The current conflict with Ukraine, forced by Russian belligerence, has created a need for reexamination of the notion that, in Putin’s worldview, the two peoples are, in fact, “a single whole.” This is not the case. In July 2021, seven months before his February 2022 invasion of Ukraine, Putin provided his version of the history of Russia into which he conflated the early history of Ukraine. It is clear now that his essay was meant to provide historical justification, tortured as it was, and to serve as a preamble for his invasion of a neighboring sovereign nation. In it, he claimed a common descendency from Nordic intervention in the region during the early Middle Ages. It is an awkward view of historical fact limited by its reliance on conquest and hegemonic authority rather than a necessarily deeper understanding of established ethnolinguistic and cultural trends and factors particular to these different regions. Putin’s narrative is further confused by his subsequent assertions that prior politically transactional agreements had bearing over the will of a nation like Ukraine to come into its own.
The story of the two nations, as it appears, is a good example of history-telling belonging to the victor. It is one that has been told from a distinctly Russian historical perspective, first given foundation in the 19th century by historians during the Romanov dynasty when it was a matter of social stature as nobility to proclaim descendency from an original source, established centuries before. Russian writers from Karamzin, Pogodin, Soloviev to Kliuchevskiy all followed the same narrative, that the dominant city-state, Kyivan Rus of the 9th through the 13th centuries, centered on the banks of the Dnieper River in present-day Ukraine, was overrun by Mongols in the mid-13th century and rendered powerless. What followed was a shift of the center of political and religious activity, attributed to the Slavic people in the region, northward where another city-state had ultimately arisen and from which, Russia as a nation would evolve.
Putin bases an argument that Varangians, or Vikings as we know them in the West, settled and assumed control among established Finnish and Slavic tribes within the north, centered in Novgorod. This, in fact, occurred at the invitation of these same tribes as they sought to gain greater security through the organization and development of a centralized local city-state by which they hoped to overcome continuing conflict among themselves. In this way, the Riuryk dynasty was established, creating a Viking-controlled territory in the north.
The Vikings, seeking wealth and territorial advantage, were keen to establish a route southward to the Byzantine Empire where a much greater prize existed. In doing so, a route was created along the Dnieper River where an already established and fortified town existed on its eastern bank. Realizing this to be an improved vantage point, the Vikings settled here and ultimately assumed control of the neighboring territory by subjugating the surrounding tribal populations. In doing so, they created what would then be acknowledged as Kyivan Rus and shifted their center of operations from Novgorod to Kyiv.
A succession of local rulers over several generations now sought to improve upon their successes, either militarily or through commercial agreement, with Byzantium. This was accomplished locally by trade with Greek and later Roman settlements established along the north shore of the Black Sea and Crimea or, more directly, with Byzantium itself. Putin argues that Kyivan Rus was simply a derivative effect of establishing Novgorod initially in the north through Viking intervention, failing to take into account an entirely separate and more foundational origin and development of another people.
So, let’s back up. Evidence of settlement in present-day Ukraine dates to the early Iron Age, according to archeological records. Its history is marked by successive invasions or migrations of central Asiatic and Persian nomadic tribes, Germanic peoples, the Ostrogoths, and others from central and southeastern Europe. Those that chose to settle these fertile lands, established settlements throughout. Continued invasions from the east were afforded by the relatively flat plain of the Caspian Depression which provided a corridor of passage south of the Ural Mountains directly into present-day Ukraine. By the 9th century, trade routes established by the Vikings in the north-south direction and by the neighboring Khazar Khaganate to the east in the east-west direction made Kyiv a powerful axis of commerce in the region.
From an ethnolinguistic standpoint, the origin of Slavic peoples of present-day eastern Europe, is thought now to have arisen in a wide swath of land, south of Russia, extending from south-central Poland through southwest Belarus into western and north-central Ukraine, centered predominantly in present-day Ukraine. By 500 BC, Slavs first began to migrate from this core southward approaching the steppes and coastal regions of the Black Sea in present-day Ukraine. Here, trade was undertaken with Greek and subsequent Roman settlements. In the steppes to the immediate north of the coastal lands, they assimilated among the Scythians, a central Asian warrior people who had settled in the area (750 – 250 BC) and, later, the Alanic tribes (250 BC – 250 AD), particularly the Antes, that were of Persian origin. Kyiv became one of the more important hill fortresses from which trade had already been established with Byzantium. Much of this activity occurred gradually between the 3rd and 7th centuries, well before the arrival of the Vikings.
