A fourth year of war is nearing an end and whereas the aggressor nation has experienced comparatively little of the physical trauma associated with this conflict, circumstances have changed in the current year enough to threaten the Russian Federation’s (RF) own survival. For Vladimir Putin, however, it is not the sentiment of the inhabitants within the broad scope of the RF that matters as much as those who dwell in Moscow. The Russian capital is under threat and not just from imposed international economic sanctions, mounting financial strain, and war fatigue, but to more direct elements that will undermine both civil life and the Kremlin’s authority. And perhaps it’s time for American media to take more notice of Russia’s many vulnerabilities as it contemplates an end to the war.
The Theater of War
Moscow’s Air Defense
Putin has taken considerable measures to protect Moscow from direct injury by providing it with a layered air-defense network consisting of both an outer and inner array of several different defense systems. It takes the form of an outer A-135M anti-ballistic missile system to specifically counter long-range threats and an inner collection of systems with the Pantsir-S1, S-400, and Tor-M2 installations. Together, the combined network has the ability to target assaults by ballistic and cruise missiles, jet aircraft and drones but not necessarily the capacity to do so.
Despite this formidable wall, absolute protection is not a guaranteed assurance against harm. There is, of course, a natural limit to the number of projectiles that can be hurled against waves of drone swarms mixed with missiles coming from different directions. Moreover, repetitive targeting of any number of strategic sites will exhaust defensive armament to a point where the target becomes open to serious destruction. Ukraine has created a formidable drone industry and although the manufacturing process has incorporated technologies of increasing sophistication helpful in evading individual detection the essential feature of a successful strike remains the use of large numbers of drones amassed in an assault. For this, much simpler, less expensive drone models may suffice.
Numerous successful drone sorties have been effectively carried out targeting strategic sites variably protected by air-defense systems throughout the RF. These have resulted in substantial damage to Russia’s fossil fuel industry, armament manufacturing facilities and military installations, resulting in significant loss of revenue and depletion of military effectiveness. The attacks have now become increasingly directed toward Moscow.
A Problem with Air Travel
This year has seen an escalation of aerial assaults upon Moscow and its surroundings. Drone attacks in the Moscow region in 2025 have repeatedly disrupted air traffic, more so this summer and fall, at all of Moscow’s major airports – Domodedovo, Zhukovsky, Sheremetyevo and Vnukovo – causing hundreds of flight cancellations and delays for thousands of travelers. The frequency and unpredictability of attacks has seriously thwarted air travel into and out of Moscow into the foreseeable future.
Direct Assault
Destruction of residential and commercial properties introduces a new perspective on the war for Moscow’s well-shielded urban population, showing its vulnerability and uncertainty for the future.In the spring of 2023, the second year of the war, two residential buildings were struck by drones within the city followed two months later by a strike upon office towers in the business district. As these apparently were not strategic targets, it was unclear whether the assaults perhaps proceeded from within the Moscow region. In October 2025, more substantial drone barrages caused explosions in the city and the surrounding region. Aerial assaults of greater intensity upon the Moscow region have continued into November and are becoming more apparent to the public at large.
A large scale power outage this autumn was attributed by local officials to an emergency situation of some sort in the regional power grid but was more likely brought about by an aerial assault. Near the same time, the Koltsevoy pipeline in Moscow Oblast was struck destroying all of its three major fuel lines just 30 miles southeast of Moscow. This attack seriously disrupted the transport of jet fuel, diesel and gasoline for military use from refineries in Ryazan, 125 miles southeast of Moscow, and Nizhny Novgorod, 270 miles to the east. The effects of aerial strikes of this nature will manifest more as a consequence of destruction of energy sources for Moscow than direct impacts upon residential infrastructure of the sort that Russia has engaged in.
An Emerging Fuel Problem
A fuel crisis in Russia began emerging in August 2025 when Ukrainian aerial assaults and sabotage operations focused upon Russia’s fossil fuel industry attacking refineries, depots, pipelines and related transport.
Moscow’s privileged status has provided it with abundant fuel resources until recently. The energy infrastructure for Moscow and Moscow Oblast is serviced by a ring system that surrounds the region and consists of individual pipelines for natural gas and petroleum products (i.e., oil, diesel, gasoline, aviation fuel). The origin of both resources resides in Western Siberia. Natural gas travels along the Yamal-Europe pipeline a distance of almost 2,500 miles and therefore requires compressor stations to ensure proper flow. The gas ultimately is distributed along parallel pipelines in Moscow’s ring system. The transport of crude oil arrives primarily by the 360 mile-long Almetyevsk-Nizhny Novgorod-Ryazan pipeline to refineries in both Ryazan and Nizhny Novgorod Oblasts and the 1,100 mile-long Surgut-Polotsk pipeline only to the latter. This transit system is highly vulnerable to attack as it cannot be protected over such distances.
