Kost Elisevich

A number of essays have appeared over the past year regarding the actions of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in fueling Vladimir Putin’s decision to invade Ukraine, a sovereign nation, in an attempt to overtake its government for the apparent purpose of preventing its assimilation within NATO. In essence, it was NATO’s gradual and willful encroachment upon Russia that was the crux of the matter. Putin’s stated goal, however, was to deNazify and demilitarize Ukraine because he saw it as a threat to Russia and all ethnic Russians in Ukraine. We have yet to see a lucid argument justifying the accusation and subsequent actions that doesn’t shame his regime and Russia before most of the world.

Ukraine was never a threat to Russia nor did it ever state that it would be. Almost three decades ago, it chose to give up its entire nuclear arsenal and associated weaponry in exchange for guarantees that its sovereignty would be protected as agreed upon in the Budapest Memorandum (1994) signed by Russia, the United States (U.S.) and United Kingdom. Likewise, there was no persecution by Ukraine’s government of ethnic Russians in eastern Ukraine nor was it unreasonable for Ukraine to require Ukrainian to be its official national language. There was never an attempt to eliminate the Russian language or culture from society, nor that of any other ethnicity. The latter was in marked contrast to the centuries-old attempt by Imperial Russia and, subsequently, Soviet Russia to undermine the Ukrainian language and culture through its process of Russification. Finally, the notion that Ukraine was overrun by Nazis and led by an extremist regime is belied by the fact that the popular vote in 2019 supported a centrist pro-European party. Right-wing extremist elements have never had any influence upon governmental affairs in the past three decades of Ukraine’s independence since the dissolution of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR).
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Otherwise, claims accusing NATO of conspiring to advance its influence over eastern Europe and threatening Russia’s borders fail to bring into account the considerable history of 20th century eastern Europe under a Russian hegemony. All such claims have looked to Russia as a victim in the matter but have somehow overlooked the desire of the several nations in Russia’s proximity seeking security guarantees against future repressive Russian regimes like that of Imperial Russia of the 19th century or Soviet Russia of the 20th century. The argument here is not that sovereign Russia be regarded as a victim of an expanding NATO but that numerous sovereign eastern European nations, including the Baltic states and now Finland, be worthy of the same consideration. Why are we inclined to defend Russia and seek its appeasement and deny other nations their just desire for security against a country that has sought to subjugate them? As a reminder, NATO maintains a principle of collective defense and crisis management for its members, to respond to outside aggression waged upon any of its members and to help deal with internal dangers. It is not there to wage war for any other reason. All that remains is for Russia to behave in a manner required by its several past agreements to respect the borders of other countries.

The much-overstated misinformation regarding promises given to Russia during the time of the dissolution and final demise of the USSR regarding further expansion of NATO within eastern Europe requires particular scrutiny. The matter has to do with a 1990 summit between President George H. W. Bush and Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev in which, among other concerns, the reunification of Germany was discussed. Gorbachev accepted the idea that a reunified Germany would become part of NATO as a choice it had made. This was in accordance with the principle set down by the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, signed in Helsinki in 1975, in which it was declared that nations were free to ally with others as they felt necessary. There was no discussion of further NATO expansion according to both Gorbachev and his foreign minister, Eduard Shevardnadze, as related by Robert Zoellick, the former undersecretary of state who was present at the table. What actually had been agreed upon involved an assurance that NATO would not arm eastern Germany and it did not. Likewise, when discussions were underway in 1996 for entry of former Warsaw Pact nations into NATO during the Clinton administration, Russia offered no objections.

The NATO-Russia Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security, signed in 1997, went on to create a roadmap for cooperation, reassuring Russia that NATO maintained a defensive posture that posed no direct military threat. At the 2002 Rome Summit of the NATO-Russia Council, Putin himself raised no concerns regarding NATO’s enlargement. Twenty years later, Finland with its 830-mile border alongside Russia joined NATO, and barely raised a response from Russia more than Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov mentioning, “Let’s see how their territory is used in practice in the North Atlantic alliance.” Clearly, Ukraine itself was the real tipping point for Putin and this goes more to what Zbigniew Brzezinski, former national security adviser during the Carter administration, declared in his book (“Strategic Vision: America and the Crisis of Global Power; 2012”), “It cannot be stressed enough that without Ukraine, Russia ceases to be an empire, but with Ukraine suborned and then subordinated, Russia automatically becomes an empire.”

