Vladimir Putin continues to prosecute his war with Ukraine in the vain hope of emerging the victor in a conflict that has inadvertently revealed Russia’s weaknesses and vulnerabilities to the world. As Russia loses its hold on Crimea; experiences considerable loss of infantry, armament and territory; watches both its fossil fuel export industry disappear and major commercial enterprises collapse; and witnesses its financial institutions now following suit, Putin chooses to turn his attention toward escalating a hybrid war upon Europe as if to distract from his failure in Ukraine. Russia’s actions in the latter case have become so overt that denial only invites ridicule. Presumably the purpose of the approach centers upon weakening the resolve of nations supporting Ukraine although it may also ostensibly feed into the Russian public’s desire to strike out against the West which Putin has demonized as the agent of their discontent.
A reciprocal response by the European Union (EU) would seem appropriate and, when delivered in a manner sufficient to awaken the Kremlin to the reality of a potential conflict with NATO, would bring Russia to either commit itself to some form of a limited outright confrontation or to withdraw from any further provocation to avoid catastrophe. An option in this particular circumstance would be for the EU to further enhance Ukraine’s military capabilities on the frontlines and beyond as it is already directly engaged in a war with a common adversary. The United Kingdom (UK) recently took this approach when it shared classified technology with Ukraine to produce its long-range Storm Shadow cruise missile. Otherwise, Ursula van der Leyen, president of the European Commission, in her recent state-of-the-union address, has proposed an “Emergency Security Protocol” to detail an EU response to Russia’s hybrid attacks. It would act in concert with NATO’s Article 4 statement that allows any member state to request a meeting of the alliance when its security is threatened. As Europe approaches such an apparent inevitability, some details relevant to current circumstances in both Russia and Europe deserve attention. The situation cannot be left as is without a response that demonstrates Europe’s resolve and for which Putin will no longer be able to hide behind the curtain of his hybrid war.
Russia
Fighting a war on two fronts, particularly when the newer front is substantially more lethal than the one upon which Russia has already committed itself, is normally considered inadvisable. Yet the logic of this argument in Putin’s mind must contend with his desire to survive the dilemma into which he has already placed himself. He is met with unsustainable military losses in Ukraine and a growing discontent among Russians at home for a questionable war, and must now redirect Russian sentiment toward confronting the “demon” in the West. But can the war fatigue accumulated over a conflict that has entered its fifth year be overcome sufficiently to sacrifice yet more of Russia’s youth and the country’s future for another questionable destiny? As Putin’s intentions become manifest with rumors of mobilization this autumn, and an ominous expansion of civilian hospital facilities adding upwards of 20,000 beds concentrated largely near the Baltic region, will Russia’s youth be brought to now seriously contemplate their future?
News began surfacing earlier this year that Russian military recruitment was falling behind attrition rates in Ukraine. Monthly casualty rates over the summer far exceeded those reported in 2025 with a three-month tally from June to August amounting to 124,170 or an average of 41,000 per month. More than 300,000 thus far have been taken out of action in the current year. August alone saw 42,020 Russian casualties when Ukrainian defense forces narrowly reclaimed occupied territory in counterattacks for a net territorial gain. In fact, by mid-September, Ukraine had effectively erased Russia’s territorial gains made since March 2026. Expectations are that mobilization will begin soon after Russia’s mid-September parliamentary elections and that an initial 300,000 will be called up. At the current rate of attrition in Ukraine, one may expect that number to dwindle to zero in the span of 7 – 8 months so that efforts toward further recruitment will be necessary before long. To avoid the massive emigration witnessed after Putin’s previous mobilization in September 2022 when an estimated 1.3 million Russians left the country, no formal announcement has been made on this occasion. Rather, a digital infrastructure has been created to summon people quietly to report for duty and measures have been taken to block possible escape routes out of the country. Anxiety in Russian society is mounting and people have shifted from contemplating contingency plans to more immediate departure citing conscription and increasing restrictions upon individual freedoms.
While Putin denies plans for a mobilization, he is enlarging civilian hospital capacity and intensifying training in trauma care for hospital staff primarily in Russia’s Northwestern Federal District alongside where a potential front may open in a coming confrontation with NATO countries. During the past five years (2021 – 2026) Russia’s military hospital bed capacity increased by about 6,300. This autumn’s sudden expansion of upwards of 3.2 times as many beds challenges the contention that some sort of significant escalation of conflict is not intended. It perhaps suggests something much more than contending with Ukraine.