Expansion northward from the same Slavic core into present-day Russia led to an encounter with predominantly Finnish tribes where tribal conflict led ultimately to the above-mentioned invitation to the Vikings who would provide organization and stability to the northern region. Ukraine itself became no less an admixture of different peoples constituting a separate identity of multiethnic origin. This was a direct result of local geography which facilitated migration of eastern nomadic groups from central Asia, colonization by Greeks and Romans along the north shore of the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov, and the arrival from the west of settlers and traders of Germanic and southeastern European origin. The Vikings who settled within their new capital of Kyiv found themselves now assimilating with their predominant Slavic co-inhabitants to create a new society that assumed hegemony ultimately over the entire area of settlement extending from the Baltic to the Black Sea.
Nomadic penetration from the east continued through the region of mostly present-day Ukraine both before and during this period which extended from the late 9th to the 13th century. Internecine wars further weakened the state and, by the time of the Mongol invasion under Batu Khan in 1237 and the ultimate attack upon Kyiv in 1240, led to its being overtaken. However, this did not result in its elimination as a centralized authority but it became one that was required to submit to Mongol rule. The territory to the north, centered in Novgorod, shifted its trade relations to the Baltic region and broke away from the control of Kyivan Rus to become a separate entity where it would prosper from the 14th century onward to give rise to the Russian Empire, ultimately to be centered in Moscow.
Kyivan Rus was now reduced to a local principality but still ruled by indigenous leaders who had become vassals under Mongol rule. Other neighboring principalities of the old Kyivan Rus to the north and west were established under the new order. A shift in the local power base toward the west naturally occurred, away from more prevalent Mongol influence, and was centered in the principalities of Galicia and Volhynia in present-day western Ukraine. Both were united into a single state early in the 13th century only to be split apart by the middle of the 14th century and subsumed by the growing kingdoms of Poland and Lithuania as the Mongol Empire itself had begun to recede.
The 14th century saw the creation of a powerful union of Poland and Lithuania, the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, that was to overtake nearly the entire territory of present-day Ukraine until the late 16th century. It had been known for some time that the land here was agriculturally well-endowed and contained many other resources that would be highly profitable for the ruling class. Events were now also taking place within Ukraine itself that would change its self-understanding and, indeed, how its national ethos would be carried forward to the present day.
Remnants of the Mongol “Golden Horde,” the Tatars, remained largely settled within the Crimea and coastal regions of the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov. During the 15th century, they established relations with their Islamic contemporaries to the south, the Ottoman Turks. The Ottomans had overtaken Constantinople in 1453 and were now looking to descend upon the territory of Ukraine and the rest of eastern and central Europe. The Tatars provided military assistance and also functioned as trading intermediaries for agricultural goods and the provision of slaves captured throughout the steppes. In response to such threats, locals within towns and the surrounding countryside in Ukraine began organizing themselves initially into small bands for defensive, and later, offensive purposes to counter Tatar incursions.
These Cossacks, as they were called, gradually organized themselves over the late 15th and 16th centuries, into much larger and fearsome cavalry units throughout the steppes and, particularly, along the lower Dnieper River. They would enter, at times, into the service of Lithuanian and Polish frontier officials to protect towns and landholdings and would conduct military operations also of their own accord. Apart from local and more distant Ukrainian peasants and townspeople who came to join the Cossacks, several others from eastern Europe as well as Turks, Tatars and Jews, entered their ranks, attracted by the freestyle existence of this warrior class. Their organization emulated democratic principles of free speech, an elected leadership and a powerful sense of self-determination.
A supreme leader, the hetman, was declared and decisions regarding military policy and alliances were made through debate by both officers and lower ranks. They became involved in military campaigns against the Tatars and Turks to the south, Poles to the west and Russians to the north and were known for their horsemanship and courage in battle. Their ideals as freedom-loving, egalitarian warriors of the steppes became legend that would be portrayed in the writings of 19th century poets and playwrights. This sentiment has carried forward to the present day in the struggle against foreign influence for these same freedoms.
A particularly powerful hetman, Bohdan Khmelnitsky, was elected to office in 1648 and, at the outset, provided military aid to Poland against the Ottomans. In return, he sought to improve the status of Cossacks in Ukraine within the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, secure amnesty for prior conflicts with Poland and allow for the reintroduction of their Christian Orthodox faith within their territory. Agreement, however, proved difficult and protracted, giving rise to further conflict and ultimately a declaration by Khmelnitsky to liberate Ukraine from the rule of the Commonwealth, particularly Poland, which had increasingly facilitated the accumulation of Ukrainian land wealth by its ruling elite. Continued stalemate forced Khmelnitsky to consider alliance with the Ottomans but, when this failed, he turned to the principality of Muscovy which had established itself as the most powerful of the northern principalities.
