Vladimir Putin’s malevolence spreads well beyond the borders of Ukraine. Russia’s immediate neighbors in the European Union (EU) can attest to the various means by which they are threatened – engineered mass migration that attempts to destabilize social order, cyberattacks upon financial and governmental institutions, disinformation campaigns focused upon societal grievances, sabotage, assassinations and other devices to be elaborated upon here. Territorial proximity, however, is not a prerequisite for Russian intrusion. Similar approaches have been applied to other nations throughout the world and particularly in the West which Putin regards as his archetypal enemy in the manner typical of his Soviet upbringing.
Under Putin’s leadership, Russia has gained a reputation of espousing exceptionalism and, with that, a sense of entitlement whereby justification for the unlawful invasion of a neighboring nation like Ukraine can be built upon tortured fabrications of the imagination. Among these is an absurd notion of a fascist regime in Ukraine that threatens Russia’s survival when it has itself to accuse of the same; another is a fantasy arising out of 19th century Russian historiography claiming Ukraine’s origin to be an early version of Russia. Finally, there is the perceived threat of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) attempting to undermine Russia’s security when, in actuality, it is Russia with its historically imperialist ambitions that presents the threat as the former Warsaw Pact nations of Eastern Europe can attest. Moreover, the Baltic nations and, more recently, both Finland and Sweden, have understood the same risks of sharing a border or some proximity, at a minimum, to the demon.
The brutality with which Putin’s war has been waged in Ukraine is well documented and, for the present, it is the nucleus by which his criminal enterprise may be initially judged. However, the scope of his efforts globally requires review to understand why it must be challenged and defeated by the global community at large. There is much at stake for the international order established soon after the conclusion of the world’s last great war, almost 80 years ago.
The Syrian Civil War and Russian Aggression
Unrest in Syria broke out in 2011 with a nationwide popular protest challenging Bashar al-Assad’s repressive regime, mirroring earlier reactions to authoritarian rule in Egypt and Tunisia during the Arab Spring. A civil war erupted following a heavily armed response to the unrest by the regime that was supported by Russia and China. Both would veto subsequent United Nations (UN) Security Council resolutions condemning Assad’s actions. Iran sent weapons to Assad and its affiliate in Lebanon, Hezbollah, sent fighters. In 2013, chemical weapons were deployed against the rebels indiscriminately killing innocent civilians in their proximity. Russia was already engaged at an early stage of the war in support of government forces by providing substantial arms and equipment.
In September 2015, Russia physically entered the war at the request of Assad to help defeat his Syrian opposition and the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). An extensive campaign of airstrikes upon opposition strongholds was initiated. The geopolitical objective for Putin was two-fold, the first to diminish U.S. influence in the Middle East and, the second, to gain a strategic foothold along the Mediterranean coast extending Russia’s reach to North Africa and the Red Sea region. Russian special forces and Putin’s mercenary Wagner Group unleashed their own brand of brutality, focusing their scorched-earth expertise upon the civilian population as much as upon military objectives. Interestingly, of the latter objectives, 80% of Russia’s aerial attacks in 2016 targeted the Syrian opposition militias engaged in fighting ISIL, exposing Syrian society to the extremist threats of a terrorist organization. ISIL would however ultimately come to lose control of all its Middle East territories by 2019 through the efforts of American, Kurdish and Iraqi forces, despite Russia’s interference.
By March 2016, Russian airstrikes alone had killed over 2,000 civilians according to the Syrian Network for Human Rights, an independent monitoring group based in the United Kingdom (UK). This was accomplished with the indiscriminate use of cluster bombs, incendiaries containing aluminum powder and iron oxide that resulted in severe penetrating burns, and thermobaric weapons that detonated an aerosolized explosive element suffocating and burning its victims. By April 30, 2018, after 31 months of Russian bombardment, the same monitoring group reported 7,700 civilian victims, among them, 1,851 children under the age of 18 years. Amnesty International has labeled these methods of war as violations of international humanitarian law, a matter more than familiar to the Russian military.
In the end, Russian intervention has seemingly assured Assad’s hold on power leaving Syria in a state of stalemate with rebel forces. By mid-2023, Russia had established 105 military sites in Syria with its presence given some promise of permanency by the Assad regime to maintain stability within the country. Russia’s two primary military bases consist of the Khmeimim Air Base in Latakia, a coastal port city in northern Syria, and a naval base in Tartus, 53 miles to the south where part of Russia’s Northern Fleet is housed, consisting presently of three landing ships. A close collaboration between Iran, which has its own military presence in Syria, and Russia has existed within the country since 2015.