It is Ukraine’s strategic value to Russia and Putin’s inclination to regard it as if it has remained a vassal state that has guided his agenda. There has been a consistent effort by Putin’s regime to exert influence over Ukraine by meddling in its political and governmental affairs to a point where it brought about the 2013-2014 Maidan Revolution. The latter resulted when Ukraine’s pro-Russian president, Victor Yanukovych, betrayed his electoral platform in which his intentions were to proceed with an association agreement to join the European Union (EU). Instead, he sided with Putin’s offer of a bailout of Ukraine’s government debt and a price reduction for Russian gas, counter to the wishes of the vast majority of Ukrainians. The Yanukovych government by that time had already become recognized as a repressive regime with accusations of corruption and clear expressions of pro-Russian sentiment. In particular, Yanukovych’s denial of the Holodomor, the 1932-1933 famine, a genocidal act brought about by Stalin in an effort to eliminate Ukrainian landowners who formed a large part of anti-Soviet opposition at the time, was an affront to the populace which would also not be forgiven.

The Maidan, as the revolution was called, had nothing to do with NATO. Moreover, neither the EU nor the U.S. had any part in orchestrating or funding the event that toppled the Yanukovych government and sent the president scurrying off to Russia for safe haven. Yet Russia tried to lay blame particularly upon the U.S. government by distorting news of funding for the mass protest, claiming that $5 billion had been provided for the purpose, and accusing then Assistant Secretary of State Victoria Nuland, of manipulating the events that were unfolding. The above-stated accrued U.S. investment in Ukraine had, in fact, been made dating back to 1991 when Ukraine first gained its independence. The funds were meant to assist Ukraine in achieving stable and secure democratic governance, and in promoting civic participation. There was no relation to the events leading up to the Maidan nor its execution.

Ukraine, on its own, was making its move toward the EU and the West, and this was sufficient for Putin to understand that despite the fact that Ukraine, as a sovereign nation, had a right to self-determination, it was simply too much for a Russian demagogue and imperialist to accept, particularly one whose notions of imperial Russia remained paramount. For him, this would justify his 2014 incursion into Crimea to preserve Russia’s strategic military presence and, soon after, intrusions within eastern Ukraine where a separatist movement was fueled and supported by Russian paramilitary forces. What would follow now involved a disingenuous attempt of settling disputes in eastern Ukraine with the Minsk Accords and Putin’s shameful rewriting of Ukrainian history as a footnote of that of a greater Russia. The consequential promotion of the idea that the two peoples were really one would never align with Ukrainian national sentiment as it would likewise not do so historically. Regarding the latter, the actions taken by Putin in this inhumane war with its indiscriminate bombing of civilian infrastructure seem rather counter to his expressed sentiment.

An impression has also been given that Putin in the early years of his presidency was inclined toward the West, perhaps even towards its democratic ideals, and that NATO, by its persistence in acquiring nations within its fold, forced him to behave otherwise. To disabuse anyone of this notion, a cursory review of those years would argue a different perspective on the character and intentions of this former officer of the Committee for State Security (KGB). Putin ascended in Boris Yeltsin’s government in the 1990s to become director of the Federal Security Service (FSB), which had replaced the older KGB of the USSR. He would become prime minister during the later years of Yeltsin’s rule as president when both the latter’s health and political stature floundered. For Putin, a relative unknown in Russia, the realization of his ascendency created a need for greater recognition of his talents in order to gain favor among the people and retain the presidency subsequently. An opportunity presented itself in the midst of the expected transition that would allow him to do that.

