When Rhetoric Clouds the Realities of Russia’s War 
Part II: The Elusive “Ironclad” Security Guarantee

“The only clue to what man can do is what man has done.” 
Robin George Collingwood, historian and political philosopher (1889-1943); from “The Idea of History.”

The term, “security guarantee,” brings with it a sense of comfort provided a vulnerable nation by other nations with assurances that substantial force will be brought to bear upon an aggressor that threatens its well-being. When the vulnerable nation is not made a member of a group like NATO whose charter expressly defines the obligations of all members to intervene in an expected manner, such “security guarantees” become, over time, a matter of debate, or worse, of inconvenience.

In return for ceding its eastern territories to Russia, limiting the size of its military, and preventing its acceptance within NATO, Ukraine is given an ill-defined 10-year commitment from the U.S. and its European allies of a collective military response to any further Russian aggression. From the outset, Volodymyr Zelensky has refused to concede Ukrainian territory, whether occupied by Russia or not, as the Ukrainian Constitution disallows it and, more so, the people stand opposed to it. To be clear, Vladimir Putin appears bent on rejecting the proposed peace plan outright, committing instead to move forward with his invasion in order to overtake further territory and keep his war economy in place as a matter of his own survival. Even that has its limits.

It is unclear what the Trump administration will bring to the table regarding the proposed security guarantee as it maintains that no U.S. military personnel would be deployed in Ukraine. The clear favoritism displayed toward Russia with its initial peace plan and the recent release of the U.S. National Security Strategy suggest a disregard for Ukraine’s future as a viable sovereign nation without further support from the West. Despite the Trump administration’s attempts to downgrade U.S. support for Ukraine, NATO, and Europe, the U.S. House of Representatives approved an $8 billion increase over that of the Trump plan, setting aside $400 million in security assistance for Ukraine in its 2026 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA). In addition, it barred U.S. troop reduction in Europe below 76,000 and prevented removal of high-end military assets. Strong bipartisan support may actually see the bill make it through at a time when Trump’s influence over Congress seems to be waning. Europe has, otherwise, committed to preparing itself against further Russian intervention in its affairs with a massive increase in investment for its own defense industry while it continues its support of Ukraine’s military operations.

Considering Russia’s historically consistent record of violating security guarantees and justifying its actions by unsubstantiated claims, it’s not difficult to imagine it abrogating any agreement pertaining to Ukraine, in particular. Putin does not believe in a Ukraine as anything more than part of Russia. Nations claiming to support Ukraine may, likewise, after some elapsed time, find reason not to intervene in the manner originally promised, seeking less aggressive measures in the hopes of minimizing expenditures during a period of economic inconvenience. The Kremlin is quite familiar with how the passage of time can erode the will to respond in force when influenced by the geopolitical perspectives of succeeding governments in the West. The conveniently termed “assurances” issued in the 1994 Budapest Memorandum that saw Ukraine give up its nuclear arsenal, obviated the need for U.S. and UK signatories to directly intervene in Russia’s invasion of Crimea in 2014 as there was no legally binding requirement to do so. The same came true when the West provided incremental military aid following Russia’s 2022 invasion of the entirety of Ukraine, creating an unnecessary stalemate in the conflict.

As if to placate European concerns regarding further threats of invading more of its territory, it seemed necessary for the Russian Foreign Minister, Sergey Lavrov, to announce at the United Nations in late September of this year that Russia had no intentions of doing so. The statement was given following the recent failed Alaska summit between Putin and Trump to seek an end to the war. Lavrov did qualify his announcement by indicating that a “decisive response” would occur in the case of any aggression. Of course, with Lavrov, one would have to clarify what that actually meant as this was the same individual who, in January, 2022, denied that an invasion of Ukraine was about to occur when more than 160,000 Russian troops with heavy armament were already amassed on Ukraine’s border before war broke out in February. The only aggression instigated at the time was the Russian-supported separatist rebellion in eastern Ukraine which had brought about a civil war.

Russia has long engaged in a bellicose manner toward its neighbors. This history dates back to Stalin’s pact with Nazi Germany in 1939 when Soviet Russia invaded eastern Poland less than three weeks after the Nazis attacked Poland from the west to launch World War II. Soon after, Russia would go on to invade Romania, the Baltic nations, and Finland before the Nazis would turn upon the Soviet Union in 1941. For his turn, Putin manufactured a war with Chechnya early in his presidency and conducted a brutal campaign of annihilation focused upon its capital, Grozny. He installed a puppet regime whose current leader, Ramzan Kadyrov, has aided Russia in its war with Ukraine and recently announced his readiness to confront Europe in support of Putin’s threats toward it. Putin’s invasion of Chechnya’s neighbor, Georgia, in 2008 secured the breakaway regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia under Russian influence. Another Russian Black Sea naval base is now under construction in the former region.

A recent release at the Berlin Summit by leaders of the European Union (EU), Ukraine and U.S. negotiators set forth a statement officially confirming support for Ukraine’s entry into the EU as a foundation for its long-term security. A legally binding security guarantee is included that provides for wide-ranging intervention in the case of any new Russian attack. It further supports the maintenance of a Ukrainian land force numbering upwards of 800,000 troops and provides a European multinational force to safeguard Ukraine’s airspace and maritime region. These terms appear destined for rejection by Russia should it choose to have a say in the matter. The proposal has merit but lacks the substance of the kind that NATO would provide in the immediate timeframe. Moreover, it is in Ukraine’s best interest to similarly seek membership in NATO which is militarily well-prepared to offer the sort of mantle of protection from the outset as guaranteed in its 1949 charter. As a reminder, an “irreversible” path to NATO membership for Ukraine was declared at the 2024 Washington Summit.

Epilogue                                                                                                 
Ukrainians have witnessed too many broken promises regarding their sovereignty to put much faith in grand pronouncements without a hard-fast commitment to the realities of the moment. Security guarantees may collapse acutely or dwindle over time, often overstepped by unfounded grievances of an aggressor, the sudden unexplained occurrence of a staged violation of the terms of the agreement or simply an unwarranted abrogation of it. Time, near and far, is the measure by which one must judge the true substance of a guarantee. It must be secured through an established and reputable authority with the wherewithal to mete out the appropriate response to a violation. A decisive end to the war is required, not one that leaves open further opportunity for a malign nation to pursue its goals unabated. This argues for the inclusion of the 2024 NATO guarantee within any peace deal put forward. Putin opposes this first and foremost because it upends his imperialist fantasies and brings his war to an undeniable end.

“Negotiations are not a substitute for force. When international negotiations work, often it is because aggressors know what is going to happen if it doesn’t work.”
Thomas Sowell, 2004, from “Weapons of Political Destruction.”

Copyright @Kost Elisevich, MD, PhD 2025. All rights reserved. Any illegal reproduction of this content will result in immediate legal action.