Russia’s Weaponization of Syrian Migration
A stampede of predominantly Syrian migrants directed toward Europe resulted from the extreme violence of Russia’s bombing campaign in support of Assad’s own forces. By early 2016, almost 129,500 had arrived by sea and another 1,545 by land, the great majority making its way through Greece. The harnessing of such a massive flow of humanity creates not only border and humanitarian crises but sprouts chaos and societal discord in those nations left to deal with the influx. Xenophobic and nativistic forces compel political movements and populist sentiments that within the context of European democracy can render serious divisions which again would work to Russia’s favor.
All this helped serve the purpose of not only causing political and social instability within Europe but distracted the West away from the conflict that arose with Russia’s deliberate paramilitary incursion within Crimea and eastern Ukraine in 2014, followed by the subsequent illegitimate annexation of Crimea. Eight years of conflict continued in the Donbas, the eastern regions of Ukraine, with Russian paramilitary operations supporting local subversive elements confronting Ukrainian forces before Russia’s outright invasion in February 2022.
Ironically, despite the problems it caused in Syria, Russia blocked entry of Syrian refugees or subjected them to further hostility when they presented themselves for asylum. Dmitry Peskov, Putin’s spokesman, seemingly unaware of Russia’s involvement in this suffering, suggested that nations responsible for causing the refugee crisis should be made to bear the cost. The absence of asylum for Syrians in Russia caused 5,500 of them to continue northward to pass through the Borisoglebsky-Storskog border crossing at about the 70°N latitude into Norway before this entry was closed. Worsening the situation for the Syrians, some were fined for presenting themselves as undocumented refugees at the interior ministry. When caught by police, they would be sent to migration detention centers to face deportation, returning them to the conflict zone.
Russian-Belarusian Collusion at the EU Border
Expanding upon the theme of nonmilitary hybrid warfare, Russia’s partnership with Belarus and its dictator, Alexander Lukashenko, has provided Putin further opportunity to create border havoc at another point of entry, this time threatening Poland and Lithuania. In 2021, just a few months before Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Belarusian authorities relaxed visa requirements encouraging thousands of migrants from conflict-ridden countries in the Middle East such as Iraq, Syria, Yemen, and Afghanistan to arrive in Belarus. Travel was facilitated by the Belarusian state-operated airline and the migrants were housed in government hotels. Belarus was, however, short on providing humanitarian aid otherwise but rather keen on herding them to its 250-mile border with Poland and the neighboring nations of Lithuania and Latvia. Some migrants appeared with Russian visas suggesting they had been facilitated through Russia by other means. This latter feature had become much more evident by the spring of 2024.
At the time, this action ostensibly was in response to EU sanctions imposed after Lukashenko’s brutal suppression of political opponents and protesters that challenged his reelection in 2020 after 27 years in power. The electoral system had been corrupted by the regime allowing Lukashenko to retain what effectively was a dictatorship. The border turbulence appeared strategically choreographed to suit Russia’s needs at the time as another large push of migrants into the EU would further fuel social and political unrest, encouraging right-wing extremists in the EU to react. By the autumn of 2021 while all this was in play, it had become more than evident that Russia was amassing troops along the Ukrainian border with an increasing likelihood of invasion.
In the meantime, not only were the migrants in Belarus accumulating in large numbers along the EU border but they were becoming increasingly aggressive with outbreaks of violence. The situation was worsened with the participation of the Belarusian border patrol who were supporting illegal passage through the border by directing migrants toward vulnerable areas and by attempting to blind the opposing border guards with laser lights. As if to highlight the collusion of the two regimes in this crisis, Russia and Belarus held military drills next to the Poland-Belarus border while thousands of migrants were stranded in freezing and increasingly unsanitary conditions of the late autumn. By this time, about 15,000 Polish troops had been deployed to the border in response to the stand-off that had developed as the EU attempted to quell the manufactured crisis. Extensive barriers were put in place and an exclusion zone 200 meters in width was created to stem the flow of migrants but the problem has continued to the present day with Russia’s involvement more clearly defined.
