It is common in a protracted conflict to witness approaches attempting to bring about what is thought to be a reasonable compromise. The intent is to forego further suffering but too often the conflict in question has been unjustifiably executed as part of an agenda by a clear aggressor. Some pundits will declare the inevitability of a particular outcome of a conflict based upon straightforward metrics having to do with population size, military reserve and production capacity. These typically argue in favor of the aggressor. In the process, they lay aside the consequences for the victim of the aggression and its future precarious state of affairs. They allow the world order to proceed without acknowledging that the root of the problem remains much as it was from the start.
In this manner, Vladimir Putin gains an appreciable part of eastern and southern Ukraine including Crimea, and Russia rejoices that its resident dictator has once more attained his goal of reclaiming another portion of the former defunct Russian Empire. All this as nations rush to accept compromises ill-suited for their own ultimate well-being. Giving up territory for peace in Ukraine is a threatening prospect for the future in the eyes of the Baltic nations and those of eastern Europe. Rather than paying for reparations, Putin or the regime that would inevitably follow him would be obliged to complete his work for the remainder of Ukraine while a bewildered West ponders its next flawed opposition to Russian aggression and its revanchist ambitions.
The timidity with which the Biden administration has confronted Russian aggression has advanced the notion that it lacks the fortitude and leadership to deter the efforts of authoritarian regimes in their pursuit of overtaking the U.S.-led international order. The coming Trump administration, by its rhetoric, is poised to complete the perception that the U.S. is abandoning its once powerful place as the guardian of a global order and capitulating to a longstanding adversary that has managed to outmaneuver it despite its own precarious state of affairs.
The irony in this circumstance is expressed by the comparative military and industrial might of the U.S. with its soaring economy and current gross domestic product (GDP) of $29.35 trillion. It far outmatches the inept conduct of a Russian military machine incapable of sustaining its efforts without the help of foreign fighters and an insufficient industrial base unable to maintain production to match its considerable losses on the battlefield. Russia’s economy faces a worsening situation highlighted by mounting inflation, currently set at 9.1% and further fueled by increased military spending coupled with labor shortages and the inevitable wage hikes among other concerns.
Interest rates were recently raised by Russia’s Central Bank to 21% making it near impossible to sustain current military spending in the long term. As best as can be determined, an estimate of Russia’s current GDP amounts to about $2.18 trillion, less than a tenth of that of the U.S., leaving aside that of the European Union. Its budget is largely dependent upon oil export which, despite sanctions, has continued with the help of a shadow fleet of tankers and the efforts of complicit third-party nations which refine the oil for shipment elsewhere. To counter this, Western sanctions have been further tightened in the past year to confront the illicit tactics used by the Russian regime. Realizing that conventional sanctions have limits in regards to overall effectiveness, Ukraine has focused on destroying Russia’s oil refineries and depots using predominantly weaponized drones. Apart from what impact such a campaign might have had on overall oil export, a considerable additional cost for industrial repair has been imposed in the process at a time when replacement parts have become harder to import.
Russia’s domestic concerns have become noticeable over the past year in particular. The financial situation in Russia has threatened its largest construction firm, Samolet, with sales falling 44% in the third quarter of 2024 and a net profit margin already down to 1.5% by midyear. The construction industry was reportedly one of the first to suffer from the marked increase in the cost of credit and material shortages. Other business enterprises appear on the verge of the same fate and, alarmingly, even the military manufacturing sector is nearing capacity to service its debt. The government’s exorbitant focus upon the war will find it unable to keep its larger companies from defaulting.
One has the feeling that news of the battlefield has for some time overtaken much disclosure of the dire state of Russia’s economy. With 7.5% of its GDP now dedicated to the war industry and with Russia’s current ability to sustain military technology procurement as the war plods onward, the rather colored portrayal of battlefield activity by state media has been sufficiently broadcast to provide the public reason to continue its “special military operation.” This comes in spite of the retail price of eggs rising by 61.4% in 2023, stabilizing in early 2024 only to rise again by 30 – 35% later in the year. The retail price of butter likewise increased 27.5% during 2024 to between $2.90 and $3.87 per pound. Real disposable income as a measure of living standard has dropped considerably with utility charges rising by 7.1% to-date and increased borrowing fees.