The main refinery of Russia’s energy giant, Rosneft, is situated in Ryazan and is accountable for 5% of the nation’s total refining capacity. It is a major provider of gasoline and other petroleum products to Moscow and much of central Russia. A November 15, 2025 drone strike forced a complete halt to processing for a second time in a week, a situation that will now last into December. Previous drone strikes had already forced partial shutdowns in August when two of the three main refining units were disabled, reducing output by about 50% with a further one in September striking another primary oil processing unit.
About 30% of Moscow Oblast’s gasoline is supplied by the Kstovo Refinery situated in Nizhny Novgorod Oblast and is part of the Lukoil PJSC conglomerate, Russia’s second largest oil company. The refinery was struck on November 4, 2025 while still undergoing repairs of a rectification column used for crude oil processing. Repeated strikes of this refinery and others have made ongoing maintenance and repair both daunting and time-consuming because of sanctions that prohibit access to foreign spare parts and expertise.
Moscow began to appreciate the effect of fuel shortages after much of the remainder of the RF already had suffered the problem. Gasoline stations were unable to replenish supplies. Long lines of vehicles awaiting refueling became common in several regions. Panic buying and hoarding practices among the public emerged. Wholesale prices rose substantially, transport was disrupted and inflation concerns further increased societal anxiety. The Kremlin has attempted to quell the problem with gasoline imports from Belarus and Asia but the strain on domestic production is unlikely to improve in the foreseeable future while attempts to overcome shortages by importing gasoline will prove economically counterproductive in the longer-term. Moreover, Ukraine’s destruction of Russia’s fossil fuel industry and its avenues of distribution certainly have not ceased.
An Emerging Heating Problem
At a latitude of 55.75 deg N, Moscow lies roughly in line with Sitka, Alaska (57.05 deg N). and experiences daily winter temperatures that average -9 deg C (14 deg F) to -3 deg C (25 deg F) although temperatures will frequently drop to -20 deg C (-4 deg F). The city is powered by at least 10 Combined Heat and Power (CHP) stations owned by Mosenergo, a subsidiary of Gazprom PJSC. They are fueled primarily by natural gas and produce both electricity and thermal energy, The CHPs connect with Moscow’s electrical grid in the metropolitan area through high-voltage power lines and substations integrated with Russia’s Unified Power System that links several power systems across the federation.
A number of power facilities in cities surrounding Moscow have been struck by drones this autumn. Specifically, three cities that form a triangle around Moscow were targeted – Oryol, 230 miles SSW of Moscow, Yaroslavl, 160 miles to the NE, and Vladimir 120 miles to the east. Part of Oryol was without electricity after damage of its CHP. The Oryol thermal power plant is the largest contributor of electricity and heat to the region. The CHP substation in Vladimir is a key high-voltage station in the ring around Moscow, transmitting electricity toward the capital and was forced to stop operations. The large Slavneft-YANOS oil refinery in Yaroslavl supplies fuel to industrial facilities, airports and oil depots in Moscow via the Kolsevoy pipeline and was struck in early October.
Local and regional electrical substations distribute power throughout the metropolitan area of Moscow with what appears to be an overlapping fashion. These represent sites of vulnerability that can be exploited with targeted strikes. To mention some, the 11-unit Mosenergo 1,375 MW CHP-22 power station in the Dzerzhinsky district, Moscow Oblast, 15 miles southeast of Moscow, provides electrical and thermal energy to industrial sites, public buildings and residential areas of Moscow’s southern parts primarily. The CHP-26 power station is the largest in Moscow for its installed electrical capacity and serves more than 2 million people in the southern and southeastern parts of Moscow while CHP-25 serves the southern and southwestern parts. CHP-16 serves about 1.5 million in the northwest and CHP-27 covers mostly the north and northeast.
Russia’s third largest thermal power station, the Kostromskaya State District Thermal Power Plant in Volgorechensk, about 217 miles northeast of Moscow, is a major hub in Russia’s national energy system with an installed capacity of 3,600 MW. It provides a significant contribution to the central Russian grid that services Moscow and the surrounding region. In late October and early November 2025, it was targeted by apparent missile attacks causing damage to its infrastructure and a large-scale power outage in Volgorechensk. On November 23, the large V.I. Lenin State District Power Plant in Shatura less than 80 miles from Moscow, experienced a massive explosion from a drone strike leaving thousands of people in the region without heat and electricity. It is one of the oldest and largest thermal power stations in Russia with an installed electrical capacity of 1,500 MW and supplies about 6% of electricity in the capital and surrounding region.
The Rise in Crime
A rapidly escalating violent crime wave will threaten to destabilize an urban society, particularly one already stressed by the circumstances of war. Somewhere between 140,000 and 180,000 criminals were released from Russia’s prisons beginning in mid-2022 to fight in Ukraine and were promised a pardon after six months’ service on the front line. The Defense Ministry extended the term of service the following year undoubtedly angering those already deployed. Moreover, prisoners have been regarded in the military as expendable and therefore assigned to missions that have accounted for as much as 33% of overall casualties. What psychopathology existed there before has only worsened by the trauma that’s been witnessed on the front. By the summer of 2023, about 32,000 former convicts, originally recruited by the Wagner mercenary group and now war veterans, reentered Russian society.