The Russo-Georgian War 2008
Before he invaded Ukraine, Putin attacked Georgia in August 2008. Unrest had existed in Georgia’s northern regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia since its independence from the Soviet Union was declared in 1991. A Russian-backed separatist movement in these two regions was the necessary substrate for Putin to engage in the affairs of Georgia when fighting broke out in South Ossetia. Since 2001, Putin had sought to undermine the region’s connection with Georgia. What further prompted Putin’s ambitions in Georgia was the latter’s increasing pro-West stance and its interest in joining NATO which had committed to the project at its Bucharest summit in 2008. Russian intentions were made clearer regarding the future of both Abkhazia and South Ossetia when a warning was given by Russia’s ambassador to NATO that Russia would seek their independence in such a circumstance. When Georgian forces moved in to quell the violence in South Ossetia, they encountered Russian troops which had illegally moved into the region. False accusations of genocide against Russian civilians within the region provided Putin the pretext to launch a full-scale war upon Georgia itself, justifying the assault in the humanitarian gloss of a “peace enforcement.”
Russian aerial bombardment ensued within and outside South Ossetia followed by a naval blockade of Georgia’s Black Sea coastline. Russia then recognized the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, after a ceasefire agreement was negotiated by President Sarkozy of France. The recognition was proclaimed only to affirm their autonomous status which had already been established in the early 1990s but still as parts of Georgia. The war had initially displaced 192,000 people and, six years later, over 20,000 mostly ethnic Georgians still had not reclaimed their homes. In 2021, the European Court of Human Rights declared Russia responsible for human rights abuses in the course of its military engagement and in 2022, the International Criminal Court indicted certain Russian nationals for war crimes against ethnic Georgians.
Russia has assumed de facto control of both Abkhazia and South Ossetia, despite the regions still internationally recognized as part of Georgia. Moreover, it has based a substantial number of military personnel in each of the regions some of which have now been recently redeployed to fight in Ukraine. Five permanent military bases have been established in South Ossetia alone. Apart from the gain of territory, Russia stands to further make use of Abkhazia’s 133-mile-long Black Sea coastline where it seeks to establish a major naval base in the port of Ochamchire over the objections of the Georgian parliament. The port is currently home to a number of Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) patrol boats. Russia’s modern history of claiming territory under questionable circumstances has been in keeping with its general policy of territorial acquisition by military occupation as was the case in Kaliningrad following WW2.
Russian Cyberattacks upon Foreign Nations
Cyber-crime has become an international phenomenon, much of it geared toward financial benefit. However, Russian operatives under Putin’s regime began a process of cyberespionage as a means of hybrid warfare to provide Russia strategic advantage by undermining vital interests within those nations it regarded to be aligned against it. At a 2012 Valdai conference, Putin discussed foreign policy under the title of “Russia and the Changing World” in which he mentioned the use of “soft power” in the form of a matrix of tools and methods for the purpose of achieving foreign policy goals without the use of arms. He suggested that these methods were being used to provoke extremist and nationalist attitudes, manipulate the public and interfere in the domestic policies of sovereign nations but failed to mention that Russia was already engaged in similar activity. At about the same time, Valery Gerasimov, Putin’s Chief of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces, and alleged author of what has been called the “Gerasimov doctrine,” put forward the notion of a new method of warfare that required an integration of nonmilitary capabilities to provide strategic advantage by undermining the security and political will of the adversary.
In 2007, Estonia, a former satellite of the Soviet Union, made plans to move a Russian WW2 memorial from its capital Tallinn prompting an angry Putin to react by disabling the country’s internet with a distributed denial of service (DDOS) cyberattack sustained over a three-week period. Public and private sector organizations were affected with targeting of state and commercial websites by overloading their servers with junk traffic making them inaccessible. This was the first known episode in which one nation threatened another’s security and independence through such an attack. In retrospect, Russia proved for itself the effectiveness of this sort of incursion as another means of hybrid warfare which would soon be applied elsewhere.
Both Georgia and Ukraine were targeted by Russia also in 2007 with the inclusion of “fake news” for the purpose of undermining democratic principles and polarizing easily manipulated elements of society. In 2008, when Lithuania outlawed the use of outdated Soviet symbols, Russian hackers defaced websites with symbols emblematic of the previous Soviet Union. A coordinated Russian military and cyber DDOS action was conducted for the first time during the Russo-Georgian war of 2008 with disruption of Georgia’s internal communications. In 2009, Russia launched cyberattacks upon two nations aligned with it in the Commonwealth of Independent States, Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan. In the first case, it was to do with forcing President Bakiyev of Kyrgyzstan to evict an American military base. In the second, it regarded a grievance with a media outlet which published a statement critical of Russia by President Nazarbayev of Kazakhstan.