Putin has entered a race hoping to outlast the West but the time interval for accomplishing his goal of at least retaining Ukrainian territory currently within his grasp is rapidly contracting. His problem is economic more than it is military despite the territorial loss in Russia’s Kursk region, the slow progress it has made in the Donbas region and Ukraine’s gradual isolation of Crimea after laying waste to Russia’s Black Sea fleet .
Despite the inexplicable self-deterrence of the Biden administration in affording Ukraine the capability of actually overcoming its larger adversary, it has managed to thwart Putin’s ambitions over the course of almost three years. In the process, it has severely depleted Russia’s conventional military strength manifest by its surprising number of troop casualties, the loss of its once considerable arsenal and the widespread destruction of its munitions. Is Ukraine now to be rewarded by the West and its pundits by giving up its territory in order to appease the neighborhood bully? Moreover, is Europe to be left facing a continued threat from Russia, causing it to look away from the U.S. and to reconsider its relations with China, other Asian nations, South America and Australia, as it builds its own defensive infrastructure?
To assess Russia’s relations with the West in the present day it is worth going back in time to examine a doctrine entitled, “Project Russia,” published during Putin’s early tenure as President of the Russian Federation. It provides perspective to judge the circumstances as we see them now in the context of what was proposed by his regime nearly two decades ago in the first volume of the work. This now five-volume compendium comprises the elements of Russia’s national ideology as defined by Putin’s regime and serves as the foundation for his conduct as Russia’s leader in the realm of global affairs.
The work, although published anonymously, was conceived within the Kremlin with the first volume released in 2005. It is openly disdainful of democracy as practiced in the U.S. and the West and advocates rather for autocratic rule by a singular leader chosen by the Russian political and social elite for his extraordinary worldview. It purports to acknowledge no difference among the several successively elected U.S. presidential administrations, whether Democratic or Republican, arguing that they exist to accomplish the same end. The work goes on to indicate that the real power in the U.S. is wielded by an elite class and the electoral process itself is treated as a sham as the average voter is incapable of making an intelligent choice and “cannot link the relationship between elections and their misfortunes into a single chain.” An anger toward the U.S. in particular is expressed for its attempts to exploit the Russian citizenry through its Western propaganda thus undermining the security of the state.
One thing becomes pointedly clear. Putin and his Kremlin hate the U.S. regardless of which administration is in charge. They have used whatever means available to threaten its societal cohesion, sow racial and cultural division, and create both uncertainty and distrust of its government. The Russian government is a malign entity that will continue its campaign to harm America. The goal established early on in Putin’s presidency has been to remove the U.S. from its place of leadership on the world stage, to lessen its economic influence through the creation of a competing international order that will undermine U.S. power globally. Just as Putin has not been a friend of the Biden administration, he will be no reliable friend of the Trump administration.
It is absurd to think that Putin can be negotiated away from his mission. He will remain true to his primary commitment of advancing Russia at the expense of his declared enemies, including Trump’s America. His methods defy international law and should not be tolerated but rather brought to an end without further discussion of negotiating with someone whose agenda remains hidden.
Leaving aside the moral imperative of confronting a criminal enterprise that is present-day Russia, there is more than sufficient reason to have it answer for its naked aggression. One must question why any civilized nation should tolerate a rogue state exerting military dominion over another without cause. Are threats of this magnitude to be accepted as matter of fact in a new world now composed of a number of authoritarian regimes capable of similar conduct? Or is there an argument to be made for defeating Russia now, repairing the harm that it has done, eliminating the threat of it destabilizing Europe and frankly the world and resuming a global order that provides security against imperialist designs – a consideration perhaps for the leader of the free world.
Copyright @Kost Elisevich, MD, PhD 2024. All rights reserved. Any illegal reproduction of this content will result in immediate legal action
One thought on “The Naysayer Pundits and the Future of Ukraine”