Putin Digs Yet Another Hole to Nowhere

Vladimir Putin continues to prosecute his war with Ukraine in the vain hope of emerging the victor in a conflict that has inadvertently revealed Russia’s weaknesses and vulnerabilities to the world. As Russia loses its hold on Crimea; experiences considerable loss of infantry, armament and territory; watches both its fossil fuel export industry disappear and major commercial enterprises collapse; and witnesses its financial institutions now following suit, Putin chooses to turn his attention toward escalating a hybrid war upon Europe as if to distract from his failure in Ukraine. Russia’s actions in the latter case have become so overt that denial only invites ridicule. Presumably the purpose of the approach centers upon weakening the resolve of nations supporting Ukraine although it may also ostensibly feed into the Russian public’s desire to strike out against the West which Putin has demonized as the agent of their discontent. … More Putin Digs Yet Another Hole to Nowhere

A Different War: Modeling Outcome in an Asymmetric and Unconventional War

Despite clear superiority in armament, munitions, and troop numbers, favored nations have, not infrequently, fallen far short of expectations when it comes to achieving their ends in war. Many factors can account for this – terrain, morale, logistics, industrial capacity, and finance among others that Carl von Clausewitz alluded to in his influential work, “On War,” published in 1832. More importantly, predictive modeling of outcomes based primarily upon variables drawn from the war experiences of the 19th and 20th centuries appear insufficient in the 21st century. Russia’s old Soviet style of conducting war quickly drew international attention in the early stages of its invasion of Ukraine when it failed to achieve its goal of capturing Kyiv and was forced to retreat into the eastern part of the country where it has remained stalled in large part during the subsequent four years. Several setbacks followed in the wake of rapid innovations in Ukraine’s strategy of resistance that have not only unfolded on the battlefield but in its efforts to undermine Russia’s economy. … More A Different War: Modeling Outcome in an Asymmetric and Unconventional War

Vladimir Putin and the Hill He is Drawn to Die Upon

Is Vladimir Putin capable of coming to terms with the mounting concerns over the state-of-affairs in Russia brought about by his war in Ukraine? His predilection for conflict has dominated policy throughout most of his 25 years in leadership beginning with his war in Chechnya (1999 – 2009), and followed by incursion into Georgia (2008), the Donbas War (2014 – 2022), the Syrian Civil War (2015 – 2024), to the invasion of Ukraine (2022 – present). The strategy has maintained Putin’s version of the historic Russian “strong-man” ethos at the helm of Russia’s destiny, one in which the nation’s security comes at the expense of individual freedom. In the process, Putin has ensured for himself the power once possessed by his tsarist ancestors but now with the added benefit of a much more sophisticated internal security apparatus. The problem confronting him in this present moment is the wall he has run into both militarily and economically. The question confronting Russians now must revolve around whether Putin is mentally capable of overcoming his own shortcomings to save the country from ruin. … More Vladimir Putin and the Hill He is Drawn to Die Upon