Alexander Lukashenko, dictator of Belarus and seemingly proud of it, came to power as its first president in 1994 following dissolution of the Soviet Union three years earlier. A true acolyte of the old Soviet regime, he retained state ownership of major industries and acquired the power to dismiss parliament, gradually consolidating his very centralized authority by 1996. The Russian language was given equivalent status to that of Belarusian and previously established economic ties with Russia were strengthened as the two countries formed a Commonwealth in 1996. The latter evolved into the Union State of Russia and Belarus with the signing of a treaty in 1999. This Union State formalized integration of their economies to which were also added both their intelligence agencies and defense. Clearly the much weaker of the two, Belarus would gain both financial and military security in the arrangement. The process was not a smooth one for Lukashenko, however.
Concern had already arisen by 1996 that Lukashenko’s eagerness for closer ties with Russia would lead to ultimate annexation by Russia. Protests broke out and came to be known as the Belarusian Spring but these did not go far enough to persuade the new regime at the time. Lukashenko’s authoritarianism fueled further discontent when opposition leaders began disappearing and known activists were imprisoned in 1999. The former, Viktar Hanchar, Anatol Krasouski and Yury Zacharanka, were later murdered by a special unit of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. A Freedom March was organized to take place in Minsk, the capital, and occurred that year in October leading to a violent confrontation with riot police and OMON (‘Special Police Task Force’). Arrests made were subsequently condemned by Amnesty International. The event did achieve some delay in the actual implementation of the Union State but its formal status held.
The Belarusian Human Rights Center (‘Viasna’) was accused by Lukashenko’s regime of ‘observing’ the presidential election in 2001 and was, hence, formally terminated in 2003. Its founder, Ales Bialiatski, was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 2022 in recognition of his work as a pro-democratic activist and his stand for human rights. He remains a prisoner of conscience.
A national referendum in 2004 allowed Lukashenko to seek unlimited terms as president with a favorable 88.9% of ‘valid votes.’ He, of course, carried the day in the subsequent election which followed almost exclusive state media self-promotion, government harassment of opponents and accusations of ballot stuffing. In 2005, Lukashenko went on to secure for Belarus a further distinction by Condoleezza Rice, then United States Secretary of State, as an ‘outpost of tyranny’ in company with equally noteworthy authoritarian regimes, North Korea, Myanmar, Zimbabwe, Iran and Cuba. To consolidate his hold on this rare honorific, he continued with his penchant for human rights violations including the persistent persecution of Viasna members and volunteers. Lukashenko, in the meantime, also continued as president with a successful string of reelections in 2010, 2015 and 2020, each marked prominently with the standard opprobrium.
The regime’s indifference during the coronavirus pandemic, which began in earnest in 2020, and distrust of electoral commissions fueled opposition that challenged Lukashenko’s grip upon the system in favor of Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya in the election of that year. She had taken the place of her husband, Sergei, when he was first barred from running and then imprisoned. Protests in more than 30 cities were brutally repressed as security forces, the siloviki, established themselves as indispensable in their handling of the situation for an increasingly vulnerable regime. Lukashenko, consequently, has not been recognized by the European Union (E.U.) or the United States (U.S.) as a legitimate president and remains a pariah in the view of the West. Nongovernmental agencies were targeted as subversive throughout Lukashenko’s regime and, in 2021, the state liquidated more than 270 of these, including any remaining human rights groups as well as 13 news media outlets.
For the past 25 years, Belarus has been excluded from the Council of Europe for its anti-democratic activities and continued violation of election norms by its political leaders. Several government officials have been personally sanctioned by both the U.S. and the E.U. for a variety of offenses related to election fraud, political repression, and overt criminal acts. Sanctions have continued to expand, as they have over the past year, the most recent announced by the head of the European Commission, Ursula van der Leyen, for support of Russia in its war against Ukraine. Amidst protracted economic stagnation, public distrust and disappearance of relations with the West, Belarus has been put in a position in which it can no longer sustain itself without Russia’s support and, with that support, it will begin relinquishing its capacity for self-rule.