A second coordinated military and DDOS attack, 32 times larger than the one conducted upon Georgia in 2008, compromised internet communication in Ukraine when Russian paramilitary overtook Crimea in March 2014. In May of the same year, shortly before Ukraine’s presidential election, Russia hacked its election commission although the Ukrainians were quick to resolve the problem with the subsequent arrest of the hackers.
The computer network of the German Bundestag was found to have been penetrated by Russian hackers in 2015 attempting to access the administrative networks of German politicians and NATO. Further concern was raised in 2016 when evidence was given that Germany’s parliamentary elections in the coming year would witness Russian cyber interference in an attempt to weaken the incumbent Chancellor Angela Merkel. Russia’s foreign outreach continued with its hackers gaining entry into the U.S. Democratic Party computer network and the e-mails of its officials which were then disseminated globally through WikiLeaks. The incursion was clearly intended to undermine Hillary Clinton’s candidacy for the presidency. Finland’s Foreign Ministry was given notice in 2016 that it had been compromised by Russian hackers in 2013 and that, at that time, it had been part of a wider campaign involving upwards of 50 nations.
Recent Russian cyberattacks have caused havoc within hospitals in the UK, defense, aerospace firms and political figures in Germany and the Czech Republic, and critical infrastructure entities in Sweden, Lithuania, Poland and Slovakia. Much of the activity has been tied to a group (“Fancy Bear”) linked to the Kremlin’s Main Directorate of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation (GRU), or simply the Russian military’s main intelligence Directorate. The attacks continue to gain momentum globally, specifically within the West, with accompanying increased vigilance and countermeasures taken correspondingly.
Russian Mercenary Incursion in Africa
For a long time now, Russia has meddled in the affairs of African nations as the first of a number of nations seeking influence, although its aggressive methods and motives have proven to be far more self-serving. Its purpose has been to extract wealth and undermine democracies in support of authoritarian regimes with which agreements can be more easily achieved by direct transactional relations rather than proceeding through the ambiguities of parliamentary debate. Aside from outright military engagement with the deployment of Kremlin-affiliated Wagner Group mercenaries in support of coups, Russia has introduced disinformation campaigns, interfered with national elections, traded arms for access to resources and overtaken national security services.
Russia has been the primary agent of disinformation in Africa, sponsoring 80 campaigns in 22 countries and representing almost 40% of all such campaigns. Its inclusion with China, the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia and Qatar accounts for nearly 60% of disinformation campaigns within the continent. Transnational campaigns, 16 of which belong to Russia, have emerged spreading anti-Western sentiment with two notable disinformation actors connected to Russia amassing a combined social media following of more than 28 million. The Wagner Group has used disinformation to specifically target Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger in West Africa. To retain power, military juntas in Mali and Burkina Faso have otherwise become dependent upon Russian support. Since seizing power in 2020, the junta in Mali has repeatedly broken its commitment regarding a transitional timeline while allowing the nation’s security and economic conditions to deteriorate alarmingly. A Taureg separatist coalition recently scored a major defeat of Mali forces and its Wagner allies by the Algerian border showing that Russia has only succeeded in creating greater instability by its actions and suffered the consequences. A similar situation has resulted in Niger following its miliary coup in July 2023 with deterioration of the nation’s security, economy and its social welfare. All the gains made under prior democratic leadership have been effectively erased with Islamist groups now creating unrest and forcing the junta to deploy Russian mercenaries in exchange for mining rights in the country’s gold-containing regions.
With Putin’s assassination of Yevgeny Prigozhin, leader of the Wagner Group, in 2023 and the group’s incorporation within the Russia’s military, any plausible deniability by Putin’s regime for ongoing systemic human rights violations (e.g., torture, pillaging, summary execution, sexual violence) perpetrated by the group, can no longer be pleaded. In the end, the recruitment of these Russians has only succeeded in exacerbating the violence and misery suffered by the people. Sadly, some African leaders have seen Russia as a means of validating their hold on power and Russia has been only too happy to accommodate them without investing much in the process. Another good example of the latter has been in effect since 2020 in the Central African Republic (CAR) where the Wagner Group has sought to exploit its gold, diamond, uranium and oil resources in exchange for the security it offers in support of the regime of Faustin-Archange Touadéra.