At this point, it is worth reminding that the Kremlin has long neglected Russia’s health care system including its own specialized military facilities. As with many public and governmental sectors throughout Russia, corruption has pervaded health care rendering it one of the worst in the industrialized world even during the early years of Putin’s tenure. Since then, it has not fared much better due to continued regional budgetary cuts recently worsened by diversion of funds for the military which now consumes more than 40% of the federal budget. Added to this has been an exodus of medical staff with a decline of some 200,000 doctors from 2014 to May 2026. In 2020, total health expenditure in Russia amounted to 5.3% of GDP which was less than that for Madagascar when the global average was about 10%. The mid-year 2026 Health Care Index ranked Russia’s system 60th of 101 countries having marked its quality of infrastructure as particularly low among its peers in its 2025 Index. Overall national injury fatality rates have been reported to be about 50% higher in Russia than in other Eastern European nations and attributable to inadequate on-site stabilization, transport time, and coordination of effort. Battlefield conditions present their own issues that relate to recovery of injured soldiers and subsequent evacuation. Indications of concern point to notable gaps between what Russia’s Defense Ministry claims and what doctors report about actual conditions. The additional concern for a Russian soldier therefore centers not only upon avoiding becoming a casualty of war but receiving optimal medical care that might ensure survival if and when evacuated from the field of battle.
Few think that Russia’s elections are above board and whether the enthusiastic support often seen for Putin’s leadership is a true reflection of the robust electoral results favoring his presidency. Since he assumed leadership in 2000, Putin has further assured his place at the top by gerrymandering regional districts, redrawing urban districts, and recruiting corporate managers to persuade workers to vote for the ruling party, United Russia. To maintain continued solidarity within the ruling party itself, a careful triage of officials by the Kremlin’s deputy chief of staff is designed to remove those who appear to have deviated from Kremlin policies. More recently, Putin and his cronies barred the anti-war party, Yabloko, from participating in the current election, removing it from the ballot before polling began. Its deputy chair, Lev Shlosberg, was sentenced to over 11 years in prison for “repeated discreditation of the Russian Armed Forces.” The remaining parties are regarded as the “systemic opposition” intended more as a buffer or, frankly, an opposition loyal to Kremlin leadership serving to absorb those voters who are otherwise not happy with the ruling party. Beyond that, the Kremlin will institute methods when needed to simply falsify election results by manipulating vote counts as they are reported over the course of three days, a tactic made easier with online voting. In the end, the goal of these efforts is intended to create an illusion of stability in the face of an ongoing conflict and growing instability domestically.
Despite this, the question now centered upon how United Russia, the pro-Putin party, would fare under the present circumstances in which the war has come home to Russia as witnessed by frequent Ukrainian aerial attacks. The last day of voting was met with a large Ukrainian drone assault upon Moscow’s main oil refinery creating a massive display of explosions as background to its cityscape. To worsen matters, a misfire of one of Russia’s air defense systems struck a large apartment building. Previous public polling revealed the United Russia party’s popularity at 33%, the lowest since the 2022 invasion of Ukraine. The fuel crisis, escalating prices, inflation, disruption of online consumerism, rising crime, urban pollution, and war fatigue have all contributed to the party’s declining public standing. As expected, however, the results of the parliamentary elections showed an absolute majority with 57.85% of the vote going to United Russia enforcing the point that the elections would not be a referendum upon Putin’s leadership. Rather, it would be the clearest indication of meddling by the Kremlin in the electoral process all to show the world that Putin would remain in control of Russia and free to carry out his imperialist agenda.