By the mid-15th century, ecclesiastical scribes in Muscovy had already begun to compose new texts promoting claims of Muscovite princes that they were now legitimate descendants of the old Riuryk dynasty and inheritors of Kyivan rule with hegemony over the entire prior domain of Kyivan Rus. Rule under Tsar Ivan IV (“the Terrible;” r 1547-84), however, resulted in continued conflict with Lithuania and Poland to the west, domestic unrest internally and a lack of succession after the Tsar had murdered his eldest son. This led Muscovy to its “Time of Troubles” (1584 – 1613) upon his death. War with the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, in turn, resulted in foreign occupation and domestic strife that persisted for three decades ending finally in 1613 with Mikhail Romanov’s election as Tsar and the establishment of the Romanov Dynasty.
The dynasty would last 300 years, coming to an end with the assassination of Tsar Nicholas II and his family at the hands of the Bolsheviks in 1917. Tsar Aleksei (r 1645 – 76), successor to Tsar Mikhail Romanov, continued the restoration of order and began the process of centralizing authority while he pursued territorial gain within the former Kyivan Rus. To this end, negotiations with Khmelnitsky resulted in the Agreement of Pereiaslav of 1654 in which allegiance of the Cossacks was given to the Tsar in return for the provision of self-rule, class and property rights and an understanding that Cossacks would continue to engage in diplomacy with foreign lands.
The longstanding Cossack desire for autonomy as a state would ultimately conflict with the Muscovite desire to consolidate control through a centralized authority. In his efforts to establish still an autonomous Cossack domain in Ukraine and to eliminate Polish influence, Khmelnitsky sought alliances with Protestant countries, engaging Sweden, Brandenburg and Transylvania. The approach perturbed the Muscovites who now began to undermine Khmelnitsky’s authority. It was here, in 1657, that Khmelnitsky died. His successor reengaged the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth with a plan to introduce Ukraine into a Polish-Lithuanian-Rus Commonwealth in the Union of Hadiach. The attempt failed but is testament to the uncertainty of allegiances in a time where states such as Poland and Muscovy remained uneasy about the governance of territory outside their more centralized authority.
A penultimate chapter in the history of relations between the Cossacks of Ukraine and Muscovy involved the latter’s conflict with Sweden and control of the Baltic Sea while it still struggled with the Ottoman Empire to the south. The Cossack hetman at the time was Ivan Mazepa who held the post from 1687 to 1709. Tsar Peter I (r 1682 – 1725) of Russia had formed an alliance with Mazepa to help subdue the Tatars and Turks along the Black and Azov Seas. This ultimately provided him access for Russia to the Black Sea. His troubles, however, mounted in the north when Charles XII of Sweden defeated the armies of Muscovy and Denmark in 1700 and marched southward to subdue Poland. The Tsar then called upon Mazepa to unleash his Cossacks upon Polish-controlled lands in Ukraine to threaten the Swedish hold upon this territory.
After reclaiming the land, Mazepa was expected to turn it over to the Tsar’s ally, King August of Saxony. By this time, however, Muscovite abuses of the Ukrainian population had led to significant discontent among the populace. Cossack casualties had mounted noticeably during military engagements for the Tsar and further resentment had grown over their recruitment into workforces building the new city of St. Petersburg where hundreds succumbed to disease in the marshy terrain. These factors, along with the Tsar’s refusal to come to the aid of Mazepa when the Cossacks themselves were threatened by a Polish resurgence, brought about the decision to side with the Swedes on the promise of securing an independent Cossack Ukraine.
Their defeat at the Battle of Poltava in 1709, however, finally would see the end of any further endeavor to bring about an independent Ukraine until the early 20th century. The next two centuries within the Russian Empire would witness the intentional elimination of the Ukrainian language and forced conversion to the use of the Russian language in all administrative, cultural and educational domains. Russians themselves moved into the urban centers of Ukraine where they would become the dominant ethnic element, enforcing changes that furthered the same Russian agenda.
To be sure, the history of Ukraine, dating back to the first millennium BC, has been a troubled one, marked by repeated invasion and prolonged domination by neighboring states. Through it all, the country has managed to come back into its own following the dissolution of the Soviet Union and to undertake the struggle toward democratic rule. Its history is distinct from that of Russia, despite recent claims to the contrary. In the end, territorial acquisition through conquest or decree does not provide justification for assimilating the history of the acquired territory into one’s own national narrative.
Copyright @Kost Elisevich, MD, PhD 2022. All rights reserved. Any illegal reproduction of this content will result in immediate legal action.
One thought on “Ukraine’s Historical Origin vs. Putin’s Convenient Fairy Tale History”