied territories of Ukraine and in the Russian Federation, disrupting supply lines and destroying railway logistics primarily. A key intervention has been the elimination of electronic warfare systems enabling Ukrainian drones to strike vital fuel depots and refineries. ATESH has developed a considerable underground network effective in dismantling the Russian rear support infrastructure and its air-defense operations. With such disruptions in Crimea in particular, conditions have now reached a point where the Russian military has been evacuating naval command staff with their families and what has remained of its Black Sea Fleet to Russian shores. Even air defense systems are being withdrawn because of their vulnerability, hardly a sign of confidence for those remaining.
Epilogue
It would be wrong to discount the current resentment of ethnic minorities toward the Kremlin. It has escalated from earlier stages of Putin’s war in Ukraine to a point where it could contribute significantly to the ultimate disintegration of the Russian Federation. The sentiment is widespread and amounts to a serious threat to a regime that is not only losing ground militarily in Ukraine but losing Russia’s future economically. General public dissatisfaction has grown over a protracted war, persistently high inflation and mounting taxation. Significant numbers from Russia’s ethnic communities have taken up arms against the Kremlin on the Ukrainian front while Russian military casualties approach 1.4 million. Morale and military unit cohesion have degraded considerably. Desertions doubled from 2024 to 2025 with estimates exceeding 70,000. As the tide of war shifts in favor of Ukraine and further territorial gains succeed in areas such as Crimea, a momentum may gather on Russia’s domestic front that creates the sort of unexpected outcome most feared in the Kremlin – the collapse of the regime and a return of chaos on a massive scale. A new Russia may be forced to reconsider how it thinks of itself without an aligned federation of ethnic minorities who have been repeatedly denied their independence for the sake of Moscow’s convenience.
‘When Ukrainians return to the land where their ancestors are buried, those living on this land will envy the dead.”
– Djokhar Dudayev
Copyright @Kost Elisevich, MD, PhD 2026. All rights reserved. Any illegal reproduction of this content will result in immediate legal action.