This particular category of veteran, of course, is only a subgroup of an estimated total of 250,000 who had returned during the first two years since the start of the war. A number of these inevitably returned with features of post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). Adding to the problem has been the serious shortage of mental health professionals in a beleaguered health care system that has been long neglected. The World Health Organization (WHO) has estimated only four to five psychologists are present per 100.000 population, a problem that Putin’s regime appears not to have given priority. Between 2021 and 2024, crimes by former military servicemen quadrupled. Since 2023, almost a thousand cases involving murder or serious bodily injury ultimately resulting in death have been registered in courts.
Moscow itself typically registers the highest number of crimes each year. In the eight-month period, January to August of 2021, prior to the war, 14,700 serious crimes were committed in the Moscow region. During the same period in 2024, that number had risen to 16,400. As more convicts return to join the ranks of those now embedded in Russian society, the situation will worsen with certain numbers of these veterans reentering organized crime networks that typically reside in a large urban environment. Such soldiers are quickly transformed into contract killers and enforcers bringing their combat experience into Moscow’s urban environment.
The matter has become more critical in Moscow with significant police personnel shortages that have further eroded public confidence. Recent reports indicate Moscow has seen a decline of up to 75% of its district police force in some areas. The attrition was exacerbated by the war with some joining the military for better pay and others purged because of ties to opposition leader, Alexei Navalny. Low pay and poor working conditions were already a chronic problem predating the war.
Terrorism has resurged in Russia, a consequence of ignoring domestic intelligence as focus has been redirected toward the war such that security measures have become more reactive than preventive. A dramatic demonstration of this shortcoming was the attack on Moscow’s Crocus City Hall in March 2024 when 145 people were killed by members of the Islamic State in Khorasan (ISIS-K). Not only were warning signs disregarded but the security response was bungled.
Moscow Losing
The start of Russia’s war saw the departure of over a thousand international companies – technology and engineering firms, retailers, automakers – creating a notable change away from Western influence to predominantly domestic and Asian ones. The process resulted in job losses in the thousands and economic uncertainty with market disruption and the inevitable foreign asset seizure by the Kremlin. Several educated Russians emigrated to escape expected societal changes marked by governmental suppression of privileges and increased censorship deemed necessary by an authoritarian regime. The partial military mobilization called in September 2022 saw the further departure.of hundreds of thousands of young men to neighboring countries, many of whom are now unlikely to return in the face of deteriorating economic conditions.
Russia continues to tighten control of the internet by promoting a new messaging app, MAX, which is controlled by Kremlin-linked agencies, while making popular platforms such as WhatsApp, YouTube and Telegram less accessible. National security is cited as the reason for cyber restrictions including access to VPNs to limit public circumvention of government cyber blockages. Punishments are now meted out to internet users for searching content that is thought “extremist” or judged as favoring Ukraine or denigrating Russia. More troubling is the surveillance capability housed in the MAX app that will further diminish public freedoms.
Frequent blackouts of internet service have become routine since 2022 and are increasing, again for issues of national security to defend against drone attacks even though most drones no longer rely on mobile internet connections. These blackouts coincide particularly with times of protest and are likely to be further adapted to provide access for news items favorable to the regime. Ironically, internet shutdowns in Moscow increased substantially during Victory Day celebrations this past May as “an element of preventive defense.” For similar reasons, 24-hour mobile internet blackouts are in place for Russians returning from abroad and possibly in possession of foreign SIM cards. Lifting of this restriction presumably must await the end of the war although the likelihood will be that it persists. The Kremlin’s domestic intelligence agency (FSB) seems also set to expand its digital authoritarianism over local telecoms as another measure of influence over societal freedoms.
Summary
For Moscow, the war has finally come to knock at its door. The coming winter poses an uncertain, potentially volatile, future for a city yet unfamiliar with the loss of the common luxuries of heat and electricity. The situation is unlike what has occurred over the past few years in Kyiv where inhabitants have become inured to such circumstances. For Moscow’s society, increasingly at the mercy of criminal violence and coping with mounting repressive governmental measures seeking to control it, the outlook appears not as bright as it once seemed when closer ties with the West appeared in reach. The younger generations may not be as forgiving as their forbears of bygone Stalinist times from which Putin emerged. The latter might do well to recall Moscow’s May, 2012 “Snow Revolution” when tens of thousands protested his return to the presidency over issues of electoral fraud and when temperatures in the city were more conducive.
Copyright @Kost Elisevich, MD, PhD 2025. All rights reserved. Any illegal reproduction of this content will result in immediate legal action.