A derivative effect of the unrest within Africa exacerbated by Wagner mercenaries has been the massive displacement of peoples in the various conflict zones, particularly in the Sahel and central Africa. In the CAR alone, by the end of 2021, 722,000 were internally displaced. The UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs estimated that more than 60% of the population required urgent relief. Many would set out on a northward migration to Tunisia and Libya to escape the famine and violence. Russia, in turn, has also established two military bases in Libya under control of Wagner mercenaries, embedded GRU and special forces personnel, and moved in S300 air defense systems as if to secure its foothold strategically close to southern Europe. Wagner personnel have been further engaged in facilitating illegal migration into Europe by negotiating with smugglers who have pervaded the coast. Just as in the case of westward migration from the Middle East through Belarus, there has been significant movement of migrants toward Europe’s southern coastline, particularly Italy through North Africa for purposes that suit the needs of Russia again to destabilize societal and governmental institutions within the EU.
Russia’s March into Venezuela
Russia’s desire for authoritarianism to take root in Venezuela came to pass with the ascent of the Marxist leader Hugo Chávez in 1999 on a populist platform that attracted the working class and the poor. Putin came to power soon after in 2000 and engaged in an effort to draw Latin American nations into Russia’s sphere of influence much like his former leaders of the Soviet Union had done with Cuba and Nicaragua. But now the intent was broader with his vision of recruiting nations into a new world order that would challenge the one led by the U.S. Chávez shared a strong anti-U.S. sentiment and soon favored relations with Russia, strengthening them with the purchase of military equipment at a price of more than $4 billion. Further agreements in 2008 were made regarding cooperation on nuclear energy, a space defense system and provision of nuclear submarines by 2020.
Chávez died in 2013 and was succeeded by his vice president, Nicholás Maduro, in a special presidential election. Corruption had taken root in resource-rich Venezuela under Chávez and became a much greater problem under Maduro whose demagoguery has resulted in political and socioeconomic deterioration with an ever-widening wealth gap. This has manifested in hyperinflation, extreme poverty, food shortages, unemployment, a failing health care system, escalating crime and mortality rates, and substantial emigration. The latter became a major source of difficulty with the resultant stresses imposed upon the U.S. southern border, particularly during the Biden administration.
When Maduro was “re-elected” in 2018 under circumstances considered by neighboring nations, the EU, Canada and the U.S. to be fraudulent, Russia quickly and unscrupulously recognized the Maduro regime and, with China, vetoed a UN Security Council resolution that sought new presidential elections. Within the same year, in exchange for Russia’s assistance in terms of loans and bailouts over the previous number of years, Russia gained ownership of large portions of several Venezuelan oil fields and control of the future output of two Caribbean natural gas fields. Moreover, it assumed 49.9% control of CITGO, Venezuela’s wholly owned U.S. company, including three Gulf Coast refineries in exchange for $1.5 billion. By the end of 2018, Russia had invested $1 billion in Venezuela’s gold mining industry, and additional contracts were agreed upon to supply 600,000 tons of wheat and to modernize and maintain its armament within Venezuela.
Amid the strife within Venezuela, the questioned authority of Maduro after the fraudulent 2018 election, and concerns over Russia’s investments, Putin’s Wagner mercenaries began entering Venezuela in 2018 ostensibly to protect Maduro. Apart from training Venezuelan combat units and pro-regime militias, Wagner forces have been engaged in protecting oil refineries along with a number of resident Russian commercial entities. The mining of thorium, a radioactive metal that can be used in the aerospace industry as well as in nuclear reactions among other applications, has become another focus for protection by Wagner at established Russian extraction operations. Likewise, the group has been implicated in illegal gold mining where human rights have been violated and environmental damage incurred.
The July 2024 disputed presidential election in Venezuela, clearly corrupted by extensive government interference, has seen Wagner mercenaries among Venezuelan security forces during the protests that followed. The recent arrival and extended presence of Russian warships in Venezuela coincided with the election as if to send the message that backup was available if needed. Moreover, Maduro’s recent territorial dispute over neighboring Guyana’s Essequibo region has led to the upgrading of Venezuela’s nearby military airstrip, expansion of military facilities and a building of a bridge to facilitate crossing into the territory. The episode has appeared to be more of a distraction to avert attention from the election. However, should the U.S. be compelled to act militarily in any escalation of the dispute, the Russian presence would complicate the situation.