Popular sentiment for commitment of Belarusian troops to the Ukraine conflict is reported to be very low and that includes Lukashenko’s own pro-Russian supporters. Support among the troops themselves may even be questioned and, hence, morale may plague the Belarusian military as it has the Russian side. This has put Lukashenko in a difficult position regarding his relations with Putin and his statements in support of ending the war. A recent photograph showing the two together at a meeting of the Supreme Eurasian Economic Council in December 2022 has Lukashenko seemingly checking to see whether he has any remaining emperor’s clothing left upon him.
A recent meeting of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), the military alliance of six prior Soviet states – Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, and Tajikistan – raised suspicions that a possible accession of Belarus into Russia may yet occur, creating an autonomous state in a new Russia. Given the degree of Lukashenko’s lack of popularity in Belarus, some speculation surfaced that Russia’s military foreign intelligence service (GRU) has considered replacing him with the CSTO General Secretary, Stanislav Zas, a Russian loyalist. Zas would, in turn, justify the accession by accusing Ukraine and Poland of presenting a military threat to Belarus. A further attempt to include the CSTO in its entirety in this venture against Ukraine might then follow. Such an action would align with Russia’s grievance, as voiced by its state media, that it is the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) that Russia, in reality, is fighting in Ukraine and so would now pit the CSTO as a counter-alliance. It is unlikely that the member nations would look upon this enthusiastically.
There is a changing attitude of not only some of the CSTO member states toward Russia but of Azerbaijan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, all seeking complete independence from Putin’s regime. Armenia has looked elsewhere for support because of Russia’s indifference regarding its prolonged conflict with Azerbaijan. Kazakhstan has become more aligned with China and Turkey with concerns that Russia has had territorial intentions in its northern region. The others have witnessed the 2008 conflict with Russia in Georgia, the same with Ukraine involving Crimea in 2014 and now with the current conflict begun in 2022 and would prefer to distance themselves.
Belarusian sentiment toward Russia itself also began to decline given the events of 2020. A November 2020 poll by the Belarusian Analytical Workshop reported 40% favored retaining union with Russia, compared with 52% two months earlier. The same time period saw a rise of those supporting closer ties with the E.U. from 27% to 33%. Putin’s support for Lukashenko was felt to be the cause. A third of Belarusians also felt that relations with Russia would worsen and 43% identified Russia as representing a primary threat to their sovereignty.
A growing interest has emerged regarding the imprint of history upon the national sentiment. The territory of Belarus prior to its accession within the Russian Empire in 1796 had been part of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania and the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth which also had included much of the territory of Ukraine. More Belarusians feel a greater affinity toward the Grand Duchy of Lithuania or the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth than the Russian Empire or its successor, the Soviet Union. The former two combined amounted to 46% of respondents compared to 28% for the latter. Moreover, a small but notable 16.2% declared for the Belarusian People’s Republic, a short-lived independent and anti-communist state (1918-19) before it was subsumed within the Soviet Union. In total, 62.2% of Belarusians draw their historical identity from an entity other than Russia.
Putin’s recent visit with Lukashenko in Minsk along with deployment of Russian troops, supplies and armor into Belarus have many speculating he will pressure his Union ally into launching operations with Belarusian forces. The country has acted as a staging ground in previous Russian operations, otherwise. It is unclear, at best, if there will be an attempt to re-enact the miliary debacle seen at the beginning of the war last February but this does not dispel the notion that some sort of diversionary tactic may be underway in the north. In the event, should it include direct Belarusian troop participation, domestic reaction in the form of protest and sabotage, may be the consequence. It is likely not to end well for Lukashenko.
Copyright @Kost Elisevich, MD, PhD, 2023. All rights reserved. Any illegal reproduction of this content will result in immediate legal action.