Finally, there is Belarus and its deeply unpopular dictator, Alexandr Lukashenko, whose subservience to Putin has been an embarrassment for the country. Opposition forces have considerable support within the public forum both for opposing the war in Ukraine and expressly not wanting their country to be consumed by Russia. Despite this, Lukashenko has provided logistical and staging support for Russia’s invasion of Ukraine from the beginning. More recently, he has been building Belarus’ military capacity by expanding its armed forces and reserve, militarizing schools, building up its military industry and integrating civilian infrastructure in support of the military. Legislation has also been rewritten to facilitate deeper military integration with Russian forces including the deployment of nuclear weapons on Belarusian territory. Relay transmission towers and network connections for high-speed wireless broadband technology were established on Belarus’ border with Ukraine to guide Russia’s Shahed and Gerbera drones more effectively into central and western regions of Ukraine. From September 15 to 18, Belarus conducted “defensive” military exercises near its borders with NATO countries, Poland and Lithuania, undoubtedly, to assess maneuvers of mechanized battalions over the terrain adjacent to the Suwalki Gap, a 40-mile-long corridor that passes from Belarus to the Russian exclave, Kaliningrad, on the Baltic Sea. The gap lies between Lithuania and Poland and serves as a land bridge linking the Baltic states to the rest of the EU. This military posturing ostensibly serves as a further threat to the EU and the Western Alliance by a committed Russian ally although its ultimate aim may be to raise argument throughout Eastern Europe to deter aid to Ukraine as Russia proceeds with its business of attempting to subjugate it.
Europe
Concern in Europe has been ongoing over the very apparent unreliability of the Trump administration towards its commitment to NATO’s Article 5 that obligates all members of the alliance to assist any nation that has been attacked by an external adversary. Much is based upon Trump’s peculiar deference toward Putin as with his preference for what Putin merely states over what U.S. intelligence has provided, conducting unconditional talks with Russia in the absence of Ukrainian and European representatives, praising Putin’s autocratic strong-man image, devaluing NATO’s importance, and sending inexperienced negotiators more intent on making deals with Putin when he is clearly focused on undermining the U.S. and the West as a primary objective. Europe has responded by scaling up its defense industry over these past few years to meet their own needs and support Ukraine’s efforts to diminish the Russian threat altogether.
The Ukrainian Hammer
Apart from defending itself against an aggressor, Ukraine has managed to weaken Russia’s ability to conduct military operations elsewhere, particularly upon the West. The Russian Black Sea Fleet, a significant part of the Russian Navy, has either lost or has had seriously damaged, more than 40% of its vessels, including two submarines and several high-profile surface vessels. Those remaining have been either retained in Sevastopol, Crimea or sent further away to Novorossiysk along Russia’s eastern Black Sea coastline where they continue to be successfully targeted. Ukraine’s sea drone technology is now being shared with the German firm Stark to develop Germany’s own maritime drone defense to manage affairs in the Baltic Sea where Russia has been increasingly showing itself to be a threat toward surrounding NATO countries. Naval strategy has been reshaped by Ukraine’s asymmetric war with Russia and has begun to alter war strategy elsewhere.
In the air just as on the sea, Russia’s strategic nuclear-capable bomber fleet has posed a threat to the West for some time and has been engaged in launching missile attacks upon Ukraine from outside its airspace. On June 1, 2025, Ukraine destroyed seven Tu-95MS strategic bombers and four Tu-22M3 intermediate-range bombers among 41 aircraft hit altogether in Operation Spiderweb. Another Tu-95MS and up to seven Tu-22M3s were reported to be damaged bringing the overall assessment to represent about 15% of Russia’s fleet of strategic bombers. A further two Tu-95MS aircraft were destroyed at Russia’s Engels-2 airbase during the current summer. In February 2023, Belarusian partisans severely damaged a Russian A-50 Airborne Early Warning and Control radar platform at an airbase near Minsk. The Beriev A-50 surveillance aircraft is vital for coordinating air attack and detecting enemy aircraft at considerable distances. In January-February 2024, two A-50s were shot down by Ukrainian forces. At least one A-50 was damaged during Operation Spiderweb and another more recently was struck on the ground in the Novgorod Oblast in March 2026. The Beriev Taganrog Aviation Scientific-Technical Complex, the sole facility for the repair and maintenance of A-50s, has been struck five times with the last strike occurring in mid-September 2026. Of the nine operational A-50s at the beginning of Russia’s 2022 invasion, very few of these sophisticated aircraft appear available for use in current operations leaving Russia without adequate control of its airspace.
