Before we become too enamored with the notion that the Russian state and its governance represents the sort of model for us to emulate and the kind of partnership we must seek in a world increasingly in need of security against the global threats of war, economic collapse, climate change and disease, a timely review of the example set by Russia is in order. Russia’s fate has been so intertwined with the sole aspirations of its resident dictator that it now faces the prospect of not simply military defeat in a poorly conceived attempt to overtake a neighboring sovereign nation but the ignominy of ultimate economic collapse. Rather than avoiding such “foibles” of authoritarian rule, some European and other western nations have been engaged in the idea of following suit with their own versions of populist ideals. Ahead of most other nations in its wild pursuit toward similar autocracy is Viktor Orbán’s Hungary, well along in its decline into authoritarian rule, and therefore equally suited for similar scrutiny.
A populist sentiment has taken root in a number of countries, where it is often driven by immigration issues, for which legitimate grievances surely exist and remain unsettled despite the efforts of democratic administrations. The problem worsens when a self-serving political opportunism infuses hateful and exaggerated rhetoric to advance the platform of a movement intent on assuming government power. In doing so, the ruling party is then obliged to undertake whatever draconian measures are available to fulfill its immediate commitment to solving the problem which it so vigorously promoted. The real problem, however, was not so much the original complaint that propelled the party into power but the nature and ultimate intent of that movement.
Populist governments are, by definition, ill-suited to handle complex matters of governance. Characterized by style, swagger and atmospherics offering superficial and simplistic solutions; enthusiastic sloganeering form the core of the populist’s playbook – the antithesis of the toolkit needed to deal with a deadly pandemic or reconcile the several forces currently existing globally.
– Fiona Hill, Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institution, Chancellor of Durham University
Once started, the process of governance, particularly that of right-wing persuasion, takes on an increasingly illiberal character through not only executive action but the support of a legislative majority of sycophants and a subordinated judiciary. It is than only a matter of time until the constitution is altered to suit the needs of the regime. Independent media is replaced by a state-run enterprise that provides the regime’s version of reality for public consumption, the educational system is made to conform to assure a universal mindset of loyalty to a centralized authority, a pervasive national security apparatus institutes measures against any societal deviancy, and an electoral process is established whereby succession of the regime is assured.
At the outset, a right-wing sort of populism may be aligned with a recognizable entity such as Christian nationalism, or may take on a more universal attitude seeking favor among a significant plurality by offering oversimplified solutions to such problems as economic uncertainty or social unrest. The process plays more upon the emotions of the public rather than providing any rational long-term means of settlement. There is no foundational agenda that seeks to better the nation overall. Once in power and, provided the necessary subsequent steps are successfully executed, the populist notion gives way to authoritarian rule and is only revived when a sufficient need for it occurs or is created. A good example of the latter is Vladimir Putin’s war upon Ukraine for which there is no worthwhile justification, despite the efforts of a few Western scholars. Rather, it is only the misled revanchist attitude of yet another Russian imperialist that matters.
Putin’s Russia and its Federation
Putin’s particular populist approach has involved an awakening of nationalist sentiment conflated with a revival of Russia’s historic religious spiritualism to create his own brand of Christian nationalism. Putin uses this to combat the evil of a fantasized Nazi regime in Ukraine that somehow threatens Russia’s existence while his regime claims to be victimized by the threat of encroachment by NATO from the west. The irony that seems to have escaped Russia’s attention is that NATO itself was and is a defensive alliance, established expressly to counter Russian belligerence and expansionism which became all too evident following World War II. Russia was and continues to be the threat. It is precisely the reason why so many eastern European nations have flocked to NATO out of fear of the recidivism that Russia has demonstrated over past centuries, seeking dominion over its neighbors. They have all simply had enough of Russian oppression and wish something better.
Much has been written of Putin’s kleptocratic regime and his particularly brutal brand of authoritarianism characterized by numerous extrajudicial executions of those critical of his regime, suppression of independent media, state-driven judicial sentencing bias of Stalinist proportions, restriction of civil liberties and human rights, rampant systemic corruption, electoral malfeasance, and unlawful incursions upon sovereign territory to mention some. The comparative lack of priority given to the handling of domestic affairs in all its domains within the Russian Federation (RF) is a good example of mismanagement by an overly centralized authority lacking adequate oversight, funding and quality assurances. The rights granted to its 22 “autonomous” republics that are part of the RF have been gradually taken back to strengthen the Kremlin’s authority over them and, more importantly, their resources.