Putin’s State-Sponsored Criminal Actions
In July 2024, a plot by Russian agents to assassinate Armin Papperger, the Chief Executive Officer and Chairman of the Executive Board of Rheinmetall AG, the fifth largest arms producer in Europe, was exposed by a collaboration of U.S. and German intelligence agencies. It was one of a number of Russian plans to kill European defense industry executives who had been supporting Ukraine’s defense against Russia’s invasion. As another component of Putin’s hybrid warfare, Russia has engaged in several projects which have included warehouse arson, vandalism, and bomb plots, all part of a widespread sabotage operation within NATO member states targeting weapon supply lines and the individuals involved in their manufacture. Most, if not all, appear connected to Russia’s GRU intelligence agency.
The planning and execution of sabotage attacks by Russia has escalated this year with the intention of increasing the cost of support for Ukraine. A proxy method has been adopted whereby Russia recruits sympathizers online for surveillance and information gathering purposes followed by a possible destruction of the site of interest. The operations are seemingly carried out in a way to stay below the threshold of instigating a wrathful military response. These interventions are familiar to Putin with his knowledge of espionage operations by Soviet security. In the early days of the Cold War of the 1950s, the Soviets had hidden caches of high explosives and arms across Western Europe and possibly the U.S. with set plans to activate upon orders but which never materialized. The location of these stockpiles have largely remained undiscovered by the West although are certainly known to Putin.
Russian state-sponsored assassinations have otherwise been reintroduced by Putin and date back to 2004 to the early stages of his presidency when Chechen Vice President Zelimkhan Yanderbiyev, a nationalist seeking independence for Chechnya, was executed in Qatar by two Russian agents. A series of poisonings of Russian exiles and opposition figures on foreign soil have followed, some successful, others less so. Those that occur within Russia have a more violent profile – shootings, explosions, “falls” from windows or down several stairs, hanging. The knowledge now that those individuals targeted for execution are citizens of other nations turns the page on the nature of such crimes. It must question whether the nation responsible for them can be made to face the consequences in a manner that compels it to desist much as it should have been made to do when it first invaded Ukraine in 2014.
Putin the Soviet
Putin appears to have convinced his people of the need for a Greater Russia, one that proclaims itself to be dominant among other nations, to be feared for its greatness so that it may lead others in a new world order within which other authoritarian regimes may feel compelled to belong. He has failed but others within his regime will yet wonder whether they may reinvent themselves and assume a similar dictator’s persona with similar intentions. The Soviet era mentality remains with its need to engage in a race to better others militarily at all costs. Territorial gain and global advantage far exceeds in priority over the welfare of Russia’s people. Putin’s effort to exert such malevolent action globally will amount to very little in the end when his nation has been overcome militarily and ruined economically as it lies prostrate before China. The example he has set with his authoritarian form of governance, just as the leaders of Soviet Russia undertook before him, is bringing his nation once more to the brink of catastrophe. In doing so, Putin has placed Russia in a bad light indeed by the criminal actions worldwide he has undertaken, demonstrating to the global community the grief that they have caused in turn. Much will be left unforgiven and remembered.
Europe must cease to fear Russian hegemony and the thought of reliving the past. The West must see the end of a recurrent nightmare brought about by yet another Russian regime incapable of learning from its past and its own repetitive cycle of failure. It is time for a different Russian governance that looks after the needs of the entire nation rather than select urban centers and ceases to create false illusions of progress when so much is failing around it. Authoritarians look at the nonsensical aspects of democracy – a judiciary that at times fails in its mission, a legislative body becoming so polarized that progress is delayed, an executive branch that falters in its judgement – and believe there is a better way with decision-making left simply in the hands of an autocrat and a cadre of loyal sycophants. Retrospectively, however, they may discover too late that the expenditure of energy exerted in argument within democratic institutions does indeed pave a path forward for a lasting national welfare and security. Democracies themselves fail when that energy dissipates, and narrow-minded populist notions once more take root to return the nation to an authoritarian nightmare.
Copyright @Kost Elisevich, MD, PhD 2024. All rights reserved. Any illegal reproduction of this content will result in immediate legal action.
2 thoughts on “The Global Russian Pox”