The IL-22M is an airborne command post and radio relay aircraft for delivery of orders to ground forces and aircraft in the field. Two out of a fleet of 12 were lost during the war in Ukraine in 2023 and 2024. Otherwise, Russia has been losing high-end tactical fighters and fighter-bombers at a rate faster than can be replaced, having already lost 10% of its fixed-wing aircraft within the first two years of war. Visually verified losses in 2025 alone amounted to 40 fixed-wing combat aircraft. The Su-35 is Russia’s most advanced 4th generation multiple fighter and is difficult to replace because of international sanctions blocking the import of essential high-tech components. Eleven have been lost thus far in this war while Ukraine has also struck plants involved in providing specialized tooling for machining alloys and composites and transport hubs involved in the production and maintenance of these aircraft.
Aside from directly depleting Russia’s armament, Ukraine has engaged in an extensive campaign degrading Russia’s war industry by targeting manufacturers of electronic components for missiles and other aviation assets, plants producing launch vehicles, essential chemicals used in propellants and explosive agents, and numerous factories and warehouses involved in the manufacture and storage of military hardware. Most notably, attacks on oil refineries producing diesel and jet fuel have significantly diminished Russia’s military logistics even forcing Russia to temporarily impose a ban on diesel and jet fuel export. The massive campaign upon Russia’s refining capabilities has reduced fuel delivery to frontline military units by about 30% forcing strict rationing. This has caused cutbacks in logistical planning with trucks limited in delivering food and ammunition to frontline depots. Russian refineries are fulfilling less than 19% of gas purchase requests on the home front as inevitable inflationary pressures stress the overall economy.
European Realities
Several nations have stepped up to meet the challenge of Russian belligerence by directly challenging it over its hybrid methods of warfare. Both Estonia and Poland openly confronted Russia at the United Nations in 2025 regarding its “reckless” incursions into their airspace involving Russian fighter-bombers over Estonia and more than 20 drone penetrations of Poland’s airspace. Repeated scrambling of NATO jets were initiated not only for these incursions but for many similar events over Romania, Lithuania, Latvia, Germany, Finland and Sweden. Russian military drone and missile incursions have escalated dramatically over Moldova in 2026 and have been a threat since 2022 with more than 70 violations during the course of Russia’s war. A number of them have crashed on Modovan territory with some detonating on impact. The cutting of undersea cables by Russian affiliated vessels in the Baltic, specifically a 700-mile telecommunications cable between Finland and Germany and a 135-mile cable between Sweden and Lithuania, has been a source of contention with Russia despite its denying involvement. A more recent incident occurred involving two Russian spy submarines lingering over vital communication cables and energy pipelines in Arctic waters near Norway’s Svalbard Archipelago when they were intercepted by UK and Norwegian authorities ostensibly foiling another attempt at sabotage. An accompanying Russian attack submarine left the premises when the captain realized it was being monitored.
Several other examples of Russian hybrid activities add to the substantial mix of incursions upon European security still under the umbrella of plausible deniability. They involve the use of local proxies to conduct arson and vandalism in attempts at instigating racial polarization and discord in society. Otherwise, it has engaged in channeling flows of migrants into countries to disrupt social structure, targeting of water treatment plants, damaging transport infrastructure, assassination plots aimed at individuals involved with armament industries or foreign political figures, cyberattacks, interference with aviation communications, disinformation campaigns, and election interference.
The escalation of Russia’s hybrid warfare in 2026 has brought a number of European leaders forward to address the problem. Emmanuel Macron of France recently ordered measures to protect the country’s critical infrastructure and vowed that attacks would not go unanswered. Germany’s chancellor, Friedrich Merz, blamed Russia directly for the recent deployment of a drone carrying explosives at the Leipzig/Halle Airport. Beyond the rhetorical responses and plans to enhance domestic security, the UK’s Prime Minister, Andy Burnham, shared classified technical data with both Ukraine and France to proceed with creating domestic assembly lines for the Storm Shadow long-range cruise missile. The provocative move appears to come in response to Russia’s escalation of its hybrid war targeting the UK and, interestingly came even after Russia threatened to retaliate against the UK for delivering explosive drones to Ukraine.