For Russian society, despite familiarity with the shortcomings of its regime and tolerance for the latter’s long history of corruption, the predominant sentiment regarding Putin’s war has centered upon finding justification from the regime’s propaganda that NATO has been the aggressor threatening their motherland. It is a matter of patriotic symbolism with its familiar taint of national chauvinism that operates in the distorted reality created by the state. The mounting toll of death and the welfare consequences of serious disability among the troops returning from the war in Ukraine will have both a psychological and a long-term economic impact as the war proceeds relentlessly without compromise. It will contribute to the uncertainty about the sustainability of an overall quality of life in a country which thus far has been compensated by government financing. As Russia continues its shift into its war economy under unprecedented international sanctions and increased global isolation, will its public finally face a new reality? Conservative estimates of Russian military personnel put out of action since the onset of war now far exceed 500,000 with about 2% of all Russian men aged 20 to 50 years killed or severely wounded.
According to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) Better Life Index, the average household net-adjusted disposable income per capita in the RF is $19,546 per year compared to the OECD average of $30,490 per year among its 38 nations. Private access to an indoor flushing toilet can be found in 86.2% of Russian homes, well below the OECD average of 97%. Only 62% of Russians are satisfied with water quality compared to 84% in OECD countries. Life expectancy at birth in the RF is 73 years, eight years below that of an OECD average of 81 years. Comparative homicide rates in each amount to 4.8 and 2.6 per 100,000, respectively. Survival to age 65 years for a Russian male is 55% with an overall male life expectancy reported in 2022 of 67.6 years.
The question now will be whether the added societal stressors from the uncertainties that will plague the Russian economy result in a lagging of public support for the war. Until recently, a conformist public attitude has allowed Putin’s regime to continue on its war footing while the economy has been driven by military spending and largely financed by Russian reserves and fossil fuel export with new markets established in Asia, Africa and South America. Inflationary pressures and a tightened labor market threatened by military conscription and the departure from the country of substantial numbers of young workers will add to wartime disenchantment.
Workers have shifted from nonmilitary manufacturing jobs to the armament industry out of necessity and for better pay They produce materiel that is being destroyed at an alarming rate on the battlefield without any return on investment. While sanctions on Russian oil export continue to tighten by undertaking measures to counter Russia’s circumvention of shipping requirements, the Ukrainians have turned their attention to the destruction of oil refineries, depots and shipping ports, compromising Russia’s ability to maintain its schedule of export. A number of these facilities cannot be returned to their previous state for lack of Western parts and technologies.
A July 2024 Pew Research Center report regarding global views of Russia in a survey of 35 countries indicates that opinions by the majorities in more than 50% were unfavorable. Of the 10 European countries surveyed, unfavorable views were expressed among 80% or more of the population in seven while the remaining three, including Hungary, reported more than 70% with the same sentiment. Elsewhere within the world, a greater variance among countries was seen although an unfavorable opinion over a favorable dominated in 17 of the remaining 25 (68%), particularly in the U.S., Canada, Australia, Japan, and Israel where again unfavorable views commanded 80% or more of the individual populations. Few countries likewise expressed confidence in Putin regarding global affairs with an overall median of 73% showing disfavor. Those persons more ideologically to the right tended to lean more in favor of Putin although, despite such a trend in Hungary (i.e., 34% vs 7%), the majority of the population (77%) still lacked confidence in his handling of global affairs. Of some relevance regarding Putin’s desire to lead an effort to develop an economic powerhouse within the Global South, a drop in confidence in his leadership was evident among a number of noteworthy countries – India, Brazil, Argentina, Mexico, Columbia, Philippines, Turkey and Ghana.
Orbán’s Hungary
The Hungarian public’s response to the protracted authoritarianism of Viktor Orbán’s Fidesz-led government has been far more robust in its protest than that within Russia against Putin. Its restrictive policies have been well documented since Orbán’s return to the prime ministership in 2010. The attack upon independent journalism and media freedom has had the clear intention of denying Hungarians access to a global perspective enough so that Human Rights Watch has urged the European Union (EU) to recognize the government’s “erosion of the rule-of-law” and impose sanctions for breach of EU values.