A recurrent issue of Chechen insurgency within the Russian Federation troubled the Caucasus region and, in 1999, when Islamic rebels from the republic crossed into the neighboring Dagestan region to support a separatist movement and threaten Russia’s control, some action would be needed. A series of bombings subsequently took place, the most notable of which, involved two apartment buildings in the vicinity of Moscow, killing more than 230 people in all. Two other bombings took place in more remote towns, killing a further 81 people. An estimated 1,000 people altogether had also been injured in these incidences. Soon after, Putin, who at the time was the FSB director and had recently been elevated to the post of prime minister, cast blame upon the Chechens and vowed revenge in a statement that caught the attention of the populace for its language. A massive air campaign was mounted in the North Caucasus. The assault on Chechnya’s capital, Grozny, was particularly noted for its brutality and the loss of upwards of 8,000 civilians. The unrest in Dagestan and Chechnya would be ultimately subdued and a puppet regime brought into place to assure continued stability in the region.

A fifth apartment bombing in Ryazan to the southeast of Moscow at the time of the previous bombings was to have taken place but didn’t. Suspicious activity in the area at the time alerted the local police who discovered explosives within a basement apartment and arrested three operatives who were discovered to be FSB agents. The explosive material was identified as the same used in the previous four apartment bombings. The episode was reported in the media and suspicion arose as to the relevance of the findings in relation to the previous events. By then, Putin had retained the presidency in the March 2000 Russian election, having gained the acknowledgement for intervening in the Chechen rebellion. A governmental commission had been established to investigate the matter but, by 2002, with the Chechen rebellion well-contained and a rising economic outlook underway, Russian indifference settled in. Attempts to bring the matter forward were suppressed. This was despite some well-publicized murders that included the poisoning by polonium-210 of former KGB officer, Alexandr Litvinenko in London and the journalist, Anna Politkovskaya who was found shot in an elevator. Both were engaged in uncovering the truth of Putin’s complicity in the events involving the bombings. Although strong prima facie evidence implicates Putin’s involvement in the entire affair, a final verdict has yet to be executed to conclude the matter.

These events serve as a reminder of the nature of a dictator who strives to justify, through a process of obfuscation and disinformation, actions carried out by his agents from a time that he began to assume power. In the end, the arguments that NATO and the U.S. are at fault for the war we are witnessing currently are meant to promote the idea that Russia somehow is the victim of efforts by NATO to neutralize it and have no substance.

In committing to the largest military campaign in Europe since World War II and, in the process, incurring massive casualties, exposing his own nation to economic uncertainty, and perpetrating numerous atrocities which cannot be overlooked, Putin has little option but to carry on his war until he comes to a point where he can save face before his people and retain power. Were it not for the recent events revealing the disarray within his own military, the latter scenario may have been anticipated. Putin was never someone who had any other aspirations for himself or for Russia than to carry out an agenda that had little to do in concert with the West. He has remained the same individual over his career as a KGB officer through his time as president.

What is to happen then regarding the outcome of this war? A Russian victory will bring with it the promise of ongoing instability in the region. It will accelerate further defensive preparations by nations along Russia’s entire western border while it strengthens its eastern ties with China. It will encourage similarly minded authoritarians in the neighborhood to behave accordingly and convince others to be less inclined to promote democratic values. It may alter the dynamic of southern and central Asian relations in concert with Russia and away from the West. Russia will build on its renewed status and continue as an entity to be chased around the globe as it seeks to undermine governments of vulnerable nations and advantage itself with their natural resources.

A conclusion must be drawn by the West on the conduct of the remainder of this war that nullifies Russian belligerence and military adventurism and restores Ukraine’s territory fully in order that it may determine what its future is to be. NATO has engaged in this effort entirely to defend the interests of its member states in eastern Europe, recognizing the real threat that exists in the region and not the manufactured one identified by Russian propagandists and perpetuated by “useful idiots” in the media, politicians seeking relevance as faux pundits, corporate types with self-interest in mind, and even some academics among us.

Copyright @Kost Elisevich, MD, PhD 2023. All rights reserved. Any illegal reproduction of this content will result in immediate legal action.