Germany has taken the extraordinary step of stationing 4,800 troops belonging to its new 45th Armored Brigade Lithuania and about 200 civilian support personnel on a permanent basis in Lithuania in 2027, the first such foreign deployment of a German combat brigade since the creation of the Bundeswehr in more than 70 years. It is intended to provide support for NATO’s eastern flank and ostensibly to help secure the Suwalki Gap between Lithuania and Poland where a Russo-Belarusian incursion may occur. Poland has undertaken a considerable initiative with its “Eastern Shield” project building fortifications, anti-tank obstacles and surveillance networks along its border with both Kaliningrad and Belarus while German and Polish military engineers have concentrated on creating defensive fortifications along the Suwalki Gap. Regular joint military exercises involving Polish, Lithuanian and French forces have otherwise been conducted along the gap. Adding to its northeastern defensive structure, Poland is deploying considerable numbers of South Korean K2 Black Panther tanks that have been adapted with electronic drone jamming with attack capability and enhanced armor cover to meet the demands realized by the current conflict in Ukraine. In similar fashion, German and Swedish militaries have conducted rapid deployment exercises focused upon the strategically important island of Gotland in the Baltic Sea. These have consisted of mobilization of as many as 1,500 troops and the transfer of anti-ship missiles under escort of both German and Swedish warships and fighter jets.
Both Estonia and Latvia share borders directly with Russia and have established with Lithuania a Baltic Defense Line given their precarious geographic situation. The measure consists of anti-tank trenches, minefields, concrete obstacles, bunkers, explosive storage for rapid deployment, advanced sensor placement and tactical drone operations. An “Eastern Sentry” initiative was launched by NATO in September 2025 emphasizing the deployment of forward land forces in the eight NATO countries bordering the Baltic Sea and employing also a range of Allied assets designed to counter drone incursions. Finland and its nearby Baltic neighbors have established Operation Baltic Sentry to create a maritime surveillance center that will also include the Gulf of Finland to boost responsiveness in matters of concern involving territorial waters. This move followed the December 2024 incident where one of Russia’s shadow fleet tankers cut an underseas communication cable linking Finland and Estonia. Finnish special forces boarded the vessel and found it loaded with spy equipment. A second similar event occurred in December 2025 involving a cargo ship that left St Petersburg carrying Russian steel and was caught in another anchor-dragging incident damaging communications cables in Estonian waters. Finland recently completed a 124 mile-long 15-foot-tall security fence along its southeastern border with Russia. The barrier features a heavy metal mesh structure, loudspeakers, night lights with surveillance cameras, and patrol roads running alongside. Norway has undertaken a similar project with its own 123-mile-border with Russia expanding and upgrading its security fence line with surveillance systems at exposed sections.
Military spending by European countries for national defense purposes as a percentage of national GDP in 2025 was highest among those in the east with Poland (4.50%), Latvia (3.61%), and Estonia (3.37%) followed by Norway (3.28%) and Denmark (3.25%) leading the effort. All 32 NATO countries have now exceeded the 2% of GDP threshold for defense spending. Both the EU and NATO have contributed substantially to Ukraine’s war effort with sufficient funding at present to support it into 2027. Otherwise, support has come from several other countries outside Europe among them Canada, Japan, Australia, South Korea, New Zealand and Taiwan. The Trump administration ceased military funding early in his second term as president despite efforts by Congress to appropriate military and security assistance for Ukraine. Ukraine’s campaign focusing upon destroying Russia’s fossil fuel export industry and reducing domestic supplies in the process may otherwise be helping to shorten the war by forcing economic pressure on top of Russia’s military failures.
Epilogue
Whether Russia plans to invade a NATO country or is attempting only to intimidate European countries to prevent them from providing further aid to Ukraine or is simply striking out vindictively as tyrants are apt to do, there is sufficient reason for European nations to band together as a precautionary measure in the very least to respond to Russia’s criminal actions upon their territories. It must also guard itself against something more overt. The continent has seen its share of violence over centuries and should not expect any less of a country fraught with instability and governed by a failing leader. The threats by Russia seem only to have strengthened Europe’s position militarily by the commitment of several of its countries individually and as contributing members of the EU and NATO. They create a formidable adversary that together would seem an order of magnitude greater than what Ukraine on its own has mustered. As Europe increasingly responds to Russian threats, Putin will be left facing what may be the last move he will make as president – a zugzwang.
Copyright @Kost Elisevich, MD, PhD 2026. All rights reserved. Any illegal reproduction of this content will result in immediate legal action.