Independence of the judiciary has been undermined by a lack of transparency in judicial appointments by the president of the National Office for the Judiciary (NJO), a post created by Orbán in 2011, placing unparalleled influence over the court by someone over whom he would have control particularly in politically sensitive matters. This was made all the more apparent when the first such president turned out to be the godmother of Orbán’s first-born child. Court rulings have upheld laws that threaten imprisonment for those who aid asylum seekers, forced one of the few remaining independent broadcasters off air, and supported fines levied against Amnesty International Hungary because of its campaign against the government’s anti-LGBTQ+ law.
Orbán’s ruling party with its supermajority control of a unicameral parliament pushed through a law creating a separate administrative court system to handle cases affecting such issues as elections, the right to asylum and to assembly, and most concerning, protections against police violence. Hungary’s Minister of Justice, a political appointee, is given authority over the court budget without judicial oversight, again steering control of the judiciary to the executive branch. The Hungarian court has not asked the European Court of Justice (ECJ) to review the government’s constitutional changes and thus far it has avoided the challenge of the primacy of EU law. Since the packing of the Constitutional Court by Orbán’s Fidesz Party loyalists, the judges have ceased to contradict the government in any cases deemed politically relevant as with issues concerning immigration and specifically asylum.
Hungary’s economy benefited substantially with its 2004 entry into the EU. With Orbán as president, Hungary has been declared as somehow unique within the EU and, to this point, his regime has been critical of what it states as the intrusions of a European bureaucracy. In doing so, it has rejected asylum seekers, eroded the independence of state institutions and eliminated certain normative liberal standards. Orbán has otherwise made Hungary dependent upon Russian oil, gas and nuclear energy while isolating it from the EU with his opposition to EU-imposed sanctions upon Russia and resistance to aiding Ukraine. Orbán has been intent upon advantaging his government by balancing relations between western and eastern blocs, benefiting from EU financial support while inviting investments from China and Russia. These actions have put Orbán at odds with the EU which has undertaken an economic security strategy to reduce any supply chain dependencies upon both countries which it considers unfriendly. Orbán, on the other hand, sees Hungary as a gateway for China into Europe and using relations with China to become a leader in battery technology for the automotive industry.
Hungary’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) declined by 0.9% in 2023 with a background of high inflation and tight financing conditions in the aftermath of Orbán’s mismanagement of the coronavirus pandemic among other concerns. Inflation has diminished and GDP is expected to show some recovery later in 2024. However, government debt to GDP in 2023 rose to 73.5% compared to a prior average of 69.4% of GDP (1995 – 2023) and a record low of 51.7% in December 2001. In March 2024, government debt-to-GDP accounted for 75.9% or $158.6 billion. Hungary’s current credit rating in the B range according to Fitch, S&P and Moody’s does not compare favorably with that of other EU nations. The country’s debt burden doubled through the third quarter of 2023 raising the prospects of becoming the worst in the EU while recording the highest inflation rate in the EU at 17% compared to the EU average of 6.4% the same year. Hungary’s debt-servicing costs for 2024 are projected to be the highest in the EU with an interest rate on government debt at 6.8%. Its interest-to-government-revenue ratio has doubled from 5% in 2021 to 10% in 2024 raising significant uncertainty regarding the strength of any recovery. Economic outlook remains dependent upon energy prices, namely Russian-supplied natural gas and oil import which are threatened by sanction as well as conflict-related supply interruptions and global investor sentiment.
A continued anxiety over the economy is fueled by an overabundance of corruption by the Orbán regime and its inability to contain it in the public sector. Hungary has retained its ranking over some time as the EU’s most corrupt country according to the most recent edition of the Corruption Perception Index (CPI), an annual compilation by the Berlin-based Secretariat of Transparency International. It is the culmination of a continuous downward trend soon after Orbán assumed the presidency. Adding to the embarrassment, the country finds itself in the lower half of a worldwide ranking of 180 countries for its level of state corruption. Not surprisingly, Russia has scored even lower than Hungary. A strong correlation can be drawn between the extent of corruption within a country and the lack of independence of its judiciary while a negative relationship with economic growth as measured by its per capita GDP is well known.
It is not only Orbán’s corruption that has angered the EU but his obsequious behavior toward Putin, arguing in 2022 that EU sanctions against Russia be lifted in a petulant response to the European Commission after it called for a halt in EU funding of $7.5 billion for Hungary because of its manifest corruption and violations of the rule-of-law. Blaming Europe’s energy crisis at the time upon EU sanctions put Orbán at odds with the EU argument that Putin was financing his assault on Ukraine with the revenue generated from Russia’s fossil fuel export. Orbán’s particular predicament, however, may have also caused him to reflect upon Hungary’s considerable dependence upon Russian energy that he had brought about. Moreover, his opposition to provision of aid for Ukraine has made it obvious that he was fast becoming a pariah within the EU when he was most in need of its continued funding to sustain his struggling economy. This outlook, in fact, forced Orbán recently to relent in his opposition to the delivery of $54 billion in aid to Ukraine over the coming four years.
In his continued campaign seeking relevance in today’s geopolitical climate, Orbán who recently began his six-month tenure as president of the EU’s Council of Ministers, set off on a whirlwind visit meeting first with Volodymyr Zelensky in Ukraine. There he attempted to secure a ceasefire at a time when Russia was in the midst a new assault in the east of the country and had attempted a coup to trigger a riot in Kyiv with the intent to seize parliament. A ceasefire would only allow Russia time to strengthen any gains that it had made in order to proceed with its offensive as it was inclined to do. Orbán’s tour then took him to Moscow for a meeting with Putin where there was likewise no substantive resolution. A subsequent Beijing meeting with Xi Jinping came a day before the NATO summit in Washington DC where China’s participation in Russia’s war effort would be discussed. China’s alliance with Russia seems very likely to stand in the way of any improvement with the EU as a trading partner while Orbán’s attempt at playing the conduit between east and west appears equally unlikely for someone who has little to show for his commitment to the EU.
The Course of Authoritarian Leadership
Too often in the life of an authoritarian regime, when the nation has become complacent with the notion that existence is manageable within a protective yet socially restrictive environment, its leader is left to engage in independent decision-making. The fruits of such independent thought have led to historically catastrophic outcomes as was the case with Hitler’s war in Europe 80 years previously. A similar episode has now taken shape with Putin’s invasion of Ukraine. With what started as a “special military operation” has now transformed into a protracted war in which his Russia has been compelled to assume a war economy because of its inherent longstanding corruption. The outcome of even this latter decision is in question given that Putin’s imperialist ambitions are exceeding the capacity of Russia’s isolated economy to sustain the military effort needed while dealing with its own increasing domestic demands. As Russian atrocities continue to mount in Ukraine and its well-recognized state-sponsored criminal enterprise continues globally, and as both Russia and Putin face increasing global disdain and isolation, a catastrophic collapse reminiscent of its previous demise as the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) looks increasingly likely.
In similar fashion, Orbán’s regime, awash with accusations of corruption, his nation’s energy almost entirely dependent upon Russia, an economy in distress and a basement-level reputation in Europe, appears not a suitable candidate to act as some sort of bridge between east and west let alone a stabilizing presence in his own country. Orbán’s bizarre indulgence on the world stage looks to have been fueled in part by the recognition given to him by America’s right-wing political establishment that is drawn to his authoritarian playbook. Indeed, a blueprint has been laid out for the U.S. to undertake a similar decline in its society.
Robert Fico’s Slovakia appears to be in a similar circumstance with authoritarian aspirations and a desire to align with Russia despite membership in both the EU and NATO. Questionable policies restricting public protest, removal of funding for LGBTQ+ groups, elimination of a special prosecutor’s office investigating political corruption, and increasing attacks on independent media are paving a familiar path to autocratic rule for a regime led by someone intent on having close relations with Putin. Public discontent has manifested over attempts by the regime to reduce punishment for corruption. Slovakia’s parliament formally designated Putin’s regime a state sponsor of terrorism a little more than a year ago and emphasizes the dichotomy of sentiment that exists within the country.
The control exerted by an increasingly authoritarian regime threatens the fabric of a free society that allows debate, innovation and choice, in addition to providing for an unbiased judiciary and an independent media that exposes the faults of government regimes and other agencies that stray from the rule-of-law. Such arrangements provide a social dynamic that encourages ongoing feedback, keeping society along a narrow, just and sustainable path. If left in the control of a single person or regime, a fascist state is not far off and freedom is lost. Several movements are afoot throughout the world that seek autocratic rule. Those that succeed lead their nations often to dismal outcomes and are only forced out after too long a time spent in misery. It is time to be watchful.
Copyright @Kost Elisevich, MD, PhD 2024. All rights reserved. Any illegal reproduction of this content will result in immediate legal